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IN THE SUPREME • 301 IRT 
OF THE STATE OF I JTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
P l a i n t i f f s ai: id Respoi idei it, 
vs , 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation. 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case l\o. dowuj4 
Category 14(b; 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
.r :sa: : jf 
ore:-::, c. figments 
f 5a .t : dKe ^un4", . 
. . -^ A . \z:?. .;.:ur: cursuant: to Utah Code 
-; . in. i: .-i± is taken from various 
*v fhfi .;.,::; . idicial District Court 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1 D- : • tl le excessi ve fines prohii::: ~: 
federal c o n s t i tut ions a pp1y t o c i v i 1 act i ons ? 
Was the $4 0 mi 1 lion award of punitive damages 
in inn must ;|( • sxcessi ^e*< ' 
3, Do state and federal ive process guarantees require 
the implementation of additional substantive and procedural 
protections in punitive damages cases? 
4. Did the trial court commit error in finding that the 
Crookstons1 claims were not barred under a contractually imposed 
statute of limitation? 
5. Were the damages awarded given under the influence of 
passion and prejudice? 
6. Did the trial court commit reversible error in giving 
fundamentally flawed jury instructions? 
7. Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing 
to instruct the jury on the principle of comparative fault? 
8. Did the evidence at trial support a verdict against 
Fire Insurance for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress? 
9. Did the trial court commit error in awarding $175,000 
in attorneys1 fees to the Crookstons? 
10. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
commenting on the evidence? 
11. Did the trial court commit reversible error in hearing 
and granting Rocky Mountain State Bankfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment without affording Fire Insurance at least a 10-day period 
prior to the hearing on the motion? 
12. Did the trial court commit reversible error in hearing 
and granting Rocky Mountain State Bankfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment less than 30 days before the date set for trial? 
13. Did the trial court violate Fire Insurances right to 
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due process in hear nig and jranting } :• ^2 Mountain 5: a*-- 3an.< ' s 
M .it I > iii t .-I • H i H U T i a r
 l|( I i j q n • :.* ? 
14, Did the trial court err in finding that Fire insurance 
had no right or claim of contribution against Rocky Mountain State 
Hank 1 
15. Do state and federal due (itxxeso ijijdi dute^ , HIJI, i 
this court to consider what effect the timing of the granting of 
summary judgment in favor of Porky Mountain State Bank had on the 
presentation uf the evidem.p in I IIH instant case? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The Eighth Amendment and :r >urteenth Amendment * 
unit-= • • ' ' ie 
Utah Const :\„\: •; r a * :^  \ >- -
 t, 95 < \ ~ . '9 
(repealed 1986) a- i *'- . ; - repealed 1986) <*§"'?-2" - ' -
II;)' U p ' ; - < ? - * - • < 
Procedu:^ d.^  ru,^ , i : .e :*u.es i i.M:e * - . d 
Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This artion arises from the collapse of -in *nt li - f ^-M f-d 
home located Morth Salt Lake, Utah The home was owned Ly the 
plaintiffs - -y Crookston and Rami i L, Crookston (hereinafter 
Croo<s* •- 11Jnv I 'i 'N I 11 " r n n k s t" JIni p u i i"hase< 1 i 1111 I I 11 i 11n 
Jot Located a* ^ * Orchard I . r ive In North S a l t Lake, Utah il* a t 
2000) 'r-ookstons wai ted to c o n s t r u c t t h e i r home on the lo t u n t i l 
they lie lui I M! i iiiij yllfini iH <l ? n n i i I ' rooks tons 
e v e n t u a l , / d e c i d e c tu b u i l d an e n e r g y - e f f i c i e n t " e a r t h home 
In December, 1980, the Crookstons entered into 
negotiations with Rocky Mountain State Bank (hereinafter "bank") 
concerning a construction loan in the sum of $60,000 for the 
purpose of constructing the home. (R. at 3) On or about December 
11, 1980, the bank agreed to make such a loan on the basis that the 
loan would be due on September 11, 1981, (R. at 12) In connection 
therewith, the Crookstons executed a promissory note and delivered 
a trust deed to the subject property as security for the loan. (R. 
at 3) 
Pursuant to the requirements of the bank, relating to the 
construction loan, the Crookstons contacted defendant-appellant 
Fire Insurance Exchange (hereinafter "Fire Insurance") to obtain 
insurance coverage on the construction project. (R. at 4) On 
December 4, 1980, the Crookstons purchased a policy of insurance 
from Fire Insurance Exchange. The policy issued, No. F60760092, 
had a policy limit of $67,000. (R. at 4, 17-28, 1917) The bank 
was listed on the policy as the loss payee in the event of an 
insured loss. (R. at 21) 
Construction on the residence took much longer than 
expected. Substantial amounts of work remained to be done on the 
structure at the time the original construction loan matured in 
September, 1981. (R. at 4, 1749, 2010, 2181) The bank refused to 
extend the loan period on the construction loan until the 
Crookstons deposited $12,000 with the bank. (R. at 2397) When the 
Crookstons delivered $12,000 to the bank, a 90-day extension on the 
loan was granted. The extension was to expire in mid-December, 
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"• . ) 
December « ;^Q1 the earth home collapsed while dir4 
*a? ceir.c r.iacec ~n top . : ~.e structure by a subcontractor. R, 
;<--*: * — ^  « ;: - -si irai ice t! i,c o\ igt: 1 thej i: :l • ..: v. . -
agent or" *-:te r --e - „z>^azse \ at 24C-L. Fire Insurance 
assignee ;;ne *- ;ts adluster- 4: handle trie claim, (R at 1 970) 
"-..*- tu trie unique nature ui tne damaged home, Fire Insurance and 
t:\er interested parties, i ncl udi ng the bank, had difficulty 
r m d i n a * :;t:a;t;:s \Ai_iinq ~ : qive reoa: • estimates ;- tne /;ss 
\rempt paymen^ cf *.:€ claim, •-. -c -/^  :*-e 4 vire Insurance's 
difficu"- ad]us f :•!; •-*• -*?? a^d --e ! -> *- .- -sistent demands, 
- - - . - -.*.,-----'- I i. 
Ralph Klemn \ .. -issert claims against the oan< i ^ "~• r - 'is^rance. 
F a^ "r-*^-^.') The home remained '~s damaged state for several 
\J: le par t:l es e ,rer * -: : e 
adjustment of the loss. (R. at 5) 
On the afternoon of June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton of Fire 
.-•".' cv - ••*?-' A- i -•.:- ^ se: tative oi the bank about the loss. At 
that meeting, the f.s- * agreec to settle its claim in consideration 
r
-r-- a draft slightly -r excess o~ '?!2 t'" payable soie.\ :.: trie 
bank. (R at 2 0 3 7 2:0 4 0 41) 
i t Li: le t:li i i ne of t! le set I.. J eniwn I between l*' i i e I n re am J 
the bank, the bank had approximately $42 000 available 
undisbursed funds in the Crookstons' loan account. This money was 
conceivably available to the Crookstons to rebuild their home. (R. 
at 7, 2070) Despite the Crookstons' desire to rebuild the home, 
the bank expressed great reluctance about refinancing another 
"earth home." (R. at 1682) Due to the bank's attitude and refusal 
to allow use of the funds, the Crookstons were unable to rebuild 
their home. 
When they learned of the settlement between Fire Insurance 
and the bank, the Crookstons consulted with their attorney to 
discuss what alternatives existed. The Crookstons considered 
filing suit against Fire Insurance, but opted to file personal 
bankruptcy. (R. at 7-8, 1707-09) When the bank received notice 
that the Crookstons had filed for bankruptcy, the bank took steps 
to foreclose on the property. (R. at 2070-74) Crookstons 
subsequently quit claimed their property to the bank in lieu of 
foreclosure. (R. at 1714) 
Crookstons1 attorney, H. Ralph Klemm, did not read the 
subject insurance policy until after June 16, 1982, more than seven 
months after the collapse of the home. (R. at 17 39) Counsel never 
advised his clients of their rights under the policy, since he felt 
that Fire Insurance had closed its claims file on the loss. (R. at 
1790-94, 2437) 
On or about February 10, 198 3, the Crookstons filed suit 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County against 
Fire Insurance and the bank. Crookstons alleged that the actions 
of the defendants caused them emotional distress and financial 
ruin. Crookstons claimed that Fire Insurance and the bank, 
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individually and in concert, had acted in bad faith. (R. at 9-10) 
Fire Insurance cross-claimed against the bank, claiming a 
right to contribution and indemnity. (R. at 64-67, 917-22) The 
bank cross-claimed against Fire Insurance also claiming a right to 
contribution. (R. at 139-41, 1075-79) 
On or about January 20, 1987, the Crookstons amended their 
Complaint for a second time against Fire Insurance and the bank. 
Crookstons1 Second Amended Complaint alleged numerous causes of 
action against both defendants, including allegations of fraud and 
misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
(R. at 1000-18) 
Prior to trial, Fire Insurance moved for summary judgment 
on the basis that the Crookstons' claims were barred by a 
contractual statute of limitation. Fire Insurance also moved to 
bifurcate the proceedings. Those motions were denied. (R. at 
513-29, 537, 923-25, 1428-32) 
On March 17, 1987, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
ordered that the trial date of May 26, 1987, which had been 
originally set by the Honorable David B. Dee, would remain in 
effect- (R. at 1063-65) 
On Friday, May 22, 1987, counsel for the bank advised the 
trial court by letter of the settlement reached between the 
Crookstons plaintiffs and the bank. (R. at 1241-42) Counsel for 
the bank also advised the court that in light of the settlement, 
the bank had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment "directed to the 
cross-claim of Fire Insurance Exchange against Rocky Mountain State 
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Bank seeking contribution and indemnity." (R. at 1241) The letter 
to the court and the bank's Motion for Summary Judgment were not 
filed until May 26, 1987. (R. at 1241-42, 1250-52) 
On the afternoon of Friday, May 22, 1987, counsel for the 
bank advised counsel for Fire insurance by telephone of the bank's 
intention to file the Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 1242) 
The motion and supporting memorandum were not personally served 
upon counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange until approximately 9:00 
p.m. on Friday, May 22, 1987. (R. at 3003) Counsel for the bank 
advised the court and other counsel by letter of their intention to 
have the Motion for Summary Judgment heard on the next business 
day, Tuesday, May 26, 1987, the same day that trial was set to 
begin. (R. at 1242) Monday, May 25, 1987 was Memorial Day, a 
court holiday. No formal Notice of Hearing was ever filed in 
conjunction with the bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On Tuesday, May 26, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., 
approximately one hour prior to the commencement of trial, the 
trial court heard argument on the bank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. at 1257, 2995-3013) Fire Insurance objected to the 
lack of adequate notice of the hearing and the untimeliness of the 
motion. (R. at 1538-40, 2998-99) At the hearing, the Crookstons 
indicated that at trial they now intended to pursue only claims for 
breach of contract and intentional tort against Fire Insurance. 
(R. at 1249, 2996, 2998) Crookstons' counsel expressly stated that 
they would not proceed at trial on any claim of negligence against 
Fire Insurance Exchange. (Id.) 
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The bank's motion was premised on the theory that no right 
of contribution arises in favor of an intentional tortfeasor, such 
as Fire Insurance Exchange. (R. at 1243-48, 2995-3013) Following 
brief argument, the court granted the bank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. at 1257, 1538-40) Fire Insurance then moved for a 
continuance to permit it to file a Third-Party Complaint against 
the bank. (R. at 3008) The trial court refused to grant the 
requested continuance. (R. at 1257) 
The matter went to trial in the absenct of the bank. 
Following a six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in excess of 
$4.8 million against defendant Fire Insurance on claims of fraud 
and misreptesentation, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. (R. at 1543-46) Fire Insurance filed 
post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new 
trial or remittitur. The motions were denied. (R. at 2959-62) At 
a later date, the trial court awarded the Crookstons $175,000 in 
attorneys1 fees. (R. 2964-67, 2972-73) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The excessive fines clauses of both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions apply to punitive damage awards in civil cases. 
Even assuming that those clauses do not directly apply, due 
process of law requires their application in civil proceedings. 
The $4.0 million award of punitive damages in the instant case is 
unconstitutionally excessive. The total damages awarded, in 
excess of $4.8 million, evidences the influence of juror passion 
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and prejudice. 
The federal and state due process clauses require 
additional substantive and procedural protections, beyond those 
normally accorded civil defendants, to be implemented in punitive 
damage cases. 
Crookstons' claims were time barred under a contractual 
statute of limitation due to their failure to file suit within one 
year of the collapse or loss of their home. 
The jury was not properly instructed in several critical 
regards. Fire Insurance's failure to except to the court's error 
is not a bar since the jury instructions were fundamentally 
flawed. 
The evidence at trial was insufficient to support the 
verdict against Fire Insurance for fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The trial court further 
committed error in commenting on the testimony of the Crookstons' 
expert witness. 
The trial court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to the 
Crookstons since such an award was not provided for under contract 
or statute. The court abused its discretion in awarding $175,000 
in attorneys' fees to the Crookstons. 
The timing and notice requirements imposed both by Rule 
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4(d) of the 
Rules of Practice of the Third Judicial District Court are intended 
to permit a non-moving party an adequate and meaningful opportunity 
to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The bank's motion 
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for summary judgment was served on Fire Insurance's counsel less 
than one full business day prior to the hearing on the motion. 
Hearing on the matter was held just one hour before trial of the 
case. Fire Insurance objected to the ill-timed motion for summary 
judgment and requested additional time to respond. The trial 
court's failure to adhere to the hearing and notice requirements 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the local Rules of 
Practice before granting the motion resulted in prejudice to Fire 
Insurance and denied said defendant its right to due process under 
the law. 
The trial court committed reversible error in finding that 
there was no right of contribution between Fire Insurance and the 
bank. The court erred in finding that there is no right to 
contribution among intentional tortfeasors. The Utah 
Legislature's enactment of §§78-27-39 and 78-27-40(3) (repealed 
1986), patterned after the 1939 version of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, clearly provides for 
contribution among all tortfeasors, including intentional 
tortfeasors. 
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(1985) . 
2. Ingraham v. Wright is Not Controlling. 
While Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), suggests 
in dicta that the Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal 
actions, Ingraham simply holds that the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause is inopposite in a civil suit. The excessive fines 
clause of the Eighth Amendment clearly was not at issue in 
Ingraham. 
The Ingraham Court's dicta that the Eighth Amendment may 
apply only to criminal proceedings is based upon the false assump-
tion that the scope of each of the amendment's three guarantees is 
and was intended to be identical. The Court's misconception of the 
scope and origin of the Eighth Amendment guarantees has been 
soundly criticized. See, Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and 
Punitive Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 Vand. L.Rev. 
1234-35 (1987). 
Careful reading of Ingraham reveals that the court did 
not state categorically that the various provisions of the Eighth 
Amendment could have no application outside the criminal context. 
In fact, Ingraham explicitly contemplates that some punishment 
might be treated as criminal even though not so labelled. 
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669, n. 37. 
While bail, fines, and punishments are more traditionally 
associated with the criminal process, the United States Supreme 
Court previously assumed that the Eighth Amendment excessive bail 
clause applied to civil cases. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 
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524, 544-46 (1952). Before Ingraham, several courts either 
recognized or implied that the excessive fines clause applied to 
civil sanctions, including punitive damages. See Toepleman v. 
United States, 263 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 359 
U.S. 989 (1959); Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688-89 (Neb. 
1960); and Keller v. Keller, 52 Wash.2d 84, 323 P.2d 231, 235 
(1958) . 
3. Constitutional Guarantees Should Not Be 
Determined by "Labels". 
The application of federal and state prohibitions against 
excessive fines must turn on a functional analysis rather than on 
artificial labels. The United States Supreme Court in Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958), stated, "How simple would be the 
tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if 
specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels 
pasted on them!" 
The Eighth Amendment, properly viewed, "functions as a 
restraint on the broader system of punishment rather than simply 
the process through which criminals are prosecuted." Note, The 
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1699, 1702-03 
(1987). A fine that is prohibitively excessive in a criminal set-
ting is no less excessive if rendered in a civil setting. In fact, 
monetary penalties imposed in a criminal prosecution are 
functionally equivalent to punitive damages awarded in a civil 
suit. Punishment clearly does not become necessarily less harmful 
or less coercive simply because it is labelled "civil" rather than 
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"criminal". 
The procedural safeguards in the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution necessarily reflect the 
view that particular safeguards must be maintained to ensure a 
proper balance between the government's power and the individual's 
freedom from undue interference with his life, liberty, and 
property. The constitutional guarantee of due process protects 
that relationship and provides flexibility for courts to maintain 
the necessary balance in the face of changed circumstances. 
The interpretation of the federal and state due process 
guarantees can and must be guided by the more specific 
constitutional safeguards, since the latter provide a bench mark 
against which other situations can be measured. The framers of 
the federal and state constitutions could not have intended to 
permit the government to circumvent the specific safeguards, 
including that against excessive fines, merely by labelling a 
proceeding "civil." Allowing the government unlimited power to 
punish a citizen in the same manner, and for the same purpose as 
in a criminal prosecution under the label of a "civil" proceeding 
is clearly inconsistent with due process of law. If specific 
constitutional safeguards were to be applied only to explicitly 
criminal proceedings, and if due process were permitted to be 
circumvented by the use of a label, the specific safeguards found 
in the United States and Utah Constitutions would become 
meaningless. 
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4. Punitive Damages Are Functionally Equivalent to 
Criminal Fines. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
certain punishments must be treated as criminal for purposes of 
the Eighth Amendment, even though they are not explicitly labelled 
as such. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669, n. 37. As a result, the 
Eighth Amendment is a flexible concept: 
[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are 
not precise, and . . . their scope is not 
static. The Amendment must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society. 
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01. 
Punitive damages, such as those imposed against Fire 
Insurance Exchange, are the functional equivalents to criminal 
fines. Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 Va. L. Rev. 139, 148 (1986). In their criminal law 
treatise, LaFave and Scott write, "Paying damages (especially 
"punitive damages") for torts or contract breaches is not much 
different from paying fines for criminal violations." 1 W. LaFave 
and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, §1.3(a) at 16 (1986) 
(footnote omitted). Likewise, Prosser and Keeton recognize 
punitive damages as a "rather anomalous" invasion of criminal law 
into "the field of torts." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton and D. 
Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, §2 at 9 (5th Ed. 1984). 
Numerous courts and commentators label punitive damages 
as "quasi criminal" sanctions, rather than damages. See Smith v. 
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886); Womack v. Gettelfinger, 
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808 F.2d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 1986); Seltzer, Punitive Damages in 
Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, 
Efficiency, and Control, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37, 43 (1983); and 
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework 
for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379, 414 (1976). 
A sanction which is penal in purpose or effect may be 
properly considered a criminal penalty. The distinction between 
civil and criminal penalties is constitutionally significant. 
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, reh'g. den., 448 U.S. 
916 (1980). When a state sanctions a defendant "for the purpose 
of punishment" rather than as a "incident of some other legitimate 
governmental purpose," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979), 
due process requires additional procedural protections and 
restrictions. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 
(1963). So long as a sanction is designed primarily to punish, 
the sanction may not be imposed without according the defendant 
procedural safeguards beyond those commonly available in civil 
cases. Id. at 248-51. 
Whether a sanction imposed by statute is criminal or 
civil is a matter of both legislative intent and statutory purpose 
or effect: 
Our inquiry . . . [into whether a penalty is 
civil or criminal] has traditionally 
proceeded on two levels. First, we have set 
out to determine whether Congress, in 
establishing the penalizing mechanism, 
indicated either expressly or impliedly a 
preference for one label or the other. 
Second, where Congress has indicated an 
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intention to establish a civil penalty, we 
have inquired further whether the statutory 
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate that intention. 
Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (emphasis added). 
Punitive damages are clearly penal in nature since they 
serve the traditional goals of punishment and deterrence. This 
Court in Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (1975), notes the 
following goals of punitive damages: 
They are: punishment of the defendant for 
particularly grievous injury caused by 
conduct which is not only wrongful, but 
which is wilful and malicious so that it 
seems to one's sense of justice that mere 
recompense for actual loss is inadequate and 
that the plaintiff should have added 
compensation; and that the defendant should 
suffer some additional penalty for that 
character of wrongful conduct; and also that 
such a verdict should serve as a wholesome 
warning to others not to engage in similar 
misdoings. 
See also, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. 
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1981) ("Punitive damages by definition are 
not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish 
the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, 
and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.") 
Similarly, the jury in the instant case was instructed 
that punitive damages could be assessed "as punishment to Fire 
Insurance Exchange . . . and as a wholesome warning to others 
. . . ." (R. at 1515) 
Since punitive damages mainly serve the criminal goals of 
retribution and deterence, rather than the traditional 
compensatory goals of the civil law, they serve as a surrogate for 
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criminal sanctions "by punishing misbehavior through the civil law 
that may go unpunished or underpunished in the criminal law." 
Note, supra, at 1703. 
Courts and commentators recognize the similarities between 
punitive damages and criminal fines. The Court in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974), stated that "[punitive 
damages] are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are pri-
vate fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct 
and to deter its future occurrence." Indeed, punitive damages 
"serve the same function as criminal penalties and are in effect 
private fines." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82 
(1971), (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Even if the penal purpose of punitive damages were not so 
obvious, consideration of the doctrine reveals that punitive 
damages are so punitive in effect as to negate any intention that 
such damages are civil in nature. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martlnez 
establishes the test for determining when additional protections 
are due to defendants in nominally civil actions. The defendant 
in Kennedy was denaturalized under the National Act of 1940 for 
leaving and remaining outside of the United States to evade mili-
tary service. The Court invalidated the statute because it 
deprived the defendant of his citizenship as punishment without 
the safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The 
factors that historically have required additional procedural 
safeguards are: 
[1] Whether, the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint, [2] 
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whether it has historically been regarded as 
punishment, [3] whether it comes into play 
only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether 
its operation will promote the traditional 
aims of punishment — retribution and 
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime, [6] 
whether an alternative purpose to which it 
may rationally be connected is assignable 
for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive 
in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned . . . . 
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). 
While the factors are neither exhaustive nor conclusive, 
careful consideration and analysis of the seven factors listed in 
Kennedy demonstrate that punitive damages are penal in effect. 
See, Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 241, 248-314 (1985). 
5. Historical Support For Application to Punitive 
Damage Awards. 
There is also substantial historical support for applying 
the protections of the excessive fines clauses to punitive damage 
awards in civil actions. The scope of the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against excessive fines preserves at least the same 
rights and privileges enjoyed by the English and the Colonists 
during the colonial period. The United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly looked to the English antecedents of the Eighth 
Amendment to determine the substantive meaning of that Amendment. 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The Court, in summarizing the 
nature of this reliance, stated: 
Although the Framers may have intended the 
Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of 
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its English counterpart, their use of the 
language of the English Bill of Rights is 
convincing proof that they intended to 
provide at least the same protection — 
including the right to be free from 
excessive punishments. 
Id. at 286. 
In defining and asserting their rights as Englishmen, the 
Colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries turned 
primarily to two documents, the Magna Carta and the English Bill 
of Rights of 1689. The language of the Eighth Amendment is taken 
verbatim from the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which in 
turn was taken from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. IcL at 
285, n. 10. The framers of the Constitution understood that the 
English Bill of Rights was but one expression of their rights and 
liberties. The rights declared in that document were by and large 
re-enactments of rights previously recognized. H. Hazeltine, "The 
Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development," 
Magna Carta Commemoration Essays 182, 189-90 (H. Maiden Ed. 1917). 
The concept of proportional monetary punishments was well 
established in England. Examination of early English history 
demonstrates that Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights were 
intended, in part to eliminate the pernicious evil of 
disproportional monetary punishments. 
Under early Saxon law, there was no distinction drawn 
between crime and tort. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the 
Common Law, 422-23, 425-26 (5th Ed. 1956); 2 F. Pollock and F. 
Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward 
The First, 449-53 (2d Ed. 1898). Indeed, prior to the Norman 
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Conquest in 1066, most wrongs were punished by requiring the 
wrongdoer to pay compensatory damages, known as "wers" or "bots", 
to the person wronged. In addition, further payment, known as 
"wites," was imposed as a sum "due to the community, on the ground 
that every evil deed inflicts a wrong on society in general, as 
well as upon its victim." W. McKechnie, Magna Carta, 285 (2d Ed. 
1958). At first, the maximum size of wites was generally uniform, 
often established by local rules. Id. at 285. This early 
practice of imposing extra-compensatory damages for evils done to 
society as well as to the victim of the wrong, remains the bedrock 
of the punitive damage doctrine upon which the instant award of 
$4.0 million was imposed against Fire Insurance Exchange. 
Some time following the Norman Conquest, the relatively 
fixed and certain system of "wites" was superceded "by a system, 
or lack of a system, by which the convicted party was 'in the 
King's mercy.' . . . ." J. Jolliffe, The Constitutional History of 
Medieval England, 225 (3d Ed. 1954). This system of payments to 
the crown, known as amercements, placed the wrongdoer's life and 
property at the King's mercy, on the ground that "offenses against 
the established order were offenses also against the King." 
McKechnie, supra, at 80. 
During the post-Norman Conquest era, amercements were 
limited, at least in theory, only by the grace of the crown. Id. 
at 286. The crown utilized amercements as an important source of 
revenue. During the reign of John, amercements were seen 
principally as instruments of extortion. Id. at 22. The seemingly 
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unbridled power to impose excessive amercements was a point of 
major concern which led up to the drafting and presenting of Magna 
Carta to King John at Runnymede on June 15, 1215. Three chapters, 
Chapters 20, 21 and 22, of Magna Carta, as accepted by John, 
addressed the problem of excessive monetary amercements. The pri-
mary clause, Chapter 20, reads as follows: 
A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight 
offence, except in accordance with the 
degree of the offence; and for a grave 
offence he shall be amerced in accordance 
with the gravity of the offence, yet saving 
always his "contenement"; and a merchant in 
the same way, saving his "merchandise"; and 
a villein shall be amerced in the same way, 
saving his "wainage" — if they have fallen 
into our mercy: And none of the aforesaid 
amercement shall be imposed except by the 
oath of honest men of the neighourhood. 
Magna Carta, Chapter 20, as quoted in McKecknie, supra, at 284. 
Chapters 21 and 22 of Magna Carta apply the principles of Chapter 
20 to barons, earls, and the clergy. Id. at 295, 198. 
The amercement clauses in Magna Carta clearly required 
proportionality between the wrong committed and the amount of 
punishment exacted. The amercement clauses' protections were 
critical. One historian notes that the amercement clauses were 
considered vital to the protection of the mass of the people. F. 
Thompson, Magna Carta: Its Role in the Making of the English 
Constitution, 1300-1629, 44 (1948). 
The amercement clauses and the principle of proportion-
ality of punishment were applied by the English equally to civil 
and criminal wrongs alike. Thompson, supra, at 33. See, e.g., 55 
Selden Society 2, 3 (Cas. No. 2); 55 Selden Society 45 (Cas. No. 
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34); and 57 Selden Society 9, 11 (Cas. No. 5). 
Gradually over the next half millennium, the term 
"amercement" fell from common usage and was replaced by the word 
"fine." During the thirteenth century, "fine" was a sum 
voluntarily paid to the crown as essentially a bribe or other 
means of buying justice to escape punishment. McKechnie, supra, 
at 292-9 3. Thirteenth century amercements, in contrast, were sums 
involuntarily imposed as punishment. Over the course of four or 
five centuries, the "option" of buying justice was eliminated. 
The elimination of the voluntary aspect of "fines" was accompanied 
by the word "fine" taking on its more modern meaning and the 
general demise of the word "amercement". McKechnie, supra, at 
29 3. See generally, Massey, supra. 
In the early seventeenth century, during the era of 
Charles II, the Court of Star Chambers imposed heavy fines. In 
order to more fully protect themselves from the Stuart kings, the 
English drafted a Declaration of Rights. Article X of the 
Declaration of Rights addressed the problem of disproportionate 
monetary punishments. The original expression of the grievance 
was: 
The requiring excessive bail of persons 
committed in criminal cases, and imposing 
excessive fines and illegal punishments to 
be prevented. 
L. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689, at 300 (1981) 
(Emphasis added). The reference to criminal cases was eventually 
eliminated. By eliminating the limiting language, the drafters 
must have intended to make the grievance applicable to civil cases 
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as well as criminal cases. Such an intent would be consistent 
with the drafters1 desire to make their declarations as all 
encompassing as possible in order to frustrate any new and 
ingenius royal device of judicial oppression. In this regard, one 
commentator has stated: 
Article X explicitly addressed the issue of 
fines, while it implicitly reaffirmed 
ancient rights with respect to amercements. 
The DecJaration of Rights excessive fines 
clause thus should be read as simultaneously 
prohibiting excessive fines and amercements, 
whether imposed by judge or jury, in both 
civil and criminal proceedings. 
Massey, supra, at 1256. 
At the time when amercements were most prevalent in 
England, full and adequate compensatory damages, as they are 
currently known, did not exist. Pollock and Maitland, supra, at 
52 3. However, once compensatory damages were recognized as a 
legitimate recovery, English legislators began to inject penal 
functions into the law of damages. The first Statute of 
Westminster included provisions for double and treble damages,, 
However, the common law doctrine of punitive damages did not 
appear until the practice of amercements had fallen into disuse. 
"Exemplary damages" were not imposed until Huckle v. Money, 2 
Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, C.P. (1763). One commentator 
has stated that the decision in Huckle supports the belief that: 
Common law punitive damages emerged at a 
time when the amercement existed in form 
only and enjoyed no use in practice. If 
amercements were still a viable part of the 
common law in 1763, the amercement could 
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have been employed to punish [the 
wrongdoer]• 
Massy, supra, at 1267. 
The evolution of punitive damages and the attendant 
demise of amercements, suggest that the functions performed by 
amercements, being so ingrained in English legal tradition, were 
merely assumed by the later doctrine of punitive damages. The 
historical occurrences in England at the relevant time periods 
were marked by a restructuring of royal authority and private 
rights. The Glorious Revolution resulted in the crown's tool of 
amercements being restructured to fit into a common law system of 
punitive damages. 
As stated supra, the Eighth Amendment patterns its 
excessive fines language after the English Bill of Rights and 
Magna Carta. The framers' lifting of the pertinent language from 
the earlier English documents brought with it centuries of history 
which convincingly demonstrates the amendment's applicability to 
monetary fines imposed for punishment and deterrence. 
In theory and in practice the English concept of 
proportionality of punishment forbids excessive punishment of any 
kind. The magnitude of a fine is chiefly a function of amount, 
not its characterization as penal or civil. Early English history 
establishes that the issue of excessiveness is directly related to 
the arbitrariness of the penalty. The adoption of the Eighth 
Amendment was "intended to provide at least the same protection — 
including the right to be free from excessive punishments," that 
our English forebears enjoyed. Solem, 46 3 U.S. at 286. Only a 
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finding that the federal and state prohibitions against excessive 
fines applies to punitive damage awards in civil actions will 
result in those prohibitions being little more than hollow 
pronouncements. 
B. Even if the Prohibitions Against Excessive Fines are 
Not Directly Applicable to Civil Actions, Those 
Protections are Subsumed in the Guarantee of Due 
Process of Law. 
Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution 
of the State of Utah guarantee that life, liberty and property may 
not be taken without due process of law. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; 
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 7. 
The due process clauses of the United States Constitution 
have long been held to incorporate the fundamental liberties and 
protections secured by Magna Carta. See, Murray's Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855). 
Those fundamental liberties and protections included the protection 
against excessive monetary punishment. 
The basic constitutional requirement of due process of 
law is fundamental fairness. The content of federal and state due 
process guarantees is not limited to the specific provisions of 
either the Bill of Rights or the Utah Constitution. See, In Re 
Winshlp, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The protections of due process have 
been characterized as follows: 
Due process requires, in whatever context, 
that legal proceedings be consistent with 
"fundamental fairness"; that they be 
consonant with "ordinary notions of fair 
play and settled rules of laws"; that they 
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accord with "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice"; and they not 
offend "the community sense of fair play and 
decency." However phrased, the message is 
clear: Due process mandates at all times, 
in all circumstances, and for all defendants, 
"fundamental fairness" at the hands of the 
law. 
Jefferies, supra, at 152 (emphasis in original). 
The guarantee of due process is not a static concept. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that changes over time in 
society and in the application and impact of a legal doctrine may 
justify reconsideration of the doctrine. In Williams v. Winter, 
3039 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1970), the court invalidated a time-
honored practice in the criminal law system, by stating: 
[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor 
the fact of steadfast legislative and 
judicial adherence to it through the 
centuries insulates it from constitutional 
dLuacjc . . . . 
The need to be open to reassessment of 
ancient practices other than those 
explicitly mandated by the constitution is 
illustrated by the present case since the 
greatly increased use of fines as a criminal 
sanction has made nonpayment a major cause 
of incarceration in this country. 
Notwithstanding the fact that punitive damages have 
traditionally formed a part of the common law, changed 
circumstances and increased use of these sanctions require an 
openminded re-examination of the doctrine of punitive damages. 
Over time punitive damages have changed from a relatively rare 
remedy reserved for cases of only the most eggregious and 
outrageous behavior, to a common place part of virtually every 
prayer in every tort action and insurance bad faith case. The 
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recent explosion of punitive damage claims and awards has been 
fully documented. M. Petersen, S. Sarma, M. Shanley, Punitive 
Damages, Emperical Findings, (1987). The rapidly escalating 
number and size of punitive damage awards and the broadening scope 
of circumstances for the imposition of such fines clearly justify 
a serious and thorough reconsideration of the constitutional 
validity and public policy justifications of punitive damages. 
England undertook such a reconsideration and drastically limited 
the availability of punitive damages. See Rookes v. Barnard, A.C. 
1129; 1 All Eng. Rep. 367 (1964). 
Application of the constitutional protections against 
excessive punishments, as well as other constitutional substantive 
and procedural safeguards, are warranted today since the framers 
of our state and federal constitutions likely did not foresee the 
gravity of the problem created by the present use of punitive 
damage awards. It is unlikely that the framers contemplated the 
proliferation of civil actions intended predominantly to punish, 
nor foresaw the potential for private citizens to appoint 
themselves as private prosecutors with the power to impose on 
fellow citizens a monetary punishment solely to promote classically 
penal and governmental purposes of deterrence and retribution. 
These recent developments have also been accompanied by a geometric 
explosion and expansion of the ability of plaintiffs to recover 
full and adequate compensatory damages. Due process of law 
requires that this court impose additional substantive and 
procedural restrictions on the imposition of punitive damages. At 
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a minimum, federal and state due process protections should require 
that the constitutional prohibitions against excessive punishment 
be applied. 
POINT II, 
THE 4.0 MILLION DOLLAR AWARD OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE WAS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE. 
While there is no constitutional requirement that a 
penalty match precisely some sort of ideal standard, the seemingly 
unprecedented award of punitive damages in the instant case is 
clearly constitutionally excessive. In Solem v. Helm, the United 
States Supreme Court identified three objective criteria for 
assessing the proportionality of a criminal penalty. These 
criteria, while not uniformly applicable to the instant case, 
suggest analogous guidelines for the control of punitive damages 
in civil cases. In Solem, the court considered whether a sentence 
of life imprisonment imposed on a recidivist convicted of uttering 
a $100 check on a nonexistent account was constitutionally 
excessive. The court looked to three factors: 
(i) The gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences 
imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in 
other jurisdictions. 
Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. 
The gravity of Fire Insurance's conduct is uncertain. The 
legislature and the courts of the State of Utah have not set any 
limit on the size of punitive damage awards which may be imposed in 
bad faith cases. Due to the absence of legislatively imposed 
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guidelines, the relative harshness of the $4.0 million punitive 
award is difficult to assess. By any common-sense standard, 
however, a punitive fine of $4.0 million for the failure to pay 
approximately an additional $30,000 on an insurance claim is 
constitutionally excessive. 
The second line of inquiry established by Solem is more 
illuminating. The legislature has made criminal certain types of 
serious offenses by corporations against the public. Corporate 
misconduct under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-302 (1953) is punishable by 
a maximum fine of $10,000. The harshness and disproportionality 
of the punishment imposed in the instant case is clear: Fire 
Insurance Exchange's fine is 400 times larger than the maximum 
monetary criminal fine deemed appropriate by the Utah legislature 
to punish and deter corporations engaged in similar conduct. 
The third criteria suggested in Solem concerns sentences 
authorized for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Fire 
Insurance Exchange is unaware of any other statefs statute which 
permits an insurance company to be fined $4.0 million for having 
engaged in similar conduct. 
The appropriate, objective measure of the excessiveness 
of a punitive damage award imposed by a civil jury should be the 
relationship of a punitive damage award to the monetary punishment 
exacted by the legislature of that jurisdiction for the same or 
similar conduct. Without such guidelines, jurors in punitive 
damage cases will continue to operate without meaningful guidance 
or bounds established either legislatively or judicially. The 
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individual determination of such juries will continue to evidence 
the type of "subjective judgments" which the United States Supreme 
Court has "eschewed." McCleskey v. Kemp, U.S. , 95 
L.Ed.2d 262, 283 (1987) . 
POINT III. 
FEDERAL AND STATE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES 
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
ACTIONS. 
In Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the United 
States Supreme Court established an analytical framework for 
determining the level of due process protection required in a 
particular type of case. The court stated: 
[Identification of the specific dictates of 
due process generally requires consideration 
of three distinct factors: First, the 
private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interests 
through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards, and 
finally the government's interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
Id. at 335 (citation omitted). 
At a minimum, due process requires a more definite 
substantive standard for determining when punitive damages may be 
awarded, a more definite standard for determining the maximum 
amount of punitive damages which may be awarded, bifurcation of 
the issues of liability and punitive damages, and a higher burden 
of proof for awarding punitive damages. 
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A. Due Process Requires a More Definite Substantive 
Standard for Determining When Punitive Damages may 
be Awarded. 
The doctrine of punitive damages is accompanied by an 
utter lack of meaningful standards upon which a judge or jury may 
base an award of punitive damages. The absence of adequate 
standards results in awards frequently being based upon the 
caprice and prejudice of the factfinder. In a case involving the 
propiety of an award of punitive damages in a civil rights suit 
brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Powell, strongly indicted punitive 
damages: 
[T]he court fails utterly to grapple with 
the cogent and persuasive criticisms that 
have been offered of punitive damages 
generally. 
* * * 
Despite . . . attempted justifications, 
the doctrine of punitive damages has been 
vigorously criticized throughout the 
Nation's history . . . . The year after 
§198 3 was enacted, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court declared, "The idea of [punitive 
damages] is wrong. It is a monstrous 
heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy 
excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the 
body of the law." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 
342, 382 (1872). . . . 
Punitive damages are generally seen as a 
windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to 
receive full compensation for their injuries 
— but no more. . . . [T]heir imposition is 
unaccompanied by the types of safeguards 
present in criminal proceedings. This 
absence of safeguards is exacerbated by the 
fact that punitive damages are frequently 
based upon the caprice and prejudice of 
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jurors . . . . We observed in Electrical 
Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-51 Note 14 
(1979), that "punitive damages may be 
employed to punish unpopular defendants. 
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 57-59. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Justice Rehnquist further argued against the imposition of 
punitive damages stating that, "A vaguely defined, elastic 
standard-like 'reckless indifference1 gives free reign to the 
biases and prejudices of jurors . . . ." :rd. at 88. The lack of 
adequate substantive standards surrounding awards of punitive 
damages decreases judicial and social economy. See Ellis, 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 
So.Cal.L.Rev. 1 (1982). 
The multiple layers of vague, overlapping, and elastic 
definitions in punitive damage actions create, in effect, no 
standard at all. The arbitrary and unpredictable nature of 
punitive damage claims is described in Devlin v. Kearny Mesa 
AMC/Jeeps/Renault, Inc., 155 Cal.3d 381, 388, 202 Cal.Rptr. 204, 
208 (1984), as follows: 
The process for which a factfinder finds 
punitive damages is somewhat contradictory. 
On the one hand, the court or jury must be 
sufficiently disturbed to conclude the 
defendant must be punished. On the other 
hand, although outraged, the factfinder cannot 
be vindictive. The channeling of just the 
correct quantum of bile to reach the correct 
level of punitive damages is, to put it 
mildly, an unscientific process complicated 
by personality differences. Conduct which 
one person may view as outrageous another 
may accept without feeling, depending on such 
diverse characteristics as an individual's 
background, temperament and societal concerns. 
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The process is further complicated by the lack 
of objective criteria from either the Legislature 
or the courts as to "how much" is necessary to 
punish and deter, (Emphasis added,) 
B. Due Process Requires a More Definite Standard for 
Limiting the Maximum Amount of Punitive Damages 
Which may be Awarded in Any Given Case. 
In Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, U.S. 
, 100 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988), the United States Supreme Court was 
asked to decide whether a punitive damage award of $1.6 million 
violated the due process, contract, and excessive fine clauses of 
the federal constitution. The Court did not, however, reach those 
claims since they were not raised and passed upon in the lower 
proceedings. Nonetheless, Justices O'Connor and Scalia in 
concurring noted that significant due process questions surround 
the seemingly unlimited power of juries to award unlimited 
punitive damages: 
Appellant has touched on a due process issue 
that I think is worthy of the Courtfs 
attention in an appropriate case. 
Mississippi law gives juries discretion to 
award any amount of punitive damages in any 
tort case in which the defendant acts with a 
certain mental state. In my view, because 
of the punitive character of such awards, 
there is reason to think that this may 
violate the Due Process Clause. 
Punitive damages are awarded not to 
compensate for injury but, rather, "to 
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter 
its future occurrence." Gertz v. Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Punitive 
damages are not measured against actual 
injury, so there is no objective standard 
that limits their amount. Hence, "the 
impact of these windfall recoveries is 
unpredictable and potentially substantial." 
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Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 
(1979). For these reasons, the Court has 
forbidden the award of punitive damages in 
defamation suits brought by private 
plaintiffs, Gertz, supra, at 349-350, and in 
unfair representation suits brought against 
unions under the Railway Labor Act, 
Electrical Workers, supra, at 52. For 
similar reasons, the Court should scrutinize 
carefully the procedures under which 
punitive damages are awarded in civil 
lawsuits. 
Under Mississippi law, the jury may award 
punitive damages for any common law tort 
committed with a certain mental state, that 
is, "for a wilful and intentional wrong, or 
for such gross negligence and reckless 
negligence as is equivalent to such a 
wrong." 483 So.2d 254, 269 (Miss. 1985) 
(opinion below). Although this standard may 
describe the required mental state with 
sufficient precision, the amount of the 
penalty that may ensue is left completely 
indeterminate. As the Mississippi Supreme 
Court said, "The determination of the amount 
of punitive damages is a matter committed 
solely to the authority and discretion of 
the jury." ][d. , at 278. This grant of 
wholly standardless discretion to determine 
the severity of punishment appears 
inconsistent with due process. The Court 
has recognized that, "Vague sentencing 
provisions may pose constitutional questions 
if they do not state with sufficient clarity 
the consequences of violating a given 
criminal statute." United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). 
Nothing in Mississippi law warned appellant 
that by committing a tort that caused 
$20,000 of actual damages, it could expect 
to incur a $1.6 million punitive damage 
award. 
Banker's Life, 100 L.Ed.2d at 78, 79. 
The striking absence of objective standards leads to 
excessive and highly disproportional punitive sanctions. See R. 
1515-17. The arbitrariness and excessiveness of punitive awards 
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can be avoided only by a legislative or judicial pronouncement 
specifying in advance the range of punishment permissible in a 
given case. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1979): 
[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must 
provide explicit standards for those who 
apply them. A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to . . . 
judges . . . and juries for resolution on an 
ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. (footnotes 
omitted). 
The lack of objective standards likewise gives little, if any, 
notice to wrongdoers of the potential penalty they may suffer as a 
result of their wrongs, nor does it allow for meaningful judicial 
review. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 486 U.S. 609 
(1984) . 
C. Due Process Requires the Issues of Liability and 
Punitive Damages to be Decided in a Bifurcated Trial. 
Prior to trial, Fire Insurance moved to bifircate the 
proceeding in order to prevent undue prejudice to the defendants. 
(R. at 92 3-26) The motion was based, in part, on the ground that 
evidence relating to the Crookstonsf tort claims might improperly 
influence the jury's ability to fairly determine other critical 
issues and claims. (R. at 927-35) The motion was denied. (R. at 
537) 
Due process required that the trial court bifurcate the 
instant trial, especially in view of the inherently prejudicial 
nature of evidence of Fire Insurance's wealth being injected into 
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the case. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
allowing a jury to consider wealth and punitive damage cases is 
likely to create prejudice and lead to excessive and unpredictable 
recoveries. In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 
247 (1981), the court held that punitive damages could not be 
awarded against a municipality. The court's decision in part was 
influenced by the likelihood that evidence of a municipality's 
wealth would create undue prejudice: 
Because evidence of a tortfeasor's wealth is 
traditionally admissible as a measure of the 
amount of punitive damages that should be 
awarded, the unlimited taxing power of 
municipality may have a prejudicial impact 
on the jury, in effect encouraging it to 
impose a sizable award. The impact of such 
a windfall recovery is likely to be both 
unpredictable and, at times, substantial, 
and we are sensitive to the possible strain 
on local treasuries and therefore on 
services available to the public at large. 
Id. at 270-71. 
The prejudicial impact of allowing evidence of an 
insurance company's wealth to go to the jury before liability for 
compensatory damages is determined is likewise apparent. One 
commentator has stated: 
[I]t is probable that this very evidence, 
instead of aiding the jury to assess a 
proper verdict, may prejudice them against 
the defendant and prevent an impartial 
judgment, not only on the size of the 
verdict, but in deciding who shall win the 
case. It is a good guess that rich men do 
not fair well before juries, and the more 
emphasis played on their riches, the less 
well they fair. 
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Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1191 
(1931). See also, Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming 
Punitive Damages, 69 Va.L.Rev. 269, 285, 291 (1983). 
The admission of evidence of a defendant's wealth taints 
the entire judicial proceeding, not just the amount of damages 
awarded. While trial judges and appellate courts frequently remit 
or reverse an award of punitive damages on the basis of passion 
and prejudice, reduction of such awards alone, however, may not be 
sufficient. Once evidence of wealth is admitted, the jury may 
assign liability on considerations wholly removed from 
culpability. In this regard, one commentator has noted: 
By allowing the jury to hear evidence of 
wealth during the culpability phase of the 
trial, the initial decision to punish may 
not have been properly deliberated. 
Therefore, any subsequent penalty assessed 
by the jury would constitute an excessive 
assessment method since there is no way to 
determine if the jury found liability on 
grounds independent of wealth. Even given 
judicial remittitur, the reasonable method 
of assessment seems speculative at best. 
Grass, supra, at 310. 
Introduction of evidence of a defendant's wealth may 
likewise violate other federal and state constitutional 
protections. Fire Insurance is guaranteed the equal protection of 
the laws under both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; and Utah Const., Article I, 
Section 2. 
It has long been established that justice should not 
depend upon a party's wealth or poverty. The United States 
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Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956), 
stated, "There can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial a 
man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Concern about 
the prejudicial effect of information regarding the relative 
wealth of defendants has long been recognized as the principal 
basis for excluding evidence of whether an individual defendant is 
insured. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §83, at 549 
(4th Ed. 1971). See Rule 411, Utah Rules of Evidence. Yet, in a 
punitive damage case evidence of a defendant's wealth is freely 
paraded before the jury. 
Under the law of punitive damages, the wealthier the 
defendant, the greater the permissible and likely assessment. 
Such an approach makes punishment largely depend on status. The 
wealthy are punished more severely than the poor. The United 
States Supreme Court has clearly established that punishment of 
status is inappropriate and generally constitutionally 
impermissible. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 
See also, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (court struck 
down a long-recognized practice whereby the amount of punishment 
was increased by the defendant's lack of assets). 
D. Due Process Requires a Higher Burden of Proof to be 
Imposed in Punitive Damage Proceedings. 
The jury in the instant case was instructed that it could 
award punitive damages against Fire Insurance if a preponderance of 
the evidence established that "the insurance company's employees' 
conduct was willful and malicious, or such conduct was done with a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the 
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Crookstons1 rights." (R. at 1515) Under such a standard of proof, 
the jury returned a verdict of $4.0 million in punitive damages 
against Fire Insurance, The court's failure to require a higher 
standard of proof before awarding punitive damages, however, 
violated Fire Insurance's right to due process. 
Due process requires that defendants in proceedings which 
are essentially criminal in nature be afforded additional 
procedural safeguards. As commonly applied to criminal 
proceedings, due process requires at a minimum an enhanced degree 
of proof. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
In determining the appropriate standard of proof, it is 
important to recognize that there is no personal right to recover 
punitive damages. See In Re Paris Air Crash Cases, 622 F.2d 1315, 
1319 (9th Cir. 1980). In essence, the doctrine of punitive 
damages permits plaintiffs to act as private prosecutors to effect 
deterence and retribution. A litigant seeking punitive damages 
vindicates a public interest, rather than a personal right or 
interest. Id. 
The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
167 (1963), established the test for determining when certain 
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution to 
criminal defendants must be given to defendants in nominally civil 
actions. See, supra at p. 18, for full discussion of the Kennedy 
test. 
Due to the penal nature of punitive damages, due process 
requires that the plaintiff be required to show by at least clear 
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and convincing evidence that an award of punitive damages is 
appropriate. Such a view has been suggested and adopted by an 
increasing number of commentators, legislatures and courts. The 
Indiana Supreme Court in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 
N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982), noted the propriety of requiring the clear 
and convincing evidence standard in awarding punitive damages. 
The court stated: 
In determining whether or not we should stray 
from the traditional "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard, it should be particularly 
noted that there is no right to punitive damages. 
Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, (1917) 
64 Ind. App. 268, 272, 113 N.E. 1019. We have 
repeatedly said that such damages may be awarded 
in an appropriate case, as punishment for the 
offense and to deter similar misconduct. It 
has never been implied that a plaintiff has any 
entitlement to such damages. Rather, he is 
merely the fortunate recipient of the "windfall." 
It cannot be said, therefore, that a plaintiff 
seeking such a bonus is denied any right, if 
he be held to a degree of proof higher than 
is required in other actions. In fact, it is 
incongruous to permit a recovery of that to 
which there is no entitlement upon evidence 
that barely warrants a recovery of that which 
is the plaintifffs absolute right. Yet, that 
is precisely what may occur when the inference 
of obduracy, from which punitive damages may 
flow, is permissible, but not compelled, from 
the same conduct from which compensatory damages 
flow, as a matter of right. To avoid such 
occurrences, punitive damages should not be 
allowable upon evidence that is merely con-
sistent with the hypothesis of malice, fraud, 
gross negligence or oppressiveness. Rather 
some evidence should be required that is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the 
tortious conduct was the result of a mistake 
of law or fact, honest error of judgment, over-
zealousness, mere negligence or other such 
noniniquitous human failing. For, just as we 
agree that it is better to acquit a person 
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guilty of crime than to convict an innocent 
one, we cannot deny that, given that the injured 
party has been fully compensated, it is better 
to exonerate a wrongdoer from punitive damages, 
even though his wrong be gross or wicked, than 
to award them at the expense of one whose error 
was one that society can tolerate and who has 
already compensated the victim of his error. 
The public interest cannot be served by a policy 
that favors the latter over the former. And, 
just as the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt furthers the public interest 
with respect to criminal cases, a requirement 
of proof by clear and convincing evidence 
furthers the public interest when punitive 
damages are sought. 
The propriety of the clear and convincing 
evidence standard is particularly evident in 
contract cases, because the breach itself for 
whatever reasons, will almost invariably be 
regarded by the complaining party as oppressive, 
if not outright fraudulent. 
* * * 
A rule that would permit an award of punitive 
damages upon inferences permissibly drawn from 
evidence of no greater persuasive value than that 
required to uphold a finding of the breach of 
contract—which may be nothing more than a 
refusal to pay the amount demanded and subsequently 
found to be owing—injects such risk into refusing 
and defending against questionable claims as to 
render them, in essence, nondisputable. 
Id. at 362-363 (emphasis added). See also, Roginsky v. 
Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Linthicum v. 
Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675, 681 
(1986); Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861, 864 (1980); 
Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); Wangen v. Ford Motor 
Co., 97 Wise.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§549.20 (1986); Or. Rev. Stat. §30.925 (1981); and Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§13-25-127(2) (1973) (beyond reasonable doubt). 
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POINT IV. 
CROOKSTONS1 ACTION WAS BARRED UNDER A 
CONTRACTUALLY IMPOSED STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
At trial, Fire Insurance Exchange moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the Crookston's action was barred by a 
contractually imposed statute of limitations. (R. at 513-29) The 
motion was denied. (R. at 1428-32) The insurance policy issued to 
the Crookstons contained the following limitation: 
No suit or action on this policy for the 
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable 
in any court of law or equity unless all the 
requirements of this policy shall have been 
complied with, and unless commenced within 
12 months next after inception of the loss. 
(R. at 18) 
It is undisputed that the damage to the Crookstons1 home 
occurred on December 2, 1981. The Crookstons waited until 
February 10, 1983, nearly 15 months after the collapse to file suit 
against Fire Insurance. (R. at 2-11) The failure of the 
Crookstons to comply with t!le policy time-to-sue limitation should 
have resultred in summary judgment being granted in favor of Fire 
Insurance. 
Under Utah law, contractual limitations of time in which 
to bring actions on insurance policies are valid, binding and 
enforceable. Hibdon v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 657 P.2d 1358 
(Utah 1983 ) ; Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bur., 595 P.2d 863, 865 (Utah 
1979); Anderson v. State Farm & Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101, 103 
(Utah 1978); Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Co., 21 Utah 
2d 173, 442 P.2d 933, 934 (1968). 
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To this general rule, the Utah Supreme Court has attached 
a number of caveats. First, the contractual limitation must be 
reasonable. Hoeppner, 595 P.2d at 86 3. Second, the insured must 
be at least constructively aware of the limitation, i.e., must 
have had a copy of the policy, id. at 865. Lastly, the insurer 
must deny the claim prior to the running of the contractual 
limitation period. Anderson, 583 P.2d at 103. Where these 
requirements are satisfied, a contractual time-to-sue limitation 
must be found to be valid, binding and enforceable. 
The record on appeal clearly establishes Fire Insurance's 
right to rely upon the subject policy's time-to-sue limitation. 
The policy's contractual limitation was reasonable. The subject 
provision mirrors substantially the limitation found in the Hibdon 
policy which this Court sustained and enforced. Furthermore, the 
time limitation, one year, complied with then existing pertinent 
state statutes. See, Utah Code §31-19-19 (1953) [repealed]. The 
record demonstrates that the Crookstons had a copy of the subject 
policy and, therefore, had either constructive notice or actual 
knowledge of the time-to-sue limitation. (R. at 518-21, 969, 
17 38-39) The record also shows that Fire Insurance adjusted the 
Crookston's loss in June, 1982, more than five and a half months 
prior to the running of the policy time-to-sue limitation. (R. at 
518-21, 969-72) Under the facts of this case, the trial court 
erred in denying Fire Insurance's motion for summary judgment. 
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POINT V. 
DAMAGES AWARDED WERE EXCESSIVE AND EVIDENCED 
PASSION AND PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF THE JURY. 
A. Compensatory Damages. 
Under U.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), a new trial is warranted where 
damages are excessive and appear to have been given under the 
influence of passion and prejudice. The Court in Bennion v. 
LeGrande Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1984), 
states: 
[A] reviewing court will defer to a jury's 
damage award unless the award indicates that 
the jury disregarded competent evidence, 
or that the award is so excessive beyond 
rational justification as to indicate the 
effect of improper factors in the determina-
tion . . . . (Citations omitted.) 
The compensatory damages awarded in the instant case 
were excessive and reflect the influence of passion and prejudice. 
Crookstons presented evidence of economic damages in the sum of 
$323,399. (R. at 2472) In addition, the Crookstons requested 
damages for emotional trauma and suffering. In support of this 
claim, the Crookstons relied, for the most part, on unbridled 
speculation and conjecture. 
i'it I z i -a J the jury awarded the Crookstons $815,266 in 
compensatory damages. (R. at 15 34 3 8, 154 3-46) Assuming that 
$323,399 of that award represented economic damage, nearly $500,000 
of the con ipensator> award can only be attributed to the claim for 
mental distress. Such an award, however, is clearly excessive in 
light of the evidence presented at trial and previous Utah case 
law m First Security Bank of Utah v. J. B. J. Feedyards, 65 3 
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P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982), the Court reduced a mental anguish award 
of $25,000 to $12,500, by stating: 
As to the amount of such damages, however, we 
can find no justification for the relatively 
large sum awarded to the intervenor. Damages 
for mental anguish are an extreme remedy which 
should be dispensed with caution. In none of 
the cases cited by the parties have mental 
anguish awards even approach the $25,000 awarded 
here. Although intervenor undoubtedly suffered " 
emotionally as a result of plaintiff's wrongful 
action, he alleged no permanent damage nor any 
other circumstance which might justify the 
extraordinarily large amount awarded by the 
court below. While the finder of fact has 
wide latitude in determining damages, this 
court has authority to reduce the amount that 
the trial court's award where "all reasonable 
minds would conclude [that] the limits have 
been exceeded." (emphasis added). 
First Security Bank, suggests, at a minimum, that the 
instant award for mental suffering is grossly excessive. The 
award's excessiveness is further buttressed by the fact that 
little, if any, competent evidence was provided at trial to 
establish the alleged emotional damages. The Crookstons sought no 
medical treatment for their condition. (R. at 2198) They incurred 
no medical expenses. No therapy or medications were ever 
prescribed. 
The court in Gumbs v. Pueblo International, Inc., 82 3 
F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1987), noted the growing need for courts to 
review damages awards. In Gumbs, the plaintiff slipped and fell 
on salad oil in the defendant's store. Gumbs sued and won a jury 
verdict of $900,000. The trial court reduced the award to 
$575,000. The Third Circuit, however, held that the damage award, 
even after remittur, was excessive. In ordering a further 
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remit ... ...-• Third Circuit stated, lf[W]e do not believe that 
$575,000 is within even the outermost limits of the range of 
reasonable and acceptable verdicts for the injury that plaintiff 
sustained . . . ." id. at 773. In ordering a further remittur of 
damages, the court stated: 
[T]his court takes note of the increasing 
willingness of the appellate courts to review 
damages awards. There is no doubt that this 
trend is a response to the increasingly out-
rageous amounts demanded by plaintiffs and 
awarded by juries. A jury has very broad 
discretion in measuring damages; nevertheless, 
a jury may not abandon analysis for sympathy 
for a suffering plaintiff and treat an injury 
as though it were a winning lottery ticket. 
There must be a rational relationship between 
the specific injury sustained and the amount 
awarded. 
Id. (Emphasis added) 
Upon a careful review of the record, the jury's award of 
damages in the instant case was grossly excessive. The jury, moved 
by passion and prejudice, treated the Crookstons' claims as though 
they "were a winning lottery ticket." There is no rational 
relationship between the specific injuries allegedly sustained by 
the Crookstons and the amount awarded. The verdict must, as a 
nut t er "' " *w he i euluceH . 
Punitive Damages. 
Punitive damages are the exception rather than the rule 
and shoii] d be cauti ousl y i mposed . Von Hake v. Thomas , 7 05 P , 2d 
766, 771 (Utah 1985). An award of punitive damages is contingent 
upon a finding that the defendant's conduct was willful and 
malicious or in reck] ess cli sregar d of the ri ghts of others Gleave 
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v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 P.2d 660, 670 
(Utah App. 1988); Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah App. 
1987). See also, First Security Bank, 653 P.2d at 598. A punitive 
damage award should not be sustained upon review if the award 
appears to have resulted from passion and prejudice. I<3. at 599; 
Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 771. 
In determining whether passion and prejudice influenced 
an award, the court should examine several factors, including: 
[T]he amount of the actual damages awarded, 
the nature of the wrongdoer's acts, the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the wrongful 
acts, the relative wealth of the wrongdoer, 
the probability the wrongdoer might act in 
the same way in the future, the relationship 
between the parties, and the effect of the 
misconduct on the lives of the victims and 
others. 
Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 771. Application of several of these 
factors to the present case demonstrates the excessive nature of 
the punitive damage award and evidences the influence of juror 
passion and prejudice. 
1. Nature of the Wrongdoer's Act. 
The Crookstons argued at trial that Fire Insurance was 
guilty of intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud. 
The Crookstons claim that the entirety of Fire Insurance's conduct 
and, in particular, its settlement with Rocky Mountain State Bank 
amounted to malicious and outrageous conduct. However, no evidence 
was introduced at trial that Fire Insurance or its agents had any 
ill will or acted maliciously toward the Crookstons. 
A review of similar cases reveals that Fire Insurance's 
-50-
conduct as a matter of law was less than outrageous. See, e.g., 
Pacific Nat, Ins. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.3d 399, 233 Cal.Rptr. 
189 (1986), petition for reh'g granted, 738 P.2d 1114, 238 
Cal.Rptr. 553 (1987) (automobile insurer's allegedly unreasonable 
settlement offers and failure to pay even if wholly unreasonable, 
were not sufficiently outrageous conduct to support cause of action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Crossley v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 155 Mich. App. 694, 400 N.W.2d 625 (1986) 
(outrageous conduct not found where insurer had rejected proof of 
loss for fire damage and accused insured of arson and fraud without 
any evidence); Saltou v. Dependable Ins. Co., Inc., 394 M,w.2d 629 
(Minn. App. 1986) (outrageous conduct not found where insurer 
delayed processing insured's insurance claim, issued a check; for 
substantially less than the amount due and made check for loss of 
personal property payable to insureds and lienholder jointly); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1985) 
(group medical insurer's action in withholding further benefits 
until provided with proof of ineligibility of insured for Medicare, 
not outrageous cono ,- ' Bowe v. Eaton, 17 Wash.App. 840, 565 P.2d 
826 (1977) (allegations that, following injured party's rejection 
of insurer's offer to pay a certain amount for lost wages, insurer 
responded by advising that i1 would nn\m r»new its offer until the 
injured party's condition Iiad sufficiently stabilized failed to set 
forth sufficiently aggravated conduct, despite allegation that 
insurer kiu»w t hat iirjnred pat ty was totally dependent on wage pay-
ments for her support). 
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Assuming, arguendo, that Fire Insurance's conduct rose to 
the level of actionable intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, its conduct did not demonstrate such a degree of ill will 
to warrant the vast sum awarded. Fire Insurance's allegedly 
reckless conduct was largely influenced by the fact that it faced 
a unique claim and the real possibility of double liability. Both 
the Crookstons and Rocky Mountain State Bank had rights under the 
issued policy for certain insurance proceeds. (R. at 21) The par-
ties made repeated and insistent demands for payment under the 
policy. (R. at 1975) These facts suggest that any misconduct was 
motivated not out of vindictiveness or ill will toward the 
Crookstons, but rather out of a desire to avoid double liability. 
While Fire Insurance's conduct may have been wrong and negligent, 
the circumstances of this case do not reflect such a high degree of 
malice to justify the extreme amount of punitive damages awarded by 
the jury. 
With respect to the Crookstons' claims of fraud and 
misrepresentation, Utah law "requires a showing of false 
representation of an existing material fact, made knowingly or 
recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon upon which 
plaintiff reasonably relies to his detriment." As discussed, 
infra, the Crookstons failed to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence the requisite elements of a cause of action for fraud. 
However, assuming, arguendo, that Fire Insurance's conduct did 
rise to the level of actionable fraud, the evidence did not show 
sufficient malice to warrant a punitive damage award of $4.0 
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million. 
rhe Court in Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 
(Utah 1984), held an award of punitive damages to be excessive in 
part on the ground that there was no evidence that the defendants 
acted out of vindictiveness or ill will. At trial, the jury 
returned a $75,000 award of punitive damages based on fraud. 
After the trial court remitted and the punitive damages award to 
$25,000, the defendant appealed. 
On appeal, the court remanded the case for a 
redetermination of an appropriate award of punitive damages, in 
part because: 
[The] facts suggest that defendant's 
misconduct was motivated not purely out of 
vindictiveness or ill will towards 
plaintiffs, but rather, at least to some 
extent, out of a desire to recover what was 
owing . . . . Thus, defendants' conduct 
under these circumstances, although 
reprehensible, did not reflect a high degree 
of malice. In addition, such unique 
circumstances do not demonstrate a 
probability that defendant will repeat such 
misconduct in the future. 
Id., at 759. 
2. Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the 
Wrongful Acts. 
This i :ase arose under circumstances where Fire Insurance 
owed duties to both Rocky Mountain State Bank and the Crookstons. 
The potential for mistake and errors of judgment was significant. 
Punitive -iafiiaqes are not awarded,, however, for mere inadvertence 
or error in judgment. See, Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). Although hindsight may 
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suggest that Fire Insurance should have proceeded upon a different 
course of conduct, Fire Insurance should not be penalized for an 
error of judgment under such circumstances. See, Tyson v. Safeco 
Ins. Companies, 461 So.2d 1308 (Ala. 1984); State Farm General 
Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974). 
3. Relative Wealth of the Wrongdoer. 
In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the 
Court held that punitive damages could not be awarded without 
first making findings of fact with regard to a defendant's net 
worth or income. In this case, evidence was provided that Fire 
Insurance's net income in 1986 was $22 million. (R. at 2516) 
In light of this fact, the jury's punitive damage award amounted 
to nearly two and one-half months of Fire Insurance's net income. 
Such an award has been found in other jurisdictions to be 
excessive. See, Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 
169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979) (award of $5 million in punitive damages 
against insurer was excessive as a matter of law where it 
represented two and one-half months of insurer's entire net income 
in one year). 
4. Probability That the Wrongdoer Will Act the Same 
Way in the Future. 
No evidence was provided at trial suggesting that 
Fire Insurance may conduct itself in the same way in the future. 
As a result, a new trial may be appropriate to reconsider the 
punitive damages award in light of such evidence. See, Bundy, 692 
P.2d at 772; Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at 1219. 
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5. Relationship Between the Parties. 
In Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 989, 995 
(1960), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Where there is a wrong involving the violation 
of a duty springing from a relation of trust or 
confidence, and the wrong is of a gross and 
aggravated nature, the malicious conduct 
necessary to justify punitive damages may be 
found. 
In this case, the controversy arose in the context of a 
first-party insurance contract. The relationship between an 
insurer and its insured was thoroughly explored in Beck v. Farmers 
Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). In Beck, the insured 
brought action against his insurer for alleged bad faith refusal to 
settle a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. The insurer moved 
to dismiss the bad faith claim on the ground that it had no duty 
"to bargain with or settle plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim." 
Id. at 797. The trial court granted the motion. In reversing the 
lower court's action, the Court noted that the parties' duties and 
obligations in t•>- ..5
 :"'--ty context are contractual rather than 
fiduciary. Id. a* ^ ""hus no relationship of trust and 
reliance is created by an insurance contract. IcL Practically 
speaking, an insurer an :il its insured are adversaries. Lyon v. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739, 
745 (1971) overruled on other grounds 701 P.2d 798 (1985). Since 
there were no breaches of fiduciary duties in the instant case, the 
staggering award of punitive damages s): iou] d not be sustained. 
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7. Effect of Wrongdoer's Conduct on the Lives of 
Victims and Others. 
When viewed in comparison to previous reported Utah 
cases, the alleged effect of Fire Insurance's conduct on the 
Crookstons did not justify an award of $4 million in punitive 
damages. For example, in Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 
1980), the award of punitive damages was upheld where there was 
evidence of permanent psychological damage resulting from 
prolonged sexual assault and abuse. 
The evidence presented at trial provides only a tenuous 
nexus between Fire Insurance's alleged misconduct and the alleged 
effect on the lives of the Crookstons. Assuming arguendo, that 
the resultant harm to the Crookstons did arise from Fire 
Insurance's conduct, such harm, given Utah law, does not justify 
such a large punitive damage award. 
POINT VI. 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED DUE TO THE 
ERRONEOUS STATEMENTS OF LAW FOUND IN JURY 
INSTRUCTION NOS. 28 AND 29. 
Jury Instruction No. 28 purported to establish that the 
plaintiffs' claim for fraud and misrepresentation against 
defendant had only six essential elements. (R. at 1509-10) 
However, the Utah Supreme Court in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 
247 P.2d 273, 274 (1952), held that an action in deceit based on 
fraudulent misrepresentation consists of nine essential elements. 
Instruction No. 28 clearly fails to contain all of the essential 
elements of fraud. The jury was not instructed that the 
"fraudulent misrepresentation" must concern a presently existing 
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fact, in addition, the jury was not instructed that the 
"fraudulent misrepresentation" must have been made by Fire 
Insurance for the purpose of inducing the Crookstons to act upon 
it. Furthermore, the jury was not instructed that it must find 
that the Crookstons actually relied on the "fraudulent misrepre-
sentation in ignorance of its falsity." An instruction which 
incorrectly states the law, as does Instruction No. 28, provides 
ground for ordering a new trial. See, Everton v. Blair, 99 Idaho 
14, 576 P.2d 585 (1978) . 
Instruction No. 29, likewise, fails to accurately state 
the applicable law. (R. at 1511) Jury Instruction No. 29 
provided: 
In the absence of information such as would 
cause a reasonable person to inquire further, 
the plaintiffs or their agents would be 
entitled to rely on the factual representations 
of the insurance company. 
While the above-stated jury instruction would accurately 
state the law i n mai ij r contexts, it wa- ^l"olly inapplicable and 
inaccurate in a first party insurance dispute. The right to rely 
upon a representation must be considered in light of the 
relationship existing between the parties. Lawrence v. Ward, 5 
Utah 2d 2L- \ 300 P. 2d 819, 622 (1956). The relationship between 
the Crookstons and Fire Insurance was contractual in nature, 
rather than fiduciary. Beck, 701 P.zu dt duu. At the time the 
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were made, the parties were, 
practically speaking, adversaries. Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745. The 
Court in Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 37 8, 42 3 P.2d 659, 
-57-
662 (1967), described the right to rely on another contracting 
party's representations as follows: 
In regard to this alleged cause of action 
for negligent misrepresentation, it is 
pertinent to keep in mind that there is 
recognized a defense somewhat analogous 
to contributory negligence in other tort 
actions. The one who complains of being 
injured by such a false representation 
cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever 
is told him but has the duty of exercising 
such degree of care to protect his own 
interests as would be exercised by an 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person 
under the circumstances; and if he fails 
to do so, is precluded from holding someone 
else to account for the consequences of his 
own neglect. 
See also, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 
364 (Ind. 1982). 
Instruction No. 29 purports to create a presumption in 
favor of the Crookstons' right to rely on the representations of 
Fire Insurance and its agents. Yet, the law is clear, the parties 
were, practically speaking, adversaries at all times. The nature 
of the relationship between the parties, as a matter of law, put 
the Crookstons on notice that they did not have any right to rely 
upon the representations made by Fire Insurance. The jury should 
have been instructed that the Crookstons had the duty of 
exercising reasonable care to protect their own interests under 
the circumstances of this case. The Crookstons were not entitled 
to "heedlessly accept as true" whatever Fire Insurance told them. 
While trial counsel for Fire Insurance did not 
specifically except to Instruction Nos. 28 and 29, this Court in 
its discretion and in the interest of justice may grant a new 
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trial for the errors contained in those instructions. U.R.C.P. 51 
provides: 
No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto . . . . Notwithstanding the 
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, 
in its discretion and in the interest of 
justice, may review the giving of or failure 
to give an instruction. 
Likewise, U.R.C.P. 59 provides ample authority for a 
trial court to order a new trial due to clearly erroneous jury 
instructions. Rule 59(a) provides in pertinent part: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or part of the issues, 
for any of the following causes . . . . 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discre-
tion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
* * * 
(7) Error in law. 
This Court has recognized that under certain circum-
stances, an erroneous instruction may provide sufficient ground 
for the granting of a new trial even though the aggrieved party 
failed to object to the suspect instruction. In Williams v. 
Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965), the court held: 
It is true that the requirement is not 
absolutely rigid, but that under the rule, 
and our decisions, a review of error without 
said objection may be had. But this will 
be done only under unusual circumstances 
where the interests of justice urgently so 
demand. 
See also, State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977); Wagner v. 
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Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971); McCall v. Kendrick, 2 
Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954). 
The Court in Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 
1975), recognizes a court's inherent power to grant relief from a 
judgment where plain error appears in the record. In Henderson, 
the plaintiffs did not move for a directed verdict on the issue of 
liability. Following a verdict for the defendant, plaintiffs 
appealed on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the verdict and that the issue of liability should not 
have gone to the jury. This Court reversed the judgment of the 
lower court with directions to enter judgment for plaintiffs on the 
matter of liability. In so doing, the Court held: 
The law is to the effect that one who does 
not move for a directed verdict generally 
has no standing to urge on appeal that the 
evidence does not support the judgment. 
However, an exception exists where plain 
error appears in the record and it would 
result in a miscarriage of justice to 
affirm the judgment. 
Id. at 291-292 (emphasis added). 
Other jurisdictions similarly hold that a new trial may 
be granted on the basis of erroneous or improper jury instructions 
despite the aggrieved party's failure to object to the 
instructions. See First National Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344, 
599 P.2d 915, 916-17 (1979); Montgomery v. Murray, 481 P.2d 755, 
760 (Okla. 1971); Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 474 
So.2d 825 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1985); Easton v. Bradford, 390 So.2d 
1202 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980); Bickford v. Wall, 371 So.2d 172 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1979); Shank v. Fassoulas, 304 So.2d 469 
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(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1974); Penn v. Hartman, 525 S.W.2d 773 (Mo.App. 
1975)• 
The failure to properly instruct the jury in this case in 
relation to Instruction Nos. 28 and 29 constitutes plain error. 
The jury ultimately returned an unprecedented award of damages in 
an insurance bad faith case. The award was in part predicated 
upon the jury's finding that Fire Insurance had engaged in 
fraudulent conduct. The instructions outlining the elements of 
fraud, and the right of the Crookstons to rely on Fire Insurance's 
representations, were plainly incorrect statements of law. To 
permit such an unprecedented award of punitive damages to be 
rendered under such circumstances would result in gross injustice. 
This Court should, therefore, exercise its discretion and find 
that Fire Insurance's failure to except to the subject 
instructions does not bar the granting of a new trial due to 
fundamentally flawed jury instructions. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON THE CROOKSTONS' DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
AND IN FAILING TO COMPARE THE CROOKSTONS' 
BAD FAITH TO THAT OF FIRE INSURANCE. 
Jury Instruction No. 24 properly set forth the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing of Fire Insurance in regard to the 
Crookstons' claims. (R. 1504-05) The jury did not, however, 
receive any instruction regarding any duty of good faith and fair 
dealing on the part of the Crookstons. The jury, on Interrogatory 
No. 5 of the Special Verdict, answered the following question in 
the affirmative: "Did the defendant Fire Insurance Exchange 
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violate its duty of good faith and fair dealing in its treatment of 
plaintiffs1 claim?" (R. at 1544) There was no corresponding 
question to elicit a determination as to whether the Crookstons 
violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court's 
failure to so instruct the jury and its failure to ask the jury to 
determine whether the Crookstons breached any such duty of good 
faith and fair dealing was error. 
The Court in Beck v. Farmers ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 
801 (Utah 1985), held that, "[A]s parties to a contract, the 
insured and the insurer have parallel obligations to perform the 
contract in good faith, obligations that inhere in every 
contractual relationship." (Emphasis added.) Since the 
Crookstons had a parallel obligation to perform the contract in 
good faith, Fire Insurance was entitled to have the jury 
compare the Crookstons1 bad faith, if any, to that of Fire 
Insurance. 
The California Court of Appeals in California Casualty 
General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal.3d 274, 218 Cal.Rptr. 
817 (1985), recognized that under most circumstances a defendant 
insurer is entitled to have the jury instructed in regard to the 
plaintiff's bad faith. In California Casualty, plaintiff 
instituted the action to recover compensatory and punitive damages 
for California Casualty's alleged breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. California Casualty answered and later moved for leave 
to amend their answer to add the following fourth affirmative 
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defense: 
The plaintiff and her former attorney are guilty 
of bad faith conduct in the prosecuting, handling 
and management of the uninsured motorist claim 
referred to in plaintiff's first amended complaint 
and as a proximate cause of their bad faith acts, 
omissions, and failure to provide full and 
complete information to the defendants and their 
insuror [sic], these defendants request that any 
damages awarded against them for bad faith be 
reduced by the amount of the bad faith conduct 
of plaintiff and her former attorney. 
California Casualty, 218 Cal.Rptr. at 819. The trial court denied 
California Casualty's motion to amend. 
The California Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's 
order denying California Casualty's motion to amend their answer, 
and stated: 
There can be little question but that an insurer 
which provides uninsured motorist coverage has a 
reasonable expectation that if the insured 
suffers a loss claimed to be covered under the 
uninsured motorist provisions of the policy, 
the insured will promptly and accurately furnish 
it with all the information and evidence perti-
nent to the claim that is known to the insured. 
If a failure of the insured to do so results in 
delaying or impeding the investigation of the 
claim by the insurer or delays or makes improvi-
dent the insurer's payment of the claim, any 
economic loss and emotional distress caused by 
the insured by virtue of any such nonpayment or 
delay in investigation or payment will have 
been caused either wholly or in part by the 
conduct of the insured. We perceive no sound 
reason, nor is it suggested, why the doctrine 
of comparative fault enunciated and applied 
to negligent conduct by the California Supreme 
Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 
804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, and later 
applied as between a strictly liable defendant 
and a negligent plaintiff (Daly v. General 
Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal.Rptr. 
380, 575 P.2d 1162) and as between two tort-
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feasors, one of whose liability was based on 
strict products liability and the other on 
negligence (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart 
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 322, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 
P.2d 441) should not be applicable to bad faith 
cases. 
Id. at 823. See also, Hendel v. United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty, 192 Cal.3d 684, 237 Cal.Rptr. 667 (1987). 
While the concept of comparative bad faith has not been 
expressly adopted in Utah, adequate basis in law exists for 
holding that the jury in the instant matter should have been 
instructed in regard to the concept of comparative bad faith. The 
Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37 to §78-27-43 
(Supp. 1987), expressly recognizes the concept of comparative 
fault. The Utah Liability Reform Act specifically defines "fault" 
to mean: 
[A]ny actionable breach of legal duty, act, 
or omission proximately causing or contributing 
to injury or damages sustained by a person 
seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, 
negligence in all its degrees, contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, 
product liability, and misuse, modification or 
abuse of a product. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(2) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). The 
Utah Liability Reform Act also expressly provides for separate 
special verdicts on total damages and proportion of fault. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-39 (Supp. 1987). 
Although the occurrences complained of in the Crookstons1 
complaint occurred before the Utah Liability Reform Act was 
enacted, the concepts of comparative fault embodied within that 
Act should control in the instant case. At the very least, the 
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jury should have been instructed that the Crookstons had a legal 
duty of good faith and fair dealing towards Fire Insurance and the 
effect of any breach of that duty by the Crookstons. Trial counsel 
for Fire Insurance requested such instructions, but the court 
refused to submit them to the jury. (R. at 1385-87) The failure 
to properly instruct the jury as to the insured's duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, and the failure to require the jury to 
compare the Crookstons1 bad faith with that of Fire Insurance 
necessitates a new trial on the matter. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF FIRE INSURANCE ON THE CROOKSTONS1 
CLAIMS OF FRAUD AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Fire Insurance moved 
for a directed verdict on the claims of fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. (R. at 2672-74) The trial 
court apparently never ruled on the motion prior to entry of 
judgment in favor of the Crookstons. The evidence at trial was 
insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict in favor of 
the Crookstons on either the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation 
or the tort of outrage. 
The record demonstrates that the Crookstons failed to 
establish anything more than a breach of implied and express 
contractual duties on the part of Fire Insurance. In the absence 
of substantial evidence to sustain the juryfs verdict on their 
other claims, the Crookstons cannot recover in tort. Beck, 701 
P.2d at 800. All damages flowing from any contractual breach of 
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duty by Fire Insurance are ex contractu, rather than ex delicto. 
See DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435-436 (Utah 1983). 
Since the damages allegedly sustained by the Crookstons arose only 
out of the breach of contractual obligations, plaintiffs may not 
recover punitive damages, even if the breach was intentional or 
maliciously motivated. Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 
229, 232-233 (Utah 1983). 
A. Crookstons Failed to Establish Sufficient Evidence 
to Support the Jury's Finding of Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
1. The Standard of Proof for the Tort of Outrage. 
The Utah Supreme Court first recognized the tort of 
outrage in Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916). In 
Jeppsen, the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries to her health 
and nervous system allegedly sustained through the defendant's 
willful, wanton, and unlawful acts. The defendant allegedly 
entered the plaintiff's home and in a loud and threatening voice, 
and with violent abusive language, threatened to shoot and kill 
plaintiff's husband. The defendant knew that the plaintiff was 
weak and ill from a recent child birth. The plaintiff was so 
terrified by the defendant's actions that she became ill and was 
confined to her bed for two days. The trial court's judgment for 
the defendant was reversed and remanded with instructions to grant 
a new trial, on the basis that the complaint stated a sufficient 
cause of action: 
We are of the opinion that the acts described 
in the complaint are such as bring this case 
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clearly within the rule that damages may be 
recovered for injuries to health or for shock 
to the nervous system, although caused by 
terror or fright alone, and where there is 
no actual bodily injury inflicted upon the 
injured person and none such intended by 
the wrongdoer. Such acts cannot be considered 
as merely ordinary negligent acts for which 
no recovery, from fright alone, is, as a 
general rule, permitted. 
Jeppsen, 155 P. at 431. 
Later in Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 
(1961), the plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries 
resulting from emotional distress. The defendant had persistently 
annoyed the plaintiff with highly insulting, obscene and indecent 
proposals that she have illicit sexual relations with him. The 
trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding that the 
plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. 
In holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the 
plaintiff's action, the court noted: 
[S]uch a cause of action may not be based 
upon mere negligence, the best considered 
view recognizes an action for severe 
emotional distress, though not accompanied 
by bodily impact or physical injury, where 
the defendant intentionally engaged in some 
conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the 
purpose of inflicting emotional distress, 
or (b) where any reasonable person would 
have known that such would result; and his 
actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in 
that they offend against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. 
Samms, 358 P.2d at 346-347. 
In Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 
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315 (1976), the Massachusetts Supreme Court outlined the four 
essential elements for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress: 
It must be shown (1) that the actor 
intended to inflict emotional distress or 
that he knew or should have known that 
emotional distress was the likely result 
of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was 
"extreme and outrageous," was "beyond all 
possible bounds of decency" and was "utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community"; 
(3) that the actions of the defendant were 
the cause of the plaintifffs distress; and 
(4) that the emotional distress sustained 
by the plaintiff was "severe" and of a 
nature "that no reasonable man could be 
expected to endure it." 
Agis, 355 N.E.2d at 318-19 (citations omitted). See also, 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §46(1) (1965): Fletcher v. Western 
National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). 
2. Fire Insurance's Conduct Was Not Sufficiently 
Aggravated or Extreme to be Actionable. 
The theory of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress was late in developing because courts saw the potential 
danger of vexatious and fictitious claims. When the cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was 
recognized, a very heavy burden of proof was imposed upon the 
party seeking recovery. In order to state a cause of action, the 
acts complained of must be "outrageous" and "beyond all possible 
bounds of decency." See Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, 
comment (d) (1965). Such a cause of action may not be based upon 
mere negligence, nor upon gross negligence. See, Samms, 358 P.2d 
at 346; and In Re Baker, 18 B.R. 243 (W.D. N.Y. 1982). 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, comment (h) (1965) 
allows for the summary determination of whether a party's conduct 
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to 
permit recovery under the theory of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The Court in Gygl v. Storch, 28 Utah 2d 399, 
503 P.2d 449 (1972), clearly indicates that it is the court's duty 
to determine whether the complained of activity is so outrageous 
and extreme and so offends the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality that the matter must go to the jury. 
A review of other insurance bad faith cases demonstrates 
that the Crookstons failed to establish as a matter of law that 
Fire Insurance's conduct was sufficiently severe to be actionable 
for the tort of outrage. In Saltou v. Dependable Ins. Co., Inc., 
394 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. App. 1986), the plaintiffs sued their 
insurer, Dependable Insurance Company, and its agent for 
the insurer's failure to pay a claim. The plaintiffs alleged 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and unfair 
and discriminatory insurance practices. The defendants' motions 
for summary judgment were granted by the trial court. 
In affirming the lower court's action, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals held that the tortious acts complained of by the 
plaintiffs did not constitute the independent tort of outrage: 
The tortious acts appellants allege, however, 
are all connected with Dependable's failure to 
pay appellants' insurance claim in the manner 
appellants felt it should have been paid. The 
failure to pay an insurance claim, in itself, 
no matter how malicious, does not constitute 
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a tort; it constitutes a breach of an insurance 
contract. Haagenson v. National Farmers Union 
Property and Casualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 
(Minn. 1979). "When the insurer refuses to pay 
or unreasonably delays payment of an undisputed 
amount, it breaches the contract and is liable 
for the loss that naturally and proximately 
flows from the breach." Olson v. Rugloski, 
277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979). Punitive 
damages are not recoverable for breach of 
contract unless the breach was accompanied by 
an independent tort. Id. at 388. 
Where an implied covenant of good faith has 
been maliciously broken, a malicious motive 
may be important in determining whether a 
material breach has occurred but is immaterial 
in determining damages for contract breach. 
Wild v. Rariq, 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775 
(1975). "[E]xtra-contract damages are not 
recoverable for breach of contract except in 
exceptional cases where the breach is accom-
panied by an independent tort." Haagenson, 
277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979). 
Id. at 633 (emphasis added). 
After setting out a standard for first-party insurance 
bad faith claims, substantially similar to that adopted in Beck 
v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the Saltou 
court stated: 
In Haagenson, the plaintiff was injured when 
he came into contact with damaged power lines 
as he was attempting to enter an automobile. 
The Haagensons contended that their insurer's 
refusal to pay plaintiffs' no-fault claim was 
intentional, malicious and in bad faith and, 
thus, constituting intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The Haagenson court held 
that, even assuming the defendant insurance 
company had no reason to contest plaintiffs' 
claim, punitive damages were not recoverable 
for bad-faith breach of contract on a theory 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
A malicious motive in breaching the contract, 
the court held, did not convert a contract 
action into a tort action. Id. 
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Similarly, appellant's allegations in support 
of their tort claim merely support a claim of 
bad-faith breach of contract and, in view of 
Haagenson and Wild, did not make out an 
independent tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Although bad faith failure 
to pay insurance claims is not to be encouraged, 
and respondents took advantage of appellants' 
vulnerable mental and economic condition, 
appellants must show more than malicious failure 
to pay an insurance claim in order to recover 
extra-contractual damages. 
Id., at 633 (emphasis added). See also, Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1985); Crossley v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 155 Mich. App. 694, 400 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1986); 
Pacific National Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.3d 399, 233 
Cal.Rptr. 189, 193 (1986), petition for reh'q granted 738 P.2d 
1114, 238 Cal.Rptr. 553 (1987); Combs v. Insurance Company of 
Illinois, 146 111. App. 3d 957, 497 N.E.2d 503, 508 (1986). 
The actions of Fire Insurance and its agents do not meet 
the minimum actionable standards for the tort of outrage. While 
the complained of conduct may have been improper, it did not 
necessarily rise to the level of being sufficiently aggravated as 
to constitite "outrageous conduct." Assuming arguendo that Fire 
Insurance's conduct in handling the claim was malicious, such 
evidence does not necessarily establish a cognizable claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Even a malicious 
motive in a defendant's breaching the contract does not convert a 
contract action into an independent tort action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Saltou, 394 N.W. 2d at 633. 
This Court has recognized that a breach of contract, 
standing alone, does not call for punitive damages even if 
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characterized by extreme bad faith, malice or recklessness. The 
Court in Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 750 (1982), stated: 
It is true that in some jurisdictions punitive 
damages may be awarded in cases involving con-
tracts where the breaching party's conduct is 
characterized by extreme bad faith, malice or 
recklessness. We prefer the standard articulated 
by the Kansas Supreme Court in Gonzales v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 217 Kan. 262, 535 P.2d 919 
(1975), which states that a breach of contract, 
standing alone, does not call for punitive 
damages even if intentional and unjustified, 
but such damages are allowable if there is some 
independent tort indicating malice, fraud or 
wanton disregard for the rights of others. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Likewise, as stated in Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 
660 P.2d 229, 232-233 (Utah 1983): 
The general rule is that punitive damages 
cannot be awarded for a breach of contract. 
However, we and other jurisdictions have 
allowed punitive damages where the breach 
of contract amounts to an independent tort. 
We recognize the rule in some jurisdictions 
which, rather than requiring an independent 
tort, allows the award of punitive damages 
if the contract was breached willfully and 
maliciously. Despite dicta in some cases, 
we have not and do not adhere to this rule. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 
1985), holds that in a first-party relationship between an insurer 
and its insured, any breach of the insurance contract or the 
implied duty to act in good faith, without more, gives rise only 
to a cause of action in contract, not one in tort. Beck does 
state, however, that in "some cases the acts constituting a breach 
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of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are 
independent of the contract and may give rise to causes of action 
in tort," Id., at 800, n. 3. As discussed supra, the Crookstons1 
right to punitive damages hinges upon their ability to establish 
breaches of duty, independent of the contract, that give rise to 
causes of action in tort. The record on appeal demonstrates that 
the Crookstons failed to meet that burden. 
3. Crookstons' Injuries Do Not Constitute 
Severe or Extreme Emotional Distress. 
In order state a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the Crookstons must likewise 
establish that they have, in fact, suffered severe or extreme 
emotional distress. Comment (j) to Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§46 (1965) provides that it is for the court to determine whether, 
on the evidence, severe emotional distress can be found. Once 
again, the party seeking recovery for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress must establish that the emotional distress 
sustained was "severe" and of a nature "that no reasonable man 
could be expected to endure." 
The case law clearly demonstrates that the alleged emo-
tional injuries, embarrassment and humiliation suffered by the 
Crookstons cannot be properly characterized as "severe emotional 
distress." In Woodman Accident and Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 784 
F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1986), the court held that the mere fact 
that the plaintiff in a bad faith action lost sleep due to the 
insurer's refusal to pay medical bills did not rise to an 
actionable level. 
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In Moolenaar v. Atlas Motor Inns, Inc., 616 F.2d 87 (3d 
Cir. 1980), the plaintiff asserted that the citizen's arrest made 
by the defendants, owners and managers of a hotel, for plaintiff's 
violation of a hotel dress code caused him severe emotional 
distress. The plaintiff asserted that he had lost weight due to 
the anxiety caused by his arrest, that his sleeping patterns were 
adversely affected, and that he was embarrassed by newspaper 
reports of the event. The court held that the plaintiff's 
embarrassment and humiliation could not be characterized as severe 
emotional distress. Id. at 89. 
In USA Oil, Inc. v. Smith, 415 So.2d 1098 (Ala. 1982), 
writ denied, 415 So.2d 1102 (Ala. 1982), the plaintiff employer 
appealed from a lower court decision which awarded a former 
employee damages on her counterclaim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. At trial the defendant testified that the 
plaintiff's conduct had affected her sleep and caused her to have 
crying spells. The appellate court reversed the award for 
emotional distress. 
It has been stated that "the breach of contract 
practically always causes mental vexation and feelings of 
disappointment in the plaintiff; but he seldom thinks of asking 
for a money payment therefor." 5 Corbin, Contracts §1076 (1964). 
While the Crookstons undoubtedly sustained some mental and 
emotional upset as a result of the Fire Insurance's alleged breach 
of contract, such is not actionable unless it rose to the level 
of being so severe "that no reasonable man could be expected to 
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endure," Samms, 358 P.2d at 347. 
The record on appeal demonstrates that the Crookstons did 
not suffer such severe distress that no reasonable man could be 
expected to endure. R. at 1994-2025, 2110-43, 2192-2231 and 
2383-2448. While the record establishes that the Crookstons were 
upset and distraught, there was no medical testimony to support or 
substantiate the nature or extent of their emotional distress. 
The frustrations, aggravations, and traumas allegedly sustained by 
the Crookstons are not infrequently endured by other members of 
society under a variety of circumstances. The loss of sleep, the 
loss of appetite, the loss of enjoyment of life, and the loss of 
motivation are all part of the price of living in society. The 
mental distress established by the Crookstons at trial is wholly 
inadequate to support a recovery for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
4. Crookstons' Emotional Upset Was Not the 
Proximate Result of Fire Insurance's Conduct. 
Even assuming arguendo that Fire Insurance's conduct was 
outrageous and that the Crookstons sustained sufficient emotional 
distress to maintain a cause of action for the tort of outrage, 
the record fails to establish that the Crookstons' emotional 
distress was actually and proximately caused by Fire Insurance's 
conduct. The testimony at trial was replete with evidence that 
the Crookstons1 emotional distress began long before any of the 
allegedly improper acts of Fire Insurance. The construction of the 
home in North Salt Lake took much longer than expected. (R. at 
-75-
2180) The protracted construction and cost overruns forced the 
Crookstons into a precarious financial situation. As Mr. Crookston 
testified, when the house collapsed, the Crookstons "collapsed." 
(R. at 2209-10) As Mr. Crookston testified at trial, the collapse 
of the home was the most significant emotional trauma ever 
sustained by him or his family. (R. at 2209-10) While some 
actions and conduct on the part of Fire Insurance may have been 
improper, such were not the proximate cause of the Crookstons1 
emotional distress. Therefore, the verdict in favor of the 
Crookstons on their claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress cannot stand. 
B. The Verdict in Favor of the Crookstons on the Claim 
of Fraud and Misrepresentation is Unsupported in 
Law and in Fact. 
This Court in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 
273, 274 (1952), held that actions based on fraudulent 
misrepresentation must establish nine essential elements. A 
plaintiff in an action based on fraud must prove each of the 
elements by clear and convincing evidence, id. A verdict 
returned based on mere suspicion and innuendo is not sufficient to 
support a verdict of fraudulent conduct. See Taylor v. Gasor, 
Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 1980). Crookstons1 failure to provide 
clear and convincing evidence to support the jury's finding on 
every element of fraud is demonstrated by a careful review of the 
facts elicited at trial. 
Crookstons pointed to seven alleged incidents of 
actionable fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of the 
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defendant. Those allegations include: 
1. That Fire Insurance misrepresented in its policy 
that it would pay the Crookstons an amount 
sufficient to demolish, clean and rebuild 
the subject structure, and also provide 
certain living expenses; 
2. That during the period of March 31, 1982 
to June 16, 1982, Fire Insurance's agents mis-
represented that they had no authority to 
settle the Crookstons1 claims; 
3. That on June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton 
misrepresented to the Crookstons' 
counsel that Fire Insurance was not yet 
in a position to settle the Crookstons1 
claims, and that he would include the 
Crookstons' counsel in any settlement 
negotiation; 
4. That Fire Insurance misrepresented that 
the only amounts due and owing under the 
policy for damage to the Crookstons' 
home was approximately $27,000; 
5. That Fire Insurance misrepresented that 
the bid submitted by Phipps was 
reasonable and represented the full 
amount needed to completely restore the 
structure back to its pre-loss 
condition; 
6. That Fire Insurance misrepresented that 
its payment of approximately $32,000 to 
Rocky Mountain State Bank extinguished 
any claims that the Crookstons had; and 
7. That Fire Insurance misrepresented to 
the Crookstons that it would pay no more 
money under the policy than the sums 
already paid out to Rocky Mountain State 
Bank. 
When the evidence produced at trial in support of the 
allegations of fraud are measured against the yardstick of Pace v. 
Parrlsh, it is clear that the Crookstons failed to establish at 
least one of the requisite elements of fraud for each of their 
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seven allegations. 
The first allegation is that Fire Insurance misrepresented 
in its policy that it would pay for the reasonable costs to 
demolish, clean, and rebuild the home, and also provide certain 
living expenses. (R. at 2692) The subject policy was originally 
issued before construction on the subject structure was even 
initiated. Generally, breached promises or expressions of future 
intention are not actionable for fraud. This rule applies as long 
as the intention to perform was made in good faith at the time, 
even though the promisor changes his mind and fails or refuses to 
perform in the future. Only a promise accompanied by the present 
intention not to perform made in order to mislead is actionable. 
See Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 
1982); and Berkeley Bank For Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 
(Utah 1980). 
There was not a scintilla of evidence produced at trial 
to support the contention that Fire Insurance at the time it 
issued the subject policy never intended to perform its 
obligations thereunder. The fact that promises are broken does 
not necessarily mean that a party has engaged in a deliberate 
scheme to mislead or to defraud. 
The loss occasioned by the collapse of the earth home was 
a highly unusual, if not unique, loss. The parties had great 
difficulty in getting contractors to submit repair estimates. Not 
even Rocky Mountain State Bank was able to convince a contractor 
to tender a bid. (R. at 1687-88, 1976-77, 2035, 2557) Adjusting 
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this atypical loss was a difficult and laborious task. Fire 
Insurance's adjusters spent more time and effort in adjusting this 
loss than called for under company policy. (R. at 19 35) While 
errors in judgment and mistakes may have been made, Fire 
Insurance's actions were void of any ill will or malice towards the 
Crookstons. 
Fire Insurance issues hundreds of policies on a daily 
basis. The company's Ogden branch office handles over 4,000 
claims a year. (R. at 2587) The overwhelming majority of those 
claims are handled expeditiously and to the complete satisfaction 
of policyholders. (R. at 2587-89) There was no evidence presented 
at trial that Fire Insurance, at the time the Crookstons' policy 
was issued, did not intend to perform its obligations thereunder. 
The scope of coverage under the Crookstons' policy was 
indistinguishable from that of countless other policies issued by 
Fire Insurance. The fact that the Crookstons maintain that they 
did not receive all the coverage they had contracted for, falls far 
short of establishing that the policy was issued with only the 
illusion of insurance coverage. 
The second allegation of actionable fraudulent 
misrepresentation is that Fire Insurance's agent misrepresented 
that he did not have any authority to settle the Crookstons' 
claim. (R. at 2692) Crookstons elicited testimony that 
"authority" had in fact been given from Fire Insurancefe regional 
office in Pocatello, Idaho. It is important to remember that the 
relationship between the Crookstons and their insurer is governed 
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solely by the contract entered into by the parties. The Utah 
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the view that a fiduciary 
relationship exists between an insurer and its insured in the 
context of a first-party dispute. See Beck, 701 P.2d at 800. 
Indeed, in the context of a first-party dispute between an insurer 
and its insured, they are "in effect and practically speaking, 
adversaries." Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745. 
Due to the relationship that existed between the parties 
during the time the loss was being adjusted, there was no duty on 
the part of Fire Insurance to divulge the nature or extent of its 
settlement authority from its regional office. It cannot be 
seriously contended that one has a duty to disclose one's 
settlement authority in an "adversarial" relationship. In light of 
the relationship of an insured and its insurer in a first-party 
dispute, there simply was no duty of disclosure. Absent a duty to 
disclose the nature or extent of its settlement authority to the 
Crookstons, any reliance by them on any such representation was 
wholly unreasonable and unjustifiable. 
Assuming arguendo that there was reasonable reliance, for 
which there was no specific testimony produced at trial, it is 
inconceivable that the Crookstons were damaged in any way from 
that particular "misrepresentation." They were represented by 
counsel during the time the alleged misrepresentations took place. 
If they had somehow compromised their claim as a result of this 
"misrepresentation," the misrepresentation might be actionable. 
However, the Crookstons did not in any way compromise or 
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jeopardize their claim or contract rights in reliance upon the 
representation of Fire Insurance's agents. 
The third allegation of actionable fraudulent 
misrepresentation is that Alan Clapperton misrepresented to the 
Crookstons1 counsel on June 16, 1982 that Fire Insurance was not 
yet in a position to settle, and that he would notify counsel at 
such time that the company was in a position to settle. (R. at 
269 3) Once again, the record does not establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Crookstons relied in any way on this 
representation. Even if they did rely, such reliance was 
unreasonable and unjustifiable. Furthermore, the Crookstons failed 
to demonstrate at trial how this particular "misrepresentation" 
damaged or jeopardized their claims or rights. 
The fourth allegation of actionable fraudulent 
misrepresentation is that Fire Insurance misrepresented that the 
only amount due and owing under the policy was approximately 
$27,000. (R. at 2693) Crookstons elicited testimony at trial to 
support their view that the subject policy included coverage for 
the cost of cleaning up the building site and for providing certain 
living expenses after the loss. Assuming arguendo that Fire 
Insurance failed to pay any amounts alleged to be due and owing for 
cleanup of the building site, or for certain living expenses, 
the fact that some promises embodied in the written contract were 
breached does not necessarily require a finding of fraud. 
This allegation of actionable fraudulent misrepresentation 
is in essence nothing more than a statement as to the legal 
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effect of the insurance contract between the parties. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 1984), 
recognized the general rule that "misrepresentations of law or 
the legal effect of contracts and writings does [sic] not 
constitute remedial fraud." (Quoting Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 
Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 276 (1947)). While there are exceptions 
to this general rule, the Crookstons had no right to rely on the 
representations of Fire Insurance's agents. Such a rule was 
recognized in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 
349 (Ind. 1982). In Armstrong, the court specifically rejected 
the view that an insurance contract creates a presumption of 
trust and competence on one side and a corresponding influence on 
the other. The court stated: 
[W]e are aware of no instance where it has 
been held or even urged that the relationship 
between an insurer and insured entitles the 
insured, after a dispute has arisen, to rely 
upon the insurer's interpretation of the con-
tract. This is not to say that the insurer 
is under no duty to refrain from making 
fraudulent representations and to act in good 
faith but only that it is not bound to be 
correct. Were it otherwise, there simply 
could be no direct adjustment of claim. 
Id. at 364 (emphasis added). 
In a context other than an insurance contract, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that: 
The one who complains of being injured by 
such a false representation cannot heedlessly 
accept as true whatever is told him, but has 
the duty of exercising such degree of care to 
protect his own interests as would be exercised 
by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person 
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under the circumstances; and if he fails to do 
so, is precluded from holding someone else to 
account for the consequences of his own neglect. 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662-663 
(1967). See also, Wolfe v. Brunqardt, 215 Kan. 272, 524 P.2d 
726, 735 (1974) ("In the ordinary business transactions of life, 
men are expected to exercise reasonable prudence and not rely 
upon others with whom they deal to care for and protect their 
interests."). 
The fundamental point in regard to this allegation of 
actionable fraudulent misrepresentation is whether there has been 
reliance. Reliance is a belief which motivates an act or an 
omission to act. There is no evidence that Clappertonfs 
statement motivated the Crookstons to take or omit to take a 
particular course of action which resulted in damage to their 
claims or contractual rights. There was no reliance. Even if the 
Crookstons did rely, their reliance was unreasonable. See 
Woodlawn Fraternal Lodge v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 510 So.2d 
162 (Ala. 1987) (it is unreasonable as a matter of law to rely on 
oral statements when one is in possession of written documents 
that would put one on notice as to the validity of those 
statements). 
The three remaining allegations of actionable fraudulent 
misrepresentation, that the Phipps1 bid was reasonable and would 
cover all costs required to restore the home back to its pre-loss 
condition, that payment of approximately $32,000 to the bank 
extinguished the Crookstons1 rights to additional sums under the 
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policy, and that no additional funds would be paid out under the 
policy, all likewise fail. (R. at 2694) There was no clear and 
convincing evidence establishing that those representations 
concerned a "presently existing material fact," that the Crookstons 
in fact relied on those representations, that such reliance was 
reasonable and justifiable, and that the Crookstons sustained some 
damage from those misrepresentations. Crookstons never 
compromised, or even exercised, their rights under the insurance 
contract. This is not a case where the insured was induced into 
compromising its rights by way of a release or otherwise due to a 
misrepresentation made by the insurer. Crookstons took no 
detrimental action, and their contractual and legal rights have not 
been diminished in any way due to any act or conduct on the part of 
Fire Insurance. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence on 
each of these points, the jury's verdict on the count for 
fraudulent misrepresentation is unsupported in law and in fact. 
POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S $175,000 ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AWARD WAS IMPROPER AND EXCESSIVE. 
Following its denial of Fire Insurance Exchange's post-
trial motions, the trial court determined that the Crookstons were 
entitled to an award of $175,000 in attorney's fees. (R. at 2956, 
2964-67) The award of attorneys' fees was improper since there 
was no statutory or contractual basis therefor. See, Espinoza v. 
Safety Title Insurance Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). This court 
has heretofore restricted the recovery of attorneys' fees to those 
incurred in the enforcement of express contractual covenants. 
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Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976). While a few 
jurisdictions allow the recovery of attorneys' fees in actions 
based on fraud, a majority of courts refuse to make such awards. 
See, Annot., 44 A.L.R.4th 776, 782, §3 (1986). Since there is no 
Utah law on point and no relevant statutory authority, the trial 
courtfs award of attorneys1 fees was unfounded. 
Even assuming the award was proper, the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding fees in the amount of $175,000, in 
addition to the 40% contingency fee counsel was already entitled to 
receive. (R. at 1019-20) 
Normally, an award of attorney's fees is in the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the 
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. Sears 
v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982). However, Judge 
Frederick's award of $175,000 was clearly an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. 
In Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985), 
the Court set the standard for determining the reasonableness of 
attorney's fees: 
A court may consider, among other factors, 
the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting 
the case, the reasonableness of the hours 
spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case 
and the result attained, the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved. 
Consistent with the foregoing factors, counsel provided 
his own affidavit and deposition testimony to support the 
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attorney's fees award. (R. at 2773-2800, 2997) Notwithstanding 
this approach, two major problem areas are evident. First, the 
award resulted almost entirely from counsel's self-serving 
opinions, a result disfavored under Utah law. Specifically, in 
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279 
(Utah 1982), the Court held that the statement of one party's coun-
sel at a post-trial hearing did not provide adequate evidentiary 
bases for the equal apportionment of attorney's fees between the 
parties: 
In this case, the parties by stipulation 
presented detailed billing records to the 
court as the evidentiary basis upon which 
the court could determine a reasonable 
attorney's fee award for the prevailing 
party. The record indicates, however, that 
the court's decision to apportion the 
liability equally was not based on this 
evidence, but rather was derived wholly from 
the post-trial statement of counsel. 
Id. at 1287. 
In so ruling, the Court looked to Sharp v. Hui Wahine, 
Inc., 49 Haw. 241, 413 P.2d 242 (1966). In Sharp, a litigant was 
denied attorney's fees after successfully prosecuting a 
foreclosure suit, because counsel had offered only his opinion to 
support the award he sought. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated: 
Counsel submitted neither evidence of the 
customary charges of the bar nor any expert 
testimony other than their own self-serving 
opinions to show their reasonableness of 
their fees. As has been aptly stated: 
" . . . While the mortgagee's attorney may 
not be an incompetent witness, it is not 
good practice to make an award [of an 
attorney fee] predicated only on his 
opinion." 
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Id. at 246-247 (quoting 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §812e(2) at 1554 
(1949)). See also, Paul Mueller Co., 657 P.2d at 1288; Freed 
Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975); 
Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 45 P.2d 1044 (1971); Mason v. 
Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730 (1945). 
The trial court in this case relied exclusively upon the 
self-serving subjective opinions of counsel to show the 
reasonableness of the requested fees. By way of affidavit and 
deposition testimony, counsel outlined why a substantial attorney's 
fee award was both reasonable and justifiable. Such an approach 
is, however, inconsistent with established Utah law. 
Furthermore, the evidence in support of the fee award was 
inadequate to support such a large award of fees. Specifically, 
counsel presented detailed billing records to the court as the 
evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable attorney's fee award 
could be determined. (R. at 2773-2800) The record before the 
trial court showed 1,026.9 hours spent on behalf of the Crookstons 
and the underlying cause of action. Counsel further stated in his 
affidavit that there would be an additional 50 to 80 hours for 
which there were no time slips. (R. at 2774) Based upon the evi-
dence that counsel for the Crookstons had spent approximately 1,100 
hours on this case, the award of fees computes out to be in excess 
of $159.00 per hour, for all time spent on the entire case, 
including paralegal and clerk time. This is clearly in excess of 
even counsel's highest billing rates during the relevant time 
period. (R. at 2997) 
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The trial court's award is also flawed in another 
respect. The Court in Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. 
Fox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981), held that a party is entitled 
only to those fees resulting from its principal cause of action. 
Based upon its holding in Fox, the Utah Supreme Court in Paul 
Mueller Co., determined that only those hours attributable to the 
prosecution of the main causes of action are compensable and not 
those attributable to the defense of counterclaims, etc. 657 P.2d 
at 1288. 
In the instant case, counsel's request for attorney's 
fees included an itemization of all time spent on the case, 
including time spent in pursuing claims against other parties, 
i.e., Rocky Mountain State Bank. As a result, the trial court's 
award is clearly excessive and evidences an abuse of discretion. 
The award must, therefore, be reversed. 
POINT X. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE 
WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
U.R.C.P. 51 provides in pertinent part, "The court shall 
not comment on the evidence in the case . . . .fl In Crawford v. 
Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the Court found reversible 
error, in part, due to the improper comments of the trial judge 
respecting wrongful death actions. The Court stated, "The state-
ment was uncalled for and may have suggested that the statute giv-
ing a right to sue for damages for the wrongful death of a parent 
was something to be criticized." Id. at 1092. 
In the instant case, the trial court also committed error 
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in commenting on the evidence. On the fifth day of trial, during 
the testimony of the Crookstons1 expert witness, economist Paul 
Randle, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Do you have any explanation 
whatsoever why the Crookstons didn't seek 
their right of appraisal under the policy 
with the insurance company? 
A. I don't have any idea why not, 
except I've dealt with people in financial 
matters for a long, long time, people with 
far greater sophistication than the 
Crookstons have -- and people are 
financially illiterate. I'm not just talk-
ing about the Crookstons, I'm talking about 
doctors and lawyers and judges and college 
professors. 
The Court: I'll affirm that. 
(Laughter) 
(R. at 2506-07) 
The court's comment was uncalled for and highly improper. 
While such a comment may not by itself be sufficient to merit 
reversal, that comment combined with the other irregularities that 
occurred at trial, warrant a new trial. 
POINT XI. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN FAILING TO ALLOW FIRE INSURANCE ADEQUATE 
OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The bank served its motion for summary judgment and 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on Friday, 
May 22, 1987, the day prior to the start of a three-day Memorial 
Day weekend. On May 26, 1987, just five calendar days and one 
working day after the bank served its motion for summary judgment, 
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the motion was granted by the trial court. Furthermore, argument 
on the motion for summary judgment was held, despite objection by 
counsel for Fire Insurance, just one hour prior to the scheduled 
six-day trial of the case. The granting of the bank?s motion for 
summary judgment without allowing the opposing party adequate time 
to respond constitutes reversible error. 
U.R.C.P. 56(c) provides non-moving parties at least ten 
days1 notice of the hearing on a motion for summary judgment: 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. 
Although some courts have found the ten-day notice 
requirement of Rule 56(c) to be jurisdictional, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 
508 P.2d 538, 541 (1973), held that the notice provision of U.R.C.P. 
56(c) is not jurisdictional. See also, Western States Thrift & 
Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972); 
and Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 
407 P.2d 141, 142 (1965). But see, Torres v. First State Bank, 550 
F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1977); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 
483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1973); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973); and Enochs v. 
Sisson, 301 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1962). 
In Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 
(1974), the Court noted that the time limitation and notice 
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are not hard and 
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fast rules. While trial courts are afforded some discretion in 
waiving procedural notice requirements, it is clear that under 
certain circumstances a trial court's failure to require strict 
compliance with the rules warrants reversal. See Mickelson v. 
Shelley, 542 P.2d 740, 742 (Utah 1975) (trial court abused its 
discretion where defendants were required to go to trial without 
adequate notice of the trial date). See also, Hein's Turkey 
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271, 
470 P.2d 257 (1970) (defendant's motion for summary judgment filed 
on day of trial held untimely). 
This Court's adoption of a harmless error standard in 
dealing with non-compliance with procedural time limitation and 
notice provisions means that a trial court's ruling will not be 
disturbed absent objection to the timing or notice of the hearing. 
Walker, 508 P.2d at 541. In addition, a trial court's ruling 
dispensing with a notice requirement will not be reversed unless 
the party opposing the motion can demonstrate prejudice. Western 
States Thrift & Loan Co., 504 P.2d at 1021. Prejudice, at least 
in part, is determined by whether the party had "actual notice and 
time to prepare to meet the questions raised by the motion of an 
adversary." Jensen, 519 P.2d at 238. 
The prejudicial effect of not affording a party adequate 
time to defend against a dispositive motion, filed on the eve of 
trial, was noted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beck v. 
Borden, Inc., 724 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1984). In Beck, the 
plaintiff's former employee brought an action against his employer, 
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alleging that it negligently failed to make contributions on his 
behalf to a union pension fund. The trial court set a trial date 
of January 24, 1983. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was 
filed and served on counsel for the plaintiff on January 17, 1983. 
The trial court gave plaintiff until 4:00 p.m. on January 19, 1983, 
to respond. Plaintiff objected that such short notice placed an 
unreasonable and unfair burden on him to prepare an adequate 
response. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment on January 24, 198 3. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to 
reversal because of the trial courtfs failure to follow the 
requirements of Rule 56(c). In response, the defendant contended 
that Rule 56(c) was flexible and that any error of the trial court 
was harmless because plaintiff had failed to show any prejudice. 
In reversing and remanding the action for further 
proceedings, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
Upon consideration of the briefs and oral 
arguments of counsel together with the 
record on appeal this court concludes that 
the district court committed reversible 
error in this case, in Kistner v. Califano, 
579 F.2d 1004, 1006 (6th Cir. 1978), we dis-
cussed the time requirement of Rule 56(c): 
Noncompliance with the time provision 
of the rule deprives the court of 
authority to grant summary judgment, 
Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 
483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1973), unless 
the opposing party has waived this 
requirement, United States v. Miller, 
318 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1963), or there 
has been no prejudice to the opposing 
party by the court's failure to comply 
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with this provision of the rule. 
Qppenheimer v. Morton Hotel Corp., 324 
F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1963) . 
There is no indication that the plaintiff 
waived the requirement in the present case 
and his memorandum in opposition set forth a 
claim of prejudice. Plaintiff was entitled 
to ten days to prepare a response to the 
motion. The fact that Borden waited so late 
to file its motion for summary judgment put 
the trial court in a difficult position. In 
the absence of a waiver by the plaintiff of 
the ten-day requirement of Rule 56(c) the 
district court should have either denied the 
motion or set it for hearing ten days hence, 
reserving any ruling until that time. It is 
generally held that motions for summary 
judgment are inappropriate on the eve of 
trial. See Management Investors v. United 
Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d 384, 389 
(6th Cir. 1979) . 
Beck, 724 F.2d at 45 (emphasis added). 
Courts generally limit the harmless error rule to 
extraordinary cases in which it is clear that the nonmoving party 
suffered no prejudice from a shortening of the time to respond. 
Due to the dispositive nature of summary judgment motions, 
appellate courts have encouraged strict compliance with the time 
provisions of Rule 56(c). In Finn v. Gunter, 722 F.2d 711 (11th 
Cir. 1984), the court reviewed a district court's sua sponte action 
converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a summary 
judgment motion without affording the nonmoving party the ten-day 
notice required by Rule 56(c) before granting partial summary 
judgment, in reversing and remanding the action, the court stated: 
It is clear why we strictly follow the 
notice requirement of Rule 56- A motion to 
dismiss may result in a rejection of the 
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complaint but it does not finally resolve 
the case. When this type of motion is 
before the court counsel are generally 
addressing questions of law. A summary 
judgment, on the other hand, carries far 
greater impact since it results in a final 
adjudication of the merits. "The very 
intimation of mortality when summary judg-
ment is at issue assures us that the motion 
will be rebutted with every factual and 
legal argument available." Georgia Southern 
& Florida Railway Co. v. Atlantic Railroad, 
37 3 F.2d at 498. Appellee argues that Finn 
has already provided everything that he 
could. Appellant says there is additional 
material that can and will be filed. What 
is important is that Finn must be given an 
opportunity to present every factual and 
legal argument available. Proper procedures 
must be followed. 
Id. at 713. 
Courts have likewise restricted the application of the 
harmless error rule where a party petitions for waiver of the 
time and notice requirements of Rule 56(c) on the eve of trial. In 
Gutwein v. Roche Laboratories, 739 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984), the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to review the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment where the motion was filed 
only five days before trial. In Gutwein, the plaintiff brought 
suit against the defendant drug manufacturer claiming that the 
defendant's products caused him to lose his eyesight. The parties 
engaged in discovery over a three-year period. Trial was 
eventually set for September 12, 1983. On September 7, five days 
before the trial, defendant moved for summary judgment based on 
lack of evidence on the issues of causation and duty to warn. In 
opposing the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's counsel 
submitted medical literature suggesting a causal link between the 
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plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's product. In addition, 
plaintiff's counsel argued that the short notice precluded him from 
obtaining supporting affidavits in opposition to the motion. After 
a hearing on September 12, in which plaintiff's counsel again 
objected to the lack of notice, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant. 
On appeal, the plaintiff once again contended that he was 
deprived of adequate opportunity to oppose the motion. The 
defendant conceded that its motion for summary judgment did not 
comply with Rule 56(c), but urged that the trial court's decision 
be affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff could not demonstrate 
prejudice. In reversing and remanding the trial court's granting 
of summary judgment, the Second Circuit noted that the harmless 
error rule should not apply to motions for summary judgment filed 
on the eve of trial: 
In Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, 632 F.2d 
219 (2d Cir. 1980), we expressed a 
preference for strict adherence to the ten-
day rule, noting that the opposing party 
must be allowed "adequate opportunity" to 
respond. While we may have left the door 
open for application of a harmless error 
rule, id. at 223 n. 6, we believe that the 
use of such a rule must be limited to 
extraordinary cases in which the ten-day 
notice is impractical, and it is absolutely 
clear that the non-moving party suffered no 
prejudice from a shortening of the period. 
This follows we believed from the non-moving 
party's burden of production and the need 
for time to marshall and prepare documents 
indicating the presence of a disputed 
factual issue. Since preparation of papers 
to oppose a motion for summary judgment may 
differ materially from preparation for 
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trial, the better practice is to establish 
discovery schedules which allow such motions 
to be made and considered prior to the trial 
date and simply to deny motions which do not 
afford the necessary notice. 
* * * 
The fact that this case was scheduled 
for trial on September 12 is not cause for 
shortening the ten-day period on the grounds 
that the appellant's evidence had to be 
marshalled within the shorter period anyway. 
Opposition to the motion for summary judgment 
required the preparation and execution of 
documents by the 12th, tasks considerably 
different from summoning witnesses for oral 
testimony at a trial beginning on the 12th. 
It may be, therefore, that granting either 
more time to prepare opposition to the 
motion or going ahead with the trial would 
have led to a different result in the 
instant case. 
We believe that where a party claims an 
inability to prepare adequate opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment within a 
shortened response period, the non-moving 
party must be afforded the full response 
period mandated by Rule 56(c), absent reason 
to believe that that claim is demonstrably 
frivolous. 
Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added). 
Numerous courts have found prejudice to be inherent where 
motions for summary judgment are filed on the eve of trial and 
where adequate time to respond is not given. See Management 
Investors v. United Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d 384, 388-89 
(6th Cir. 1979); Ailshire v. Darnell, 508 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 
1974); and Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 
F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973) . 
The potential for prejudice to a party from last minute 
motions for summary judgment is also reflected in Rule 4(d) of the 
-96-
Rules of Practice of the Third Judicial District Court. Rule 4(d) 
governs the instant case, and clearly is intended to discourage and 
restrict the filing of motions for summary judgment on the eve of 
trial. Rule 4(d) provides: 
All motions for summary judgment or other 
dispositive motions must be heard at least 
thirty (30) days before the day set for 
trial. No such motion shall be heard after 
that date without leave of court. 
The lack of adequate notice and time to respond was 
particularly prejudicial to Fire Insurance in the instant case. 
At the hearing on the bank's motion for summary judgment, counsel 
for Rocky Mountain States Bank reviewed for the court the 
circumstances surrounding their settlement with the plaintiffs and 
the subsequent filing of the motion for summary judgment on 
Friday, May 22, 1986. (R. at 2996-98) Trial counsel for Fire 
Insurance immediately objected to the notice and timing of the 
motion: 
Mr. Roybal: Well, your Honor, the unfortu-
nate thing about this particular aspect of 
this case is the timing. It is very diffi-
cult for all parties to take the position on 
it. Number 1, I have not had time to go 
through the memorandum and research the 
issues that the bank has raised relative to 
whether contribution and indemnity go to 
anything other than purely negligence, but I 
will submit to the court that under Rule 
56(c), I must be given at least ten days 
notice before the hearing is set to respond 
to a motion for summary judgment, which is 
what the bank has filed, is a motion for 
summary judgment. 
I have not been given that, and on that 
ground alone, I think the court should not 
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require me to even respond in any way, shape 
or form to it, and should the bank take the 
position that this is a motion to dismiss 
rather than a motion for summary judgment, 
Rule 2-7(b) of the Rules of Practice in the 
district and circuit court also require at 
least five days1 notice prior to the notice 
of hearing which I have not had. 
(R. at 2998-99) 
The improper timing of the bank's motion was also 
acknowledged by counsel for both the plaintiffs and the bank. 
(R. at 2997, 3000-01) The trial court noted Fire Insurance's 
objection to the notice and timing of the motion for summary 
judgment, but ruled as follows: 
I am of the view that in light of the 
exigent circumstances that have now been 
prompted principally by the result of the 
settlement that the opportunity to respond, 
as provided in the Rules, can be and should 
be appropriately be waived in light of what 
I deem to be no showing of unfair prejudice 
to a party, and, accordingly, the notice 
requirement is waived. It is my judgment 
that being Tuesday, there has been some ade-
quate or at least available time within 
which Mr. Roybal, the memorandum, which is 
not lengthy in this matter, could have been 
reviewed and an argument at least presented 
to this court as to what additional theories 
you thought might be appropriate or what 
evidence might be appropriate to allow you 
to assert a cross-claim for contribution or 
indemnity. 
Therefore, it is my view, counsel, in 
light of the settlement that's been effected 
and the arguments that have been presented 
here, that the motion for summary judgment 
is granted, and I think that, too, in light 
of what appears to me to be a very slim, if 
any, likelihood of any basis for asserting a 
cross-claim or indemntification against the 
bank that serves merely to unduly prolong 
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these proceedings and the issues that the 
jury will have to consider, in any event. 
So the bank's motion is granted. 
(R. at 3006) Following the court's ruling, counsel for Fire 
Insurance moved for a continuance in order to prepare a possible 
third-party complaint against the defendant bank. (R. at 3007) 
The motion to continue was denied. (R. at 3012) 
In choosing to act as it did on the bank's motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court disposed of a complex case 
without even permitting Fire Insurance the benefits of applicable 
procedural rules. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
should have allowed Fire Insurance at least ten days after the 
motion for summary judgment was served to respond. Similarly, 
local Rule 4(d) should have prohibited the filing of such a motion 
on the very eve of trial. In this case, however, the motion was 
not served upon Fire Insurance's counsel until late in the evening 
of Friday, May 22, 1986. Hearing on the motion was held on the 
next business day, the same day previously set for the beginning 
of a six-day trial. Counsel for Fire Insurance objected to the 
timing and the lack of notice of the defendant bank's motion. 
Counsel requested additional time to respond to the motion. 
Although the court heard argument on the motion and in that sense 
granted a hearing, the hearing was little more than an empty 
gesture since counsel for Fire Insurance effectively had been 
deprived of his opportunity to respond to the motion. 
Both the Constitution of the State of Utah and the United 
States Constitution guarantee due process of law. U.S. Const. 
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Amend. XIV, §1, and Utah Const. Art. I, §7. The Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the local Rules of Practice define what minimum 
procedural safeguards are due in a given circumstance. The trial 
courtfs refusal to require strict compliance with the notice and 
time limitations of those rules, after counsel objected and 
requested additional time to respond, prejudiced Fire Insurance 
and denied defendant its due process right to be heard. See 
Management Investors v. United Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d 
384, 390 (6th Cir. 1979). Fire Insurance respectfully submits 
that the trial court's actions in entertaining and granting the 
motion for summary judgment after less than five days1 notice and 
on the eve of trial constitutes reversible error. 
POINT XII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FIRE 
INSURANCE HAD NO RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION 
AGAINST ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK. 
The question squarely presented to the trial court below 
was whether there was any ground to support a right of contribution 
in favor of Fire Insurance against Rocky Mountain State Bank. 
Counsel for the bank took the position in the lower court that 
there is no basis for contribution or indemnity for either 
intentional torts or breaches of contract. (R. at 1243-49, 2997) 
The trial court, having found that the plaintiffs did not intend 
to pursue any claims sounding in negligence against Fire Insurance 
at trial, held that the bank was entitled to summary judgment in 
its favor as a matter of law on the ground that there is no right 
of contribution between intentional tortfeasors. (R. at 1257, 
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1538-40, 3007) 
At common law there was no contribution among joint 
tortfeasors. Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. 
Rep. 1337 (1799). See also, Restatement of Restitution §102 
(1936). Utah, as well as many other jurisdictions, adhered to the 
common law rule until the legislature abrogated the prohibition 
against contribution. The legislature's enactment of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-39 in 197 3 abolished the common law rule on 
contribution in the State of Utah. See Krukiewicz v. Draper, 
725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986). Section 78-27-39 of the Utah 
Code, now repealed, provides for contribution among joint 
tortfeasors: 
(1) The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint 
tort-feasor shall not be entitled to money 
judgment for contribution until he has, by 
payment, discharged the common liability or 
more than his pro rata share thereof. 
Section 78-27-40(3) of the Utah Code defines "joint tort-
feasor" as follows: 
As used in this action, "joint tort-feasor" 
means one of two or more persons, jointly or 
severally liable in tort for the same injury 
to person or property, whether or not judgment 
has been recovered against all or some of them. 
The determination of whether Fire Insurance has a right 
of contribution against the bank turns not on what might have been 
the rule at common law, but whether such a right exists under 
§§78-27-39 and 78-27-40, now repealed, of the Utah Code. In 
determining whether such a statutory right exists, a well-
established rule of statutory construction, Utah Code Ann. 
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§68-3-2 (1953), controls: 
The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed 
has no application to the statutes of this state. 
The statutes establish the laws of this state 
respecting the subjects to which they relate, 
and their provisions and all proceedings under 
them are to be liberally construed with a view 
to effect the object of the statutes and to 
promote justice. Whenever there is any variance 
between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter 
the rules of equity shall prevail. (Emphasis 
added) 
The Court in Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349 (Utah 
1986), had occasion to determine whether a defendant was a "joint 
tortfeasor" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40(3) 
(repealed 1986). In Krukiewicz, the plaintiffs were injured in an 
automobile collision with an automobile driven by defendant Holm. 
At the time of the accident, Holm was acting in the course of his 
employment by defendant Draper. Pursuant to a settlement 
agreement, Holm paid the plaintiffs $40,000, and the plaintiffs 
released Holm from further liability, but expresssly reserved all 
rights against Draper. Subsequently, plaintiffs sued Draper. 
Draper then moved for summary judgment. The trial court held that 
the plaintiffs release of Holm also released Draper from liability 
as a matter of law, and plaintiffs appealed. 
On appeal, the court was asked to determine whether a 
master in the context of a master-servant relationship is a "joint 
tortfeasor" under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40(3), now repealed. The 
court, noting the origin of the Utah statutes abrogating the common 
law prohibition against contribution, stated: 
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The background of §78-27-42, enacted in 
1973 as part of the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act, §§78-27-39 to -43, indicates 
that it was designed to reverse the common 
law rule. It was patterned after the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 
first promulgated by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1939. 
Id. at 1351 (emphasis added). 
The Court in Krukiewicz looked to the decisions of other 
jurisdictions with statutes patterned after the 1939 version of 
the Uniform Act to determine whether a master is a "joint 
tortfeasor" under the Utah contribution statute. The court, 
citing with approval the Delaware Supreme Court decision in 
Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1978), stated: 
The Delaware Supreme Court, in discussing why 
the 1939 Uniform Act's definition of joint 
tortfeasor included the master-servant relation-
ship, stated: 
The basis of liability is not relevant, 
nor is the relationship among those 
liable for the tort. In short, it makes 
no difference whether the [master's] 
liability is based upon the doctrine of 
respondeat superior or any other legal 
concept. The point is that both it and 
the [servant] are (at least) "severally" 
liable for the same injury to plaintiff. 
Therefore the Uniform Contribution Among 
Tort-feasors Act applies. We so hold. 
Id. at 1351-52 (emphasis added). 
The Court reversed and remanded the matter, holding that 
the defendant employer was a "joint tortfeasor" since he was 
severally liable with his servant for the same indivisible injury 
to the plaintiff, id. 
Similarly, the Court in Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 
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(Utah 1983), noted that the right to contribution is not limited 
under Utah law to actions sounding solely in negligence. Cruz 
arose from an incident in a Salt Lake City cafe where Mr* Cruz 
sustained personal injuries as a result of a fight with Val 
Montoya and Mike Montoya. Cruz brought suit against the Montoyas. 
The jury awarded a verdict against Val Montoya in excess of 
$21,000. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Mike 
Montoya because the plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie 
case against him. Several other defendants were not present at 
the trial. 
On appeal, Val Montoya contended that he was unfairly 
required to answer for the acts of all the defendants and not just 
his own. Montoya also contended that he was being forced to bear 
a disproportionate amount of the damages because all of the 
defendants were not similarly brought to trial. The Court 
rejected his arguments by stating: 
This statute [Utah Code Annotated §78-27-40(2)] 
applies to joint tortfeasors' rights of con-
tribution. It does not support Valfs argument 
nor mandate that the plaintiff must obtain 
jurisdiction over all the tortfeasors and 
bring them to trial so that the proportion 
of fault of each may be there determined. 
Further, the manner in which the Montoyas were 
brought to trial does not diminish the damage 
[Cruz] suffered or Val's participation in and 
liability for the assault. With respect to 
general and special damages, [Cruz] concedes 
that the maximum amount that he can collect 
from all of the defendants is $9,000 general 
damages and $869.80 special damages. If these 
amounts are paid by Val, he is not precluded 
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from exercising his right to seek contribution 
from the other Montoyas. 
Id. at 727-28 (emphasis added). 
As already noted, the Utah contribution statute was 
patterned after the 19 39 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors 
Act- Krukiewicz, 725 P.2d at 1351. Other jurisdictions still 
retaining the substance of the original Uniform Act of 1939 
include: Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. 
12 Uniform Laws Ann. 62 (1975). A review of the history 
surrounding the promulgation of the 19 39 Act, as well as an 
analysis of cases arising in jurisdictions with contribution 
statutes patterned after the 19 39 Act provide persuasive evidence 
that intentional tortfeasors have a right of contribution under 
Utah law. See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903 
(Utah 1984) (construction placed on similar statute by sister 
states is a valuable aid in determining legislative intent); and 
Valley National Bank v. Avco Development Co., 14 Ariz.App. 56, 480 
P.2d 671 (1971) (comments of Commission on Uniform State Laws are 
highly persuasive and should be adopted unless contrary to the 
settled policy of a state). 
Due to the existence of numerous variations and 
exceptions to the common law rule prohibiting contribution, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
recommended the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 
19 39. The pertinent sections of the 19 39 Act are as follows: 
Section 1. For the purposes of this Act the 
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term joint tortfeasors means two or more 
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for 
the same injury to persons or property, whether 
or not judgment has been recovered against all 
or some of them. 
Section 2. (1) The right of contribution exists 
among joint tortfeasors; (2) A joint tort-
feasor is not entitled to a money judgment for 
contribution until he has by payment discharged 
the common liability or has paid more than his 
pro-rata share thereof. 
12 Uniform Laws Ann. 57 (1975). 
It should be noted that the Act itself makes no 
distinction between intentional tortfeasors and those who are 
merely negligent. In fact, the commissioners purposely omitted 
any distinction. The Act was to apply to all joint tortfeasors, 
regardless of the theory or basis of their liability. In 
commenting upon the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 
19 39, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws state: 
This subsection creates the right of contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors. It does not, 
in any way, qualify the creation of this right 
by confining it to joint tortfeasors in any 
narrower sense than that indicated in section 1. 
Nor does it confine contribution to merely 
negligent tortfeasors or to those in any way 
inadvertently harming others. It permits con-
tribution among all tortfeasors whom the injured 
person could hold liable for the same damage or 
injury to his person or property. 
1938 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, p. 393 (emphasis added). See also, 1939 
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, p. 136 et seq; Comment, Contribution - Willful 
Tortfeasors - Common Law and Under Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act, 62 Dick. L. Rev. 262, 264 (1957-58); and F. 
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Harper and P. James, The Law of Torts, §10.2 at 722 (1956). 
Those jurisdictions which have patterned their 
contribution statutes after the 19 39 version of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act generally hold that intentional 
tortfeasors have a right of contribution. In Judson v. Peoples 
Bank and Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954), the New Jersey 
court held that intentional tortfeasors have a right to 
contribution. In Judson, the plaintiffs brought suit against five 
defendants for fraudulently conspiring to oust the plaintiffs from 
control of a corporation by inducing them to part with their stock 
at an unconscionable price. Plaintiffs accepted $2,500 from two 
of the defendants, Peoples Bank and Trust Company and from a Mr. 
Smith, an officer of Peoples Bank. Summary judgments were 
thereafter entered in favor of the remaining defendants, and 
plaintiff appealed. 
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court with Judge 
William J. Brennan, Jr., authoring the majority opinion, held that 
the summary judgments were improvidently granted since genuine 
issues of material facts remained. The court went on to address 
whether the New Jersey contribution statute, patterned after the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939, establishes a 
right of contribution among intentional tortfeasors. The court 
noted that over time the traditional common-law prohibition 
against contribution had given way to a number of judicially 
created exceptions permitting contribution under limited 
circumstances. Speaking of these exceptions, and the effect of 
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the New Jersey contribution statute on the common law rule, the 
court stated: 
These judicially created common-law and 
equitable principles are, of course, vulnerable 
to extinction or modification at the hands of 
the Legislature, the ultimate arbitor of public 
policy. Our problem is whether the Legislature 
in enacting the Contribution Law of 1952 adopted 
the policy of allowing contribution not only 
among unintentional co-tortfeasors but even 
among intentional including fraudulent joint 
wrongdoers. If the Legislature has enacted 
the broader right, our judicial function is to 
declare it however we may deplore the necessity 
of lending the aid of the courts to suitors 
guilty of intentional wrongdoing. 
The framers of the draft uniform act made clear 
the recommendation that Sections 1 and 2(1) of 
the draft act embraced the creation of a right 
of contribution among tortfeasors without regard 
to whether the tort for which the liability 
arose was intentionally or unintentionally 
inflicted. Section 1 provides that "for the 
purpose of this act the term 'joint tortfeasors1 
means two or more persons jointly or severally 
liable in tort for the same injury to person 
or property, whether or not judgment has been 
recovered against all or some of them." 
Section 2(1) provides, "the right of contribu-
tion exists among joint tortfeasors." That 
the inclusiveness of all torts implicit in 
this wording is intended is confirmed by the 
commissioner's note dealing with the 
sections . . . . 
* * * 
The legislative history prior to the enactment 
of our act of 1952 buttresses the conclusion 
that our Legislature adopted the provisions of 
the draft act in this regard to effect the 
comprehensive coverage recommended by the 
framers of the draft act. Assembly bills 
introduced in 1949, 1950 and 1951, as bills 
numbered 104, 267 and 242 for the respective 
years, would have limited contribution to 
tortfeasors guilty of negligence, and all 
failed of passage. 
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• * * 
The more reasonable interpretation [of the New 
Jersey contribution statutes] leave[s] no doubt 
that all torts of commission and omission were 
with the ambit of the law. 
Judson, 110 A.2d at 34-36 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the court in McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 
1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d 
Cir. 1979), held that the Delaware contribution statute, also 
patterned after the 19 39 Uniform Act, affords an intentional 
tortfeasor the right of contribution. The plaintiff in McLean 
brought suit after purchasing stock in reliance on a misleading 
report prepared by an accountant. The accountant cross-claimed 
for indemnification and contribution against various other 
defendants who were parties to the stock transaction. The 
plaintiff contended that the defendant accountant was not entitled 
to contribution, since such a right was limited to liability 
arising solely out of negligence. The district court rejected the 
plaintiff's position by applying Delaware law: 
In contrast to federal right for contribution, 
there is ample guidance with respect to the 
state claim. Defendant's cross-claim for 
contribution based on the finding of common 
law fraud must be resolved on the basis of 
the Delaware statute which permits apportion-
ment by comparative fault. Delaware was one 
of the first states to adopt the 19 39 Uniform 
Joint Tortfeasors Act providing that: 
When there is such a disproportion of 
fault among joint tortfeasors as to 
render an equitable and equal distribu-
tion among them of the common liability 
by contribution, the relative degrees of 
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fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be 
considered in determining the pro rata 
shares. 10 Del. C. §6302(d). 
Although plaintiff argues that the statute is 
limited to cases of negligence, there is no 
limitation expressed within the terms of the 
statute. Rather, there is evidence that no 
such qualification was intended. Instructive 
are comments to the 1955 version of the Uniform 
Joint Tortfeasors Act noting that Delaware by 
adoption of the 1939 Act applies the principle 
of relative culpability to non-intentional and 
intentional torts. Commentators writing at the 
time of its passage understood the statute to 
apply to intentional wrongdoing as well as non-
intentional torts agreeing that principles of 
apportionment were inherently more fair in 
either case and therefore basic to a well-
ordered system of loss allocation. Gregory, 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform 
Practice, 1938 Wise. L. Rev. 365, 380. 
* * * 
Finally, plaintiff asserts that the apportionment 
of damages which results in a reduction of 
damages for some defendants will undermine the 
principle of deterrence. This is the same 
argument found to be unpersuasive by the over-
whelming majority of states which now permit 
contribution. Although one defendant's damages 
are reduced, another's are increased; Thus a 
system which holds all wrongdoers liable for 
some damages, the amount of which depends on 
the extent of his involvement, will in all 
likelihood increase deterrence. Under such a 
system, one cannot embark on an unlawful course 
with the hope or expectation that someone less 
culpable will foot the bill. Thus, vigilance, 
if affected at all, is more likely increased 
than decreased. 
McLean, 449 F.Supp. at 1274-1275 (emphasis added). 
The Federal District Court in Testa v. Winquist, 451 
F.Supp. 388 (D. R.I. 1978), likewise held that under the Rhode 
Island contribution statute, patterned after the 19 39 Uniform Act, 
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an intentional tortfeasor has a right to contribution. In Testa, 
the plaintiffs brought action against several police officers to 
recover for alleged deprivations of their constitutional rights. 
The defendant police officers filed a third-party claim against 
various parties for contribution and indemnity. The court, in 
holding that intentional tortfeasors have a right of contribution 
under Rhode Island law, stated: 
In Rhode Island, contribution is generally 
available between joint tortfeasors for negli-
gent acts that are the concurring causes of 
plaintiff's injury. Third-party defendants 
urge that contribution is only available to 
the non-intentional tortfeasor and, thus, 
third-party plaintiffs charged with false 
arrest, imprisonment and constitutional wrongs 
cannot recover against them for their negligent 
acts. Third-party defendants correctly state 
the rule in some states which have abrogated 
the common law prohibition against contribution 
but still deny the right of contribution to an 
intentional tortfeasor. See generally, 18 Am.Jur. 
2d §§33-40 (1965). However, Rhode Island has 
adopted, without material alteration, the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which contains 
no such limitation on the right of contribution 
between joint tortfeasors, nor makes any distinc-
tion between negligent or intentional torts. 
F. Harper and FT James, The Law of Torts, §10.2 
at 722 (1956). The moving party has failed to 
provide any Rhode Island case law suggesting 
such a narrow interpretation of the act, nor 
has this court found any. Of course, inten-
tional conduct is more likely to constitute a 
superseding unforeseeable cause for which the 
initial negligent tortfeasor is not liable. 
But there is no reason to institute a hard and 
fast rule denying contribution to the party who 
commits an intentional tort such as false arrest 
and imp r i s onment. 
Testa, 451 F.Supp. at 392-393 (emphasis added). 
The court in Boyles v. Hyder, 22 B.R. 851 (N.D. Tex. 
1982), held that under Texas law intentional tortfeasors also have 
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a right of contribution. The Texas court stated: 
The Texas statute is broadly worded to allow 
contribution in favor of any tortfeasor. 
Absent a clear mandate by the Texas legislature 
or Texas courts to limit the provisions to unin-
tentional tortfeasors, I will construe the 
statute literally. Also, from a policy stand-
point, this result is sensible. The common law 
rule has been justified as deterring wrong-doers, 
but allowing one tortfeasor to go scot-free while 
penalizing a joint tortfeasor does little to 
deter the wrong-doer who pays nothing. Further, 
it seems questionable that the majority of those 
who conspire, commit fraud, and inflict other 
wrongs intentionally are deterred by a rule 
they probably never consider and indeed do not 
know until long after the intentional wrong is 
committed. When contribution among intentional 
tortfeasors is allowed, all wrong-doers are 
punished to some extent for their actions. 
Allowing contribution in no way prejudices the 
injured party who remains free to seek full 
satisfaction from any one of the tortfeasors. 
Contribution only affects the rights of the 
wrong-doers among themselves. 
Id. at 854 (emphasis added). 
Other jurisdictions have similarly held under statutes 
comparable to the Utah contribution statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-39, that intentional tortfeasors have a right of 
contribution. See, Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 
234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956) (under Maryland law co-conspirators 
are liable to one another for contribution as joint tortfeasors); 
Shultz v. Young, 205 Ark. 533, 169 S.W.2d 648 (1943) (damages may 
be apportioned among intentional tortfeasors); Schauer v. Joyce, 
54 N.Y.S.2d 1, 429 N.E.2d 83 (1981) (right of contribution applies 
even to intentional tortfeasors); Roma v. Buffalo General Hosp., 
103 A.D.2d 606, 481 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1984) (right of contribution 
arises where intentional tortfeasor is jointly liable for the same 
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injury); Helmrlch v. Eli Lily and Co., 89 A.D.2d 441, 455 N.Y.S.2d 
460 (1982) (right of contribution arises where plaintiff sues 
each defendant for the same injuries); Taft v. Shaffer Trucking, 
Inc., 52 A.D.2d 255, 383 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1976) (a claim for 
contribution arises when intentional tortfeasors share in the 
responsibility of causing injury); and Taylor v. Kinston Free 
Press Co., 237 N.C. 551, 75 S.E.2d 528 (1953) (cross-complaint for 
contribution between intentional tortfeasors held to state a cause 
of action). 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Krukiewicz v. Draper, 
725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986), a joint tortfeasor is defined 
under Utah law in terms of liability, not negligence. Under Utah 
law, a joint tortfeasor is simply "one of two or more persons, 
jointly or severally liable in tort . . . ." Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-40(3). The particular basis of a defendant's liability to 
a plaintiff is not relevant to the determination of who is a joint 
tortfeasor under Utah law. The sole requirement is that the joint 
tortfeasor be "severally" liable for the same indivisible injury. 
See, Thode, Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 
and the Effect of a Release—A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 
1973 Utah L.Rev. 406, 420. See also, Lang v. Gunn, 23 Ala.App. 
574, 129 So. 318, 319 (1930) (where a wrong is jointly 
participated in or contributed to by each defendant, they are 
"joint tort-feasors" and responsible severally for the injury); 
Hollls v. School Board, 384 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.Dlst.Ct.App. 1980) 
(general rule is that persons who combine to commit a wrong are 
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"joint tortfeasors"); and Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 P. 
782 (1923) (to be a joint tortfeasor, the parties must either act 
together in committing the wrong, or their acts, if independent of 
each other, must unite in causing a single injury). 
That the Utah Legislature intended the term "joint 
tortfeasor" to include intentional tortfeasors is clearly 
demonstrated by the legislative debates on the contribution 
statute. During debate in the Utah Senate, the question was 
posed by Senator Warren Pugh, "What's a tortfeasor?" One of the 
bill's proponents, Senator Richard Howe, answered: 
He's a person that commits a personal 
wrong, such as someone who negligently 
drives his automobile into you or hits you 
with his fist, someone who inflicts personal 
damage upon you and is wrongful, he's 
called a tortfeasor. 
Utah Senate Floor Records, Utah State Legislature, 197 3 General 
Session, Mar. 8, 1973, Record No. 319. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs at trial pursued claims 
of intentional tort against defendant Fire Insurance. Eventually, 
the jury returned a verdict in excess of $4.8 million against Fire 
Insurance on several counts, including fraud and 
misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The Utah contribution statute provides for the right of 
contribution among all joint tortfeasors. In order to obtain 
contribution, the tortfeasor need only establish that he is 
"severally" liable with another for the same injury. Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint clearly indicates their belief that Fire 
Insurance and the bank acted in concert and individually to cause 
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a single indivisible injury or damage to plaintiffs. Fire 
Insurance's Cross-claim against the bank sought contribution for 
those injuries and damages. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, 
Utah law does provide Fire Insurance with a right of contribution 
against the bank. The trial court erred as a matter of law in 
holding that such a right did not exist under Utah law. 
POINT XIII. 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES THIS COURT TO 
CONSIDER WHAT EFFECT THE ILL-TIMED AND 
ERRONEOUS GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK HAD ON 
THE TRIAL OF THE INSTANT CASE. 
While the foregoing Points XI and XII were raised in 
Appeal No. 870252, currently pending before this Court, the issues 
raised therein are of such critical importance that they must be 
considered and addressed in the instant appeal. Fire Insurance 
respectfully claims that the granting of summary judgment in favor 
of the bank on the morning of trial, and the denial of Fire 
Insurance's motion to continue, effectively denied Fire Insurance 
its right to due process. The interrelationship between the 
claims and defenses of Fire Insurance and Rocky Mountain State 
Bank were such that the last minute dismissal of one party 
defendant, Rocky Mountain State Bank, unduly prejudiced Fire 
Insurance at the trial of the instant case. The trial judge, 
Judge Frederick, has also recognized the impact of his ill-timed 
granting of summary judgment: 
Counsel, I recognize had the dismissal of 
the Bank not occurred, that is, had this 
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Court ruled that there was indeed contribu-
tion . . . between intentional tortfeasors, 
the complexion of the trial and the issues 
submitted to the jury may well have been 
different than they are. 
In the Matter of the Possession of Rocky Mountain State Bank, 
C87-5743, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County; 
Transcript of Motion to Lift Stay, April 8, 1988, at p. 20. 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Fire 
Insurance's motion to continue following the last minute dismissal 
of Rocky Mountain State Bank from the litigation. Under such 
circumstances, Fire Insurance should have been given adequate 
opportunity to prepare its defense in an action where it was the 
sole remaining defendant. The trial court's actions on the morn-
ing of trial created great prejudice to Fire Insurance, and war-
rants reversal and remand to the trial court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, justice requires that this 
Court reverse the actions of the trial court in the instant case. 
DATED this C&tf day of <z^O&n , 1988. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By 
Philip R. Fishier 
C^tg#nwi J . Trayherc: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Fr re Insurance Exchange 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the 
foregoing document were hand delivered on the /y^W day of 
_, 1988, to: 
Francis M. Wikstrom 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
F5-BOA7/20/88DC 
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ADDENDUM 
Determinative Authorities Al 
Cross-Claim of Fire Insurance Exchange, 
December 3, 1986 A6 
Cross-Claim of Rocky Mountain State Bank, 
March 17, 1987 A12 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint 
January 16, 1987 A16 
Correspondence, May 22, 1987 A35 
Rocky Mountain State Bank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, May 22, 1987 A37 
Transcript of Hearing on Rocky Mountain 
State Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
May 26, 1987 A40 
Order, June 9, 1987 A59 
Judgment, June 11, 1987 A62 
Order, April 22, 1983 A66 
Minute Entry, December 18, 1986 A6 8 
Order, May 19, 1987 A69 
Findings of Fact, January 11, 1988 A74 
Additional Judgment A78 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Constitution of the United States Amend. VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Constitution of the United States Amend. XIV §1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §2 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform 
their government as the public welfare may require. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §9 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 (1953) 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed 
— Rules of equity prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the 
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statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this 
state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their 
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules 
of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same 
matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 (Supp. 1987) 
78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in §§78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit 
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or 
damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including, but not 
limited to, negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied 
warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification 
or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking 
damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of 
another for whom it is authorized to act as legal representative. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 Supp. 1987) 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant or 
group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no 
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount 
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that defen-
dant. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-39 (repealed 1986) 
78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-feasors 
—Discharge of common liability by joint tort-feasor required. 
—(1) The right of contribution shall exist among joint tort-
feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled to a money 
judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the 
common liability or more than his prorata share thereof. 
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Utah Code Ann. $78-27-40 (Supp. 1987) 
78-27-40• Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault — 
No contribution. 
Subject to §78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a 
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. 
No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40 (repealed 1986) 
78-27-40. Settlement by joint tort-feasor — 
Determination of relative degrees of fault of joint tort-feasors 
— "Joint tort-feasor'1 defined. — (1) A joint tort-feasor who 
enters into a settlement with the injured person shall not be 
entitled to recover contribution from another joint tort-feasor 
whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by that 
settlement. 
(2) When there is a disproportion of fault among joint 
tort-feasors to an extent that it would render inequitable an 
equal distribution by contribution among them of their common 
liability, the relative degrees of fault of the joint tort-feasors 
shall be considered in determining their prorata shares, solely 
for the purpose of determining their rights of contribution among 
themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured person 
for the whole injury as at common law. 
(3) As used in this section, "joint tort-feasor" means 
one of two or more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort 
for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment 
has been recovered against all or some of them. 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Instructions to jury; 
objections 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as 
the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall fur-
nish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or 
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be 
given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be 
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made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and 
in the interests of justice, may review the giving or of failure 
to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make 
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after 
the court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on 
the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the 
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, New trials; amendments 
of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all 
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried with-
out a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and 
direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
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(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or 
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any 
general or special verdict, or to a finding of any ques-
tion submitted to them by the court, by resort to 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such 
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of 
the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at 
trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Rule 4(d), Rules of Practice of the Third Judicial District Court 
(d) All motions for summary judgment or other 
dispositive motions must be heard at least thirty (30) days before 
the date set for trial. No such motion shall be heard after that 
date without leave of court. 
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FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816] 
Attorney for Defendant 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone:[801]292-1483 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
v 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON & RANDI L, 
CROOKSTON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
reciprocal or interinsurance 
exchange, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H. 
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
C R O S S - C L A I M 
C i v i l No. C83-1030 
J u d g e D a v i d B. Dee 
-A6* 
r'v;: 
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BERT BERRETT, : 
Fourth-Party z 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, : 
Fourth-Party : 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the above-named defendant and cross-
claimant, FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a reciprocal or interinsur-
ance exchange, [hereinafter referred to as cross-claimant], 
and cross-claims against the above-named defendant, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, a Utah corporation, [hereinafter referred 
to as cross-claim defendant], pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code 
Annotated [1953], as amended, and alleges as follows: 
1. That on or about the 8th of February, 19 83, 
plaintiffs commenced an action against cross-claimant and 
cross-claim defendant by filing a Complaint, Civil No. C83-1030 
in the above-entitled court alleging that cross-claimant, 
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among other things, contracted with plaintiffs for purchase 
of a standard form insurance policy, thereafter, a partially 
constructed building collapsed causing property damage, and 
that cross-claimant was in breach of contract and implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing. Subsequently, a 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint was filed, 
2. That cross-claim defendant is now and at all 
relevant times hereafter mentioned a corporation doing 
business within the State of Utah. 
3. That cross-claim defendant, after receiving 
payment from cross-claimant, was negligent in failing to 
res_tore and. make the necessary repairs to plaintiffs' damaged 
structure, therefore, is liable to cross-claimant and 
plaintiffs for plaintiffs' alleged property damage. 
4. That if it is determined cross-claimant is neg-
ligent or is found in breach of contract and implied covenants 
of good faith and fair dealing, then cross-claimant is entitled 
to the right of contractual and statutory contribution and 
indemnity from cross-claim defendant. 
5. That the negligence, if any, of cross-claimant 
was passive and secondary, whereas the negligence of the 
cross-claim defendant was active and primary. 
-A8- i - - ' : • > • • ' 
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6, That by reason of the foregoing, should plaintiff 
recover a judgment against cross-claimant, then cross-claimant 
is entitled to full indemnification from cross-claim defendant, 
pursuant to §78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated [1953], as amended; 
in the alternative, should the court determine that such neg-
ligence was a proximate cause of the alleged damages suffered 
by plaintiff, then cross-claimant and cross-claim defendant 
are joint tort-feasors as that term is defined in §78-27-40(3), 
Utah Code Annotated [1953] , as amended. 
7. That cross-claimant is entitled to an adjudication 
of the relative degrees of fault as between itself and cross-
claim defendant pursuant to the provisions of §78-27-40(2), Utah 
Code Annotated [1953] , as amended, and for a money judgment 
for contribution against cross-claim defendant upon payment 
by cross-claimant of the common liability or more that its 
prorata share thereof pursuant to the provisions of §78-27-39(1), 
Utah Code Annotated [1953] , as amended. 
WHEREFORE, cross-claimant prays for judgment against 
cross-claim defendant for any and all sums that may be recovered 
by plaintiff from cross-claimant in the present action, for 
indemnification and, in the alternative, a determination by the 
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Court of the relative degrees of fault of cross-claimant and 
cross-claim defendant for the purpose of determining their 
rights of contribution among themselves, for money judgment 
in favor of cross-claimant against cross-claim defendant upon 
payment by cross-claimant of the common liability or more 
than her prorata share thereof, for reasonable attorney's 
fees, costs of court incurred herein and such other and 
further relief as the court deems proper and just in the pre-
mises. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1986 
mK A.RtttfBALY\Attornfey^ 
DefWndantAmd Jfross -Claimant, 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J'LYNNE H. WOLFLEYT hereby certify that on the 
3rd day of December, 1986, a copy of the foregoing Cross-
Claim was properly mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
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L. Rich Humpherys 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys at Law 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Francis M. Wikstrom 
Daniel W. Hindert 
PARTONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen G. Morgan 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carman E. Kipp 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys at Law 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
1095 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
John M. Chipman 
Andrea C. Alcabes 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys at Law 
1300 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462) 
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
7^ CJs^^^/u^o^, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON and RANDI 
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals, 
and ANNA W. DRAKE, as Trustee 
of the Estate of S. Larry 
Crookston and Randi L. 
Crookston, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
FIRE INSURANCE"^;XCHANGE7"a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON AND RANDI 
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals, 
and ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Secaad-PattY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H. 
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT, 
Second-Party 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK'S AMENDED 
CROSSCLAIM 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge David B. Dee 
Civil No. C84-7061 
[Consolidated] 
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BERT BERRETT, 
Third-Party ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Defendant, ) 
* * * * * * * 
Defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank (the "Bank") hereby 
crossclaims against defendant Fire Insurance Exchange ("Insurance 
Company") as follows: 
2. Insurance Company is a California corporation that 
transacts business as an insurance company in the State of Utah. 
2. On June 16, 1982, the Bank accepted the sum of 
"Thrrrty-Two -Thousand Seven—Hundred- Forty-Four -and—7-6/LQQ—Do Liars-
($32,744.76) from Insurance Company in settlement of the Bank's 
rights as loss-payee under a policy of insurance which covered 
damages resulting from the collapse of plaintiffs' house then 
under construction. 
3. The Bank accepted said settlement in reliance on 
representations made by Alan Clapperton on behalf of Insurance 
Company, indicating that the approximate amount of $27,830 was 
the reasonable cost of restoring the collapsed house to its 
pre-loss condition. 
-2-
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4. If any damages alleged by plaintiffs in their 
second amended complaint are proven to have been caused by the 
settlement between the Insurance Company and the Bank, such 
damages were caused by Insurance Company's misrepresentation to 
the Bank, or by Insurance Company's failure to otherwise inform 
the Bank, as to the reasonable cost of restoring the collapsed 
home to its pre-loss condition, 
5. If judgment is granted in favor of plaintiffs or 
any of them against the Bankf the Bank is entitled to indemnity 
or contribution from Insurance Company for the entire amount of 
said judgment. 
WHEREFORE, the Bank prays for judgment against 
Insurance Company as follows: in an amount equal to any judgment 
entered against the Bank in favor of plaintiffs; for reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs of court; and for such other and 
further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DATED this /7 - day of March, 1987. 
FRAN^ShTwit STROM 
DANIEL W. HINDERT 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, hereby certify that on the /7 day of 
March, 1987, ^ a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK'S AMENDED CROSSCLAIM was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
M. Douglas Mayly 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys at Law 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Frank A. Roybal 
Attorney at Law 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Stephen G. Morgan 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John M. Chipman 
Linda L. W. Roth 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys at Law 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
322:031787A 
Carmen E. Kipp 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
600 Commercial Club Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
1095 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Anna W. Drake 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys at Law 
Beneficial Life Tower, #1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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L. Rich Humpherys, A1582 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
i.„ ?3 4 13 FH '31 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
-a-U-tah-coxporat i on.*_ 
Defendants. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
reciprocal or interinsurance 
exchange, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H.-
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
BERT BERRETT, and KYLE H. 
BREWSTER, 
Fourth-Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge David B. Dee 
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SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Fourth-Party Defendant. ) 
Plaintiffs complain against defendants and allege as 
follows: 
1. During all times mentioned herein, plaintiffs S. 
Larry Crooks ton and Randi L. Crookston were residents of Davis 
County, Utah. Anna W. Drake has been appointed Trustee of the 
estate of Spencer Larry Crookston and Randi Lynn Crookston, in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, case 
number 82A 01590. 
2. Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange ("Insurance 
Company.J. is a foreig_n_.corporation transacting insurance business 
in the State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank ("Bank") is a 
Utah corporation, duly licensed and authorized to do business as 
a banking institution in the State of Utah. 
4. At all times mentioned herein, defendants actions 
and omissions were performed by said defendants' agents and 
employees who were at all times acting within the purpose and 
scope of their agency and employment, and each defendant has 
ratified and approved the acts of its respective agents and 
employees relating hereto. 
-A"l72. " ^-' :'*" 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract - Insurance Company) 
5. Prior to December 2, 1981, plaintiffs entered into 
a contract of insurance with the Insurance Company, who issued 
insurance policy no, F6076 00 92. In pertinent part, the policy 
provides that the Insurance Company will indemnify plaintiffs 
from damage to plaintiffs' home that was located at 3745 Orchard 
Drive, North Salt Lake, Utah, and also agreed to pay the 
mortgagee loss payee (defendant bank) for any such damage, up to 
the stated monetary limits as set forth therein. Specifically, 
Insurance Company agreed to indemnify plaintiffs and/or the 
mortgage loss payee for the following items: 
_a^  .physical loss to plaintiffs' home and building 
equipment, fixtures, outdoor equipment, materials and supplies 
located on the described premises; 
b. the necessary increase in living expenses caused by 
the loss to plaintiffs' home; and 
c. the expenses incurred in the removal of debris 
occasioned by such loss; 
6. Throughout the period of said policy, plaintiffs 
paid the premiums and performed each act required on their part 
to keep the policy in full force and effect. Plaintiffs intended 
and expected thereby to be assured of peace of mind and financial 
and economic security in the event of damage to their home. 
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7. On or about December 2, 1981, plaintiffs home 
sustained direct physical loss caused by the collapse of the roof 
of the home. Plaintiffs gave timely notice of the loss as pro-
vided in said policy. By reason thereof, under the terms of the 
policy and the laws of the State of Utah, Insurance Company 
became obligated to pay and the mortgagee loss payee and/or 
plaintiffs became entitled to, indemnification of the losses, as 
described above. 
8. Notwithstanding its obligation to do so, Insurance 
Company has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, 
to pay the mortgagee loss payee and plaintiffs the monies owing 
to them, despite demand therefor. Such failures and refusals 
constitute a material breach of the agreement with plaintiffs and 
also the collateral agreement to insure and pay the"mortgagee 
loss payee. 
9. As a direct and proximate result of said breach of 
agreements, plaintiffs have been injured and damaged in a sum in 
excess of $50,000, for which Insurance Company is liable. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing - Insurance Company) 
10. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 9 above. 
11. At all times material hereto, Insurance Company 
agreed to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs when 
they entered into the contract of insurance and accepted premiums 
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from plaintiffs. Nevertheless, Insurance Company refused and 
failed to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs, as 
described below. 
12. In the absence of a reasonable basis for doing so, 
and with full knowledge and/or reckless disregard of the con-
sequences Insurance Company has failed and refused to indemnify 
plaintiffs and/or the mortgagee loss payee under the policy and 
the laws of Utah. 
13. The Insurance Company engaged and continues to 
engage in a course of conduct to further its own economic 
interest and in violation of its obligations to plaintiffs, 
including, but not limited to: 
a. misrepresentation of pertinent policy provisions 
and coverages at issue; 
b. unreasonable delays in acting upon plaintiffs' 
claims; 
c. unreasonable and improper investigation of plain-
tiffs claims; 
d. unreasonable and improper settlement of claims with 
the mortgagee loss payee (BanJO; and 
e. other wrongful and illegal conduct. 
14. The Insurance Company pursued said course of con-
duct intentionally, maliciously, in conscious disregard of the 
rights of plaintiffs, fraudulently, and/or with reckless disre-
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gard of the circumstances of the plaintiffs and the likelihood of 
causing plaintiffs emotional and mental distress and/or at all 
times to further its own economic interest at the expense of 
plaintiffs' economic interest, mental health and well-being, 
15. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of 
the Insurance Company, plaintiffs have suffered emotional and 
mental trauma and other general damages in an amount not yet 
determined. 
16. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
conduct of the Insurance Company, plaintiffs have incurred and 
will incur economic detriment, including, but not limited to, the 
loss of their home and building lot, property taxes, expenses 
associated with construction of the home, increased living expen-
ses, loss of credit due to bankruptcy, attorneys^ fees, ~co3~£3"~and 
expenses of litigation and other damages in an amount not yet 
determined. 
17. In order to deter such conduct of the Insurance 
Company in the future and prevent the repetition thereof as a 
practice, by way of punishment and as an example, plaintiffs pray 
that exemplary damages be awarded according to proof at the time 
of trial. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing — Bank) 
18. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 17 above. 
19. On or about December 11, 1980, Bank agreed to make 
a construction loan to the plaintiffs in the sum of Sixty 
Thousand Dollars ($60,000) for the purpose of constructing a home 
on plaintiffs' property located at or near 3745 Orchard Drive, 
North Salt Lake, Utah. In connection therewith, plaintiffs exe-
cuted and delivered to Bank a Trust Deed Note for the same 
amount. As security for the construction loan, plaintiffs also 
executed and delivered a Trust Deed, under which the Bank is both 
the trustee and the beneficiary. 
10^ Pursuant to the terms of said Trust Deed, plain-
tiffs obtained the policy of insurance with Insurance Company, 
providing a "Mortgagee Clause" or "Loss Payee" provision in favor 
of Bank. 
21. Under said Trust Deed, plaintiffs, as trustors, 
were required to assign all benefits under the insurance policy 
to the Bank in the event of any loss. The pertinent language 
reads as follows: 
Beneficiary [Bank] shall be entitled to all 
compensation, awards, and other payments or 
relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its 
option to commence, appear in and prosecute in 
its own name any action or proceedings, or to 
make any compromise or settlement, in connec-
tion with such taking or damage. All such 
compensation, awards, damages, rights of 
action and proceeds, including the proceeds of 
any policies of fire and other insurance 
affecting said policy, are hereby assigned to 
beneficiary [Bank]. . . 
22. In consideration for the construction loan, plain-
tiffs agreed to and did pay the Bank finance charges of One 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500) (2-1/2% of the loan 
amount) and interest on the unpaid balance at the annual percen-
tage rate of 16.5%. Interest was increased to 20.5% per annum in 
a Note Extension Agreement dated September 11, 1981. Plaintiffs 
paid said finance charge and regularly made interest payments, 
and performed all other acts required on their part to comply 
with the terms of the note, loan agreements and Trust Deed. 
Plaintiffs intended and expected thereby to have the peace of 
mind that the proceeds of the loan would be disbursed properly 
and the Bank would comply -with all terms and conditions oT the 
loan agreements and Trust Deed, and that such compliance would 
ultimately result in a newly constructed home in which plaintiffs 
would live. 
23. At all times material hereto, defendant Bank agreed 
to act in good faith and deal fairly with the plaintiffs when 
they entered into the loan~ agreements and accepted said con-
sideration paid by plaintiffs. Nevertheless, Bank has refused 
and failed to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs, 
as set forth below. 
24. In the absence of a reasonable basis for doing so, 
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and with full knowledge and/or reckless disregard of the con-
sequences, Bank has engaged and continues to engage in the course 
of conduct to further its own economic interest and in violation 
of their obligations to plaintiffs, including, but not limited 
to: 
a. misrepresentation of the Bank's intended actions 
concerning settlement of the claims against Insurance Company; 
b. unreasonable and improper investigation concerning 
the claims against the Insurance Company; 
c. unreasonable and improper settlement of claims 
against the Insurance Company; 
d. the foreclosure or trust sale proceedings against 
plaintiffs; and 
e. other wrongtul and illegal conduct. 
25. The Bank pursued said course of conduct inten-
tionally, maliciously, in conscious disregard of the rights of 
plaintiffs, fraudulently, and/or with reckless disregard of the 
circumstance of plaintiffs and the likelihood of causing plain-
tiffs emotional and mental distress, and/or at all times to 
further its own economic interest at the expense of plaintiffs1 
economic interest, mental health and well-being. 
26. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of 
said Bank, plaintiffs have suffered the following damages: 
a. emotional and mental trauma and other general dama-
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ges in an amount not yet determined; 
b. past and future economic detriment, including, but 
not limited to, the loss of their home and building lot, property 
taxes, expenses associated with the construction of the loan 
increased living expenses, loss of credit due to bankruptcy, 
attorneys' fees, costs and expenses of litigation and other spe-
cial damages in an amount not yet determined. 
27. In order to deter such conduct of the Bank in the 
future and to prevent the repetition thereof as a practice, by 
way of punishment and as an example, plaintiffs pray that 
exemplary damages be av/arded according to proof at the time of 
trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties — Bank) 
28. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 27 above. 
29. By reason of the assignment contained in the Trust 
Deed of all rights and claims of insurance proceeds in the event 
of a loss to the insured premises, and also the relationship bet-
ween plaintiffs and Bank und^ jr these circumstances, Bank assumed 
a fiduciary obligation to plaintiffs and agreed to abide by their 
fiduciary duties. Nevertheless, the Bank engaged in a course of 
conduct to further its own economic interest and in violation of 
its fiduciary obligation to plaintiffs, including, but not 
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limited to: 
a. unreasonable and improper settlement of the claims 
against Insurance Company for less than fair value; 
b. unreasonably exposing plaintiffs to needless per-
sonal liability which coverage under the policy was designed to 
prevent; 
c. unreasonably acting in conflict of interest to the 
detriment of plaintiffs; and 
d. other wrongful and illegal conduct. 
30. Bank pursued said course of conduct intentionally, 
maliciously and in conscious disregard of the financial and emo-
tional circumstances of plaintiffs, fraudulently and/or with 
reckless disreqard of the likelihood of causing plaintiffs emo-
tional and mental distress, and/or at all times to further its 
economic interest at the expense of plaintiffs1 economic 
interest, mental health and well-being. 
31. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of 
the Bank, plaintiffs have suffered the damages as stated above. 
32. In order to deter such conduct of the Bank in the 
future and to prevent the repetition thereof as a practice, by 
way of punishment and as an example, plaintiffs pray that 
exemplary damages be awarded according to proof at the time of 
trial. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Misrepresentation and Fraud —Insurance Company) 
33. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 32 above. 
34. Since the purchase of the insurance policy, 
Insurance Company made the following representations to plain-
tiffs: 
a. in the insurance policy, the Insurance Company 
represented to plaintiffs that it would, in the event of certain 
contingencies, pay monies to plaintiffs and/or the mortgagee loss 
payee for indemnification of all losses, with certain exceptions 
not relevant here. 
b. during the period of March 31, 1982, through June 
15, 1982, Denton Mosier and Alan Clapperton, as agents of" 
Insurance Company represented to plaintiffs and plaintiffs 
mortgagee loss payee (Bank) on numerous occasions that they did 
not have authority to settle the claim. 
c. on or about June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton as agent 
of Insurance Company represented to plaintiffs that it was not 
yet in a position to offer any settlement on the claim. 
d. on or about June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton as agent 
of Insurance Company represented to plaintiffs mortgagee loss 
payee (Bank) that: 
1. the only amount owing under the policy 
relating to the damages to plaintiffs home was 
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$32,744.76; 
2. that he was not authorized to offer any more 
money; 
3. that the bid of Phipps Construction, Inc. was 
reasonable, reliable and sufficient to rebuild plain-
tiffs home to its statute prior to the loss; 
4. Insurance Company would not pay any more under 
the policy. 
e. on or about June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton, as 
agent of Insurance Company, represented to plaintiffs that 
Insurance Company had settled all claims under the policy with 
the Bank, and that the plaintiffs no longer had any claims under 
the policy. 
35. At the time the above representations were by made 
the Insurance Company, it was acting in bad faith and with the 
intent to deceive and defraud plaintiffs. 
36. Said representations of material fact were false, 
and Insurance Company did not intend to and do not intend to pay 
any additional monies, notwithstanding plaintiffs entitlement 
pursuant to policy and the laws of Utah. 
37. Insurance Company knew that said representations 
were false and fraudulent at the time they were made, and made 
such false and fraudulent representations for the purpose of 
inducing plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs mortgagee to rely thereon 
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to their detriment. 
38. Plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs mortgagee, at the time 
said representations were made, were ignorant of their falsity, 
but believed them to be true. 
39. Plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs mortgagee reasonably 
and justifiably relied on said representations, in view of the 
superior knowledge of Insurance Company and the fiduciary rela-
tionship between the parties. 
40. Based upon some of the above representations, 
plaintiffs were induced to enter into policy and pay premiums 
therefor. Had plaintiffs known the true facts they would not 
have taken such action. 
41. Insurance ComDany pursued said course of conduct 
intentionally, maliciously, oppressively, in conscious disregard 
of the rights of plaintiffs, fraudulently, in constructive fraud 
and/or with reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing 
plaintiffs emotional and mental trauma, and/or at all times to 
further its own economic interests, mental health and well-being. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment against Insurance 
Company for special, general and exemplary damages, as herein set 
forth. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Misrepresentation and Fraud - Bank) 
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42. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 32 above. 
43. Defendant Bank made the following representations 
to plaintiffs: 
a. at or around December 10, 1980, the closing date of 
plaintiffs loan with Bank, an agent of the Bank represented to 
plaintiffs that the Bank was the expert in construction and knew 
how to handle all matters relating to the loan and construction 
of plaintiffs home. The Bank further represented that it would 
obtain proper and adequate insurance to protect plaintiffs during 
the construction loan. 
b. through the Trust Deed executed by plaintiffs and 
Bank, wherein plaintiffs were required to assign to Bank all 
rights to claims for insurance proceeds, Bank impliedly repre-
sented that it would properly pursue all claims of insurance. 
44. Said representations of material fact were false, 
and Bank did not intend to properly pursue the claims against the 
Insurance Company, notwithstanding the Banks entitlement thereto, 
pursuant to the policy and the laws of Utah. 
45. Bank knew that said representations were false and 
fraudulent at the time they were made, and made such false and 
fraudulent representations for the purpose of inducing plaintiffs 
to rely thereon to their detriment. 
46. Plaintiffs, at the time said representations were 
made, were ignorant of their falsity, but believed them to be 
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true. 
47. Plaintiffs reasonably and justifiably relied on said 
representations, in view of the superior knowledge of the Bank, 
and the fiduciary relationship between the parties. 
48. Based upon said representations, plaintiffs were 
induced to enter into the loan and Trust Deed agreements and paid 
the Bank valuable consideration therefor. Had plaintiffs known 
the true facts, they would not have taken such action. 
49. The Bank pursued said course of conduct inten-
tionally, maliciously, oppressively, in conscious disregard of 
the rights of plaintiffs, fraudulently, in constructive fraud 
and/or with reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing 
plaintiffs emotional and mental trauma^ and/or at all times to 
further its own economic interests, mental health and well-being. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment against Bank for 
special, general and exemplary damages, as herein set forth. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Acting in Concert — Insurance Company and Bank) 
50. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 49 above. 
51. In engaging in the wrongful course of conduct and 
in committing the wrongful acts and practices hereinabove 
complained of, defendants acted in concert together and each 
conspired with, assisted, encouraged and abetted the other, to 
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further their own economic interest at the expense of the econo-
mic interest, peace of mind, mental health and well-being of 
plaintiffs. 
52. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' 
actions and omissions, plaintiffs have suffered damages as set 
forth above. Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for all special 
damages and for exemplary damages as set forth above. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress — Bank 
and Insurance Company) 
53. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs l through 52 above. 
54. In so doing, defendants, and each of them, pursued 
an outrageous course of conduct, intentionally and/or recklessly, 
proximately causing plaintiffs severe emotional distress, ~s~Tiock, 
and other painful emotions. 
55. Defendants are therefore liable for plaintiffs spe-
cial and general damages and for exemplary damages as set forth 
above. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Resulting and Constructive Trust — Bank) 
56. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs l through 55 above. 
57. As a result of the relationship between plaintiffs 
and Bank, described above, a constructive and/or resulting trust 
was created as it relates to the assignment of the rights and 
- 17 -
!! 
I claims to insurance proceeds, with the Bank holding said rights 
| and claims as trustee for the benefit of itself and the plain-
I tiffs. 
58. As a result of the wrongful conduct of the Bank, 
I the Bank breached its fiduciary duties as a trustee, causing said 
damages to the plaintiffs. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Liability for Intended Consequences — 
H Insurance Company and Bank) 
59. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 58 above. 
60. Defendants wrongful conduct was unjustified, inten-
| feional, and .generally culpable/ causing plaintiff's damages set 
forth above, for which defendants are liable. 
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Liability for Tortious Conduct — Insurance Company and Bank) 
61. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 60 above. 
62. Defendants activities and conduct were in other 
I ways tortious and wrongful, causing plaintiff's damages set forth 
I above, for which defendants are liable. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against each 
I defendant as follows: 
|! a. for general, special and consequential damages as 
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proven at the time of trial; 
b. for exemplary and punitive damages as established 
at the time of trial; 
c. for reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses 
of litigation, as determined at the time of trial; and 
d. for such other and further relief as the court may 
deem just and proper under the circumstances. 
DATED this /&?* day of January, 1987. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
^ y^/ 
/ By ^ . / s~ y w^~ 
^ / L . ^Ri^ ch Humpherys / 
Attorney for Pla int i f fs 
- 19 -
-A34 -
 r r -
KEITM E TAYLOR 
JAMES a LEE 
SCOTT M MATHCSON 
GORDON L_ ROBERTS 
r ROBERT REEOER 
WILLIAM L, CRA¥VrORO 
LAWRENCE E. STEVENS 
D A N I E L M A L L R E O 
HOWARD J MARSH 
VAN M ROSS 
OAVIO S OOUOWIT2 
KENT W WINTERHOLLER 
BARBARA K POLICH 
RANOV L. ORTER 
CHARLES H THRONSON 
OAVIO R BiRO 
RAYMOND J ETCHEVERRY 
FRANCIS M WIKSTROM 
OAVIO W TUNOERMANN 
JAMES M ELEGANTE 
VAL R ANTCZAK 
PATRICK J GARVER 
SPENCER E AUSTIN 
JOHN B WILSON 
ROBERT C HYDE 
LAW OFFICES 
PARSONS. BEHLE & LATIMER 
A *ROrCSS«OWAt. CORPORATION 
IBS SOUTH STATE STREET SUITE 7 0 0 
P O S T O F F I C E B O X M S 9 6 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y . U T A H 8 4 1 4 7 - 0 8 9 8 
TELEPHONE (BOO 332 «*3* 
TELECOPIER (BOD S32 123* EXT 273 
IOIB I 6 T H STREET N W SUITE BOO 
W A S H I N G T O N O C 2 0 0 3 6 
TELEPHONE (202) 6 5 9 0 6 6 2 
rORMCRLY 
OlCKSON CLUS PARSONS * MCCRCA 
CC LARSONS 
I0O7 • • « • 
CALVIN A. BCHLC 
l»47 
or COUNSEL 
CCORGC W LATIMER 
May 22, 1987 
CRAIG B TERRY 
DAVIO A ANOERSON 
KENT O ROCHE 
PATRICIA J WINMJLL 
RANOY M GRIMSHAW 
OANIELW HINOERT 
T PATRICK CASEY 
VALOEN P LIVINGSTON 
O R CHAMBERS 
BYRON W MILSTEAO 
LOIS A. BAAR 
MARK E RINEHART 
MICHAEL L. LARSEN 
JONATHAN K BUTLER 
OAVIO G MANGUM 
JULIA C ATTWOOD 
DEREK LANG TON 
LUCY B JENKINS 
HAL J POS 
W MARK GAVRE 
OAVIO J SMITH 
TONI MARIE SUTLIfF 
MARK S WEBBER 
RANOAL L. MEEK 
JAMES C HYOE 
FOR HAND DELIVERY $3- Qi
Q 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re; Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
o - -"7 
ange, et al. 
LT^ ar -Judge-Frederick: 
This letter is to advise you that a settlement was 
reached between the plaintiffs and Rocky Mountain State Bank 
late Thursday afternoon. The stipulation was not executed 
by Anna Drake, as Trustee, until Friday afternoon. Enclosed 
is the Stipulation, Motion and Order of Dismissal. We would 
request that you sign and enter the Order of Dismissal. 
In light of the settlement with plaintiffs, we 
have enclosed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum 
in Support, directed to the crossclaim of Fire Insurance 
Exchange against Rocky Mountain State Bank seeking 
contribution and indemnity. 
Mr. Humpherys has advised us in writing that he 
will pursue no claims against the insurance company which 
are based on negligence theories. Mr. Humpherys has 
authorized me to represent to you that he will confirm this 
in open court on Tuesday. All of plaintiffs' claims are 
based on intentional torts and breach of contract. As the 
attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities demonstrates, 
there is no basis for contribution or indemnity under these 
theories. 
-A35-
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
May 22, 1987 
Page 2 
While the filing of our motion for summary 
judgment may not give Mr. Roybal as much time to respond as 
envisioned under the rules, we feel that it is appropriate 
to have it heard before the trial begins. If we are correct 
on the law, there is no point in requiring the Bank to sit 
through the plaintiffs1 case in order for the plaintiffs to 
demonstrate what they have already conceded, i.e., that they 
will assert no claims based on negligence. 
We have advised Mr. Roybal by phone on Friday 
afternoon of our intention to file this motion and have 
personally served him with a copy of this letter, the motion 
and memorandum on Friday evening. Under the circumstances, 
we would request that the matter be heard prior to 
commencement of the trial on Tuesdays morning. 
Sincerely, 
F'r^ ncis M. Wikstrom 
FMW:cj 
Ends. 
cc: (hand delivered) Frank A. Roybal, Esq. 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq, 
-A36- ,y,-. - • ^  \ '* 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462) 
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake Cityr UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON and RANDI 
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals, 
and ANNA W. DRAKE, as Trustee 
of the Estate of S. Larry 
Crookston and Randi L. 
Crookston, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, Cross-
complainants and 
Cross-defendants. 
DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
* * * * * * * 
Cross-defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank ("RMSB") 
hereby moves for summary judgment in its favor and against 
cross-complainant Fire Insurance Exchange ("FIE") on all causes 
of action set forth in FIE's cross-claim against RMSB. This 
-A37-
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motion is supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
filed concurrently herewith, 
DATED this 22^ day of May, 1987. 
- *2o 
ICIS M. WIKST^OM 
DANIEL W. HINDERT 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Cross-Defendant, 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
-2-
-A38- C';*-'"*' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK'S MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^^ * day of May, 
1987, to: 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 E. 400 So., #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin Larew, Jr. 
1200 Beneficial Life Towers 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 E. 300 So., 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John M. Chipman 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON S. CHIPMAN 
T300 Continental Bank" Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
And hand-delivered to: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, UT "84101 
Frank A. Roybal 
442 No. Main St. 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
DWH:052287A 
^ ^ j g c O ^ / cfZ^J 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON AND 
RANDI L. CROOKSTON, 
HIS WIFE, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, 
AND ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE 
BANK, A UTAH CORPORATION, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CIVIL NO. C83-1030 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, JUDGE 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MAY 26, 1987 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR PLAINTIFF: 
FOR DEFENDANT FIRE 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE: 
FOR DEFENDANT ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN STATE BANK: 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN S POWELL 
900 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8^101 
FRANK A. ROYBAL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
kk2 NORTH MAIN 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 8^010 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM 
DANIEL W. HINDERT 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
PARSONS, BEHLE 5 LATIMER 
185 SOUTH STATE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Rocky Mountain 
Reporting Service, Ire. 
712 Nawhouse Building 
10 Excnanga Place 
Salt UKa City. Utah 84111 
Phona (801) 531-0256 
Susan K. Hellberg, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
License #190 
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1 , P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 ', THE COURT: WE HAVE A CIVIL MATTER, WHICH IS SET 
i 
3 j FOR TRIAL THIS MORNING, CROOKSTON VS. FIRE INSURANCE 
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EXCHANGE, ET AL. 
COUNSEL IN THAT MATTER, PLEASE STATE YOUR APPEAR-
ANCES. I'M NOT SURE ALL OF YOU ARE HERE, BUT LET'S HEAR 
FROM YOU, WHOEVER IS HERE-
MR. WIKSTROM: YOUR HONOR, FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM AND 
DAN HINDERT ON BEHALF OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK. 
MR. ROYBAL: FRANK ROYBAL ON BEHALF OF FIRE 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE. 
MR. WIKSTROM: MR. HUMPHERYS IS IN THE HALL. IF 
IT'S THE COURT'S INTENTION TO HEAR OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AT THIS POINT, I'M NOT SURE HIS PRESENCE IS NECES-
SARY. 
THE COURT: THAT MIGHT BE THE CASE. I DO NOT SEE 
HIM HERE, AND MAYBE HE OUGHT TO BE HERE TO VOICE FOR THE 
RECORD HIS POSITION THAT YOU HAVE REPRESENTED IN YOUR MEMOR-
ANDUM, MR. WIKSTROM. 
MR. WIKSTROM: WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO SEE IF I CAN 
FIND HIM? 
THE COURT: MR. HUMPHERYS, YOU ARE NOW PRESENT IN 
THIS MATTER ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: YES. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, THIS IS A HEARING THAT'S BEENl 
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1 J SOUGHT BEFORE WE BRING THE JURY IN, AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE 
2 • YOU STATE FOR THE RECORD, MR. WIKSTROM, YOUR POSITION IN 
3 j THIS MATTER, SINCE YOU ARE SEEKING THIS HEARING. 
i 
4 J MR. WIKSTROM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. BY WAY OF 
i 
5 j BACKGROUND, YOUR HONOR, AT ABOUT U:3 0 P.M. LAST THURSDAY, 
6 MR. HUMPHERYS AND I REACHED A SETTLEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS1 
7 CLAIMS AGAINST ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK. WE, AT THAT 
8 TIME, EXECUTED A STIPULATION PROVIDING FOR THE DISMISSAL OF 
9 THE PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS AGAINST THE BANK, AND IMMEDIATELY 
10 NOTIFIED MR. ROYBAL OF THAT FACT, EVEN THOUGH THE TRUSTEE 
H ! IN BANKRUPTCY, ANNA DRAKE, DID NOT SIGN OFF ON THE STIPULA-
12 ! TION AND DID NOT DO SO ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON. 
13 j I THINK THAT'S CRITICAL, I THINK, TO OUR MOTION 
14 THAT'S PRESENTLY BEFORE THE COURT, AT THAT TIME MR. HUMPHERYS 
15 CONFIRMED HE WAS NOT PROCEEDING AGAINST THE INSURANCE 
16 COMPANY ON ANY THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S 
17 NOT OUR SETTLEMENT THAT MAKES OUR MOTION APPROPRIATE; IT'S 
18 HIS ELECTION TO PROCEED AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
19 SOLELY ON THE THEORIES OF INTENTIONAL TORT AND BREACH OF 
20 CONTRACT, BREACH OF INSURANCE CONTRACT INSOFAR AS IT CON-
2i I TAINS AN IMPLIED COVENANTS OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
22 SO AS THIS CASE WILL GO TO THE JURY THIS MORNING, 
23 THERE ARE TWO NEGLIGENT CLAIMS, AND PLAINTIFFS WILL STAND 
24 ON THAT BASIS. IN OTHER WORDS, THERE CAN BE, NOW THAT THEY 
25 HAVE MADE THE ELECTION, NO RECOVERY AGAINST THE INSURANCE 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
1 EN EXCHANGE PUCE > l l T E ' i : 
^ \ L ! LAKT O h I I \H s-ii 11 
- A 4 2 -
1 ! COMPANY BASED ON NEGLIGENCE, ONLY FOR INTENTIONAL TORT OR \ 
i i 
2 | BREACH OF CONTRACT. J 
3 AS WE SET FORTH IN OUR MEMORANDUM, SHORT MEMORAN-
4 i DUM WHICH WE FILED WITH THE COURT, WE SERVED ON MR. ROYBAL 
5 LATE FRIDAY EVENING, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CONTRIBUTION OR 
6 INDEMNITY FOR EITHER INTENTIONAL TORT OR BREACH OF CONTRACT, 
7 J AND SINCE THAT'S ALL WE HAVE LEFT IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD 
8 THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT THAT THE CROSS-CLAIM 
9 OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY AGAINST THE BANK BE DISMISSED. 
10 LIKE I SAY, THE DELAY IS UNFORTUNATE, BUT IT 
11 WASN'T REALLY A FACTOR SO MUCH OF THE SETTLEMENT, BUT AFTER 
12 HAVING COMPLETED DISCOVERY AND TAKING A HARD LOOK AT HIS 
13 THEORIES AND THE EVIDENCE, AND MR. HUMPHERYS AND BOTH HIS 
14 INSTRUCTIONS AND THEN LATER IN THE LETTER CONFIRMED THAT 
15 FACT TO US, HAS INDICATED THAT HE!S NOT PROCEEDING ON THE 
16 PRINCIPLE OF NEGLIGENCE. THERE'S NO WAY, AS I UNDERSTAND 
17 IT, THAT THE BANK CAN BE LIABLE FOR FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
18 UNDER CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY THEORIES AND THAT'S ALL WE 
19 HAVE. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT MR. ROYBAL CAN REALLY STAND UP 
20 AND ARTICULATE ANY BASIS AND KEEP US IN UNDER THAT CROSS-
21 CLAIM. SO IT'S OUR POSITION THAT THE BANK OUGHT TO BE OUT 
22 OF THE LAWSUIT, AND THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO DO THAT IS NOW. 
23 IF V.'E STAY IN, IF WE GET INVOLVED IN THE OPENING 
24 STATEMENTS AND INVOLVED IN THE EVIDENCE, I ANTICIPATE THERE 
25 WOULD BE A FAIR AMOUNT OF MUD SLUNG BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN 
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1 I THE BANK AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY WHICH IS ONLY GOING TO 
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CONFUSE THE JURY IN THIS CASE, AND PERHAPS CAUSE SOME PROB-
LEMS WITH THE RECORD. I DON'T KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT THAT 
MIGHT BE, BUT I KNOW WHEN WE GET THREE PARTIES FIGHTING LIKE 
THAT, AND THEN ONE PARTY GETS OUT OF THE LAWSUIT, SAY, AT 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE, THAT THERE IS A 
POTENTIAL FOR SOME CONFUSION ON THE PART OF THE JURY. SINCE 
THE LEGAL THEORIES, AT LEAST THE AUTHORITIES, SEEM TO BE 
CLEAR ON THE THEORIES OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY. WE 
WILL SUBMIT THAT NOW IS THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO CUT THE BANK 
OUT OF THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. WIKSTROM. I MIGHT STATE, 
FOR THE RECORD, I HAVE REVIEWED THE MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON BEHALH 
OF THE BANK AGAINST THE INSURANCE CARRIER ON THE CROSS-
CLAIM. 
IS IT ACCURATE, AS FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED, 
MR. HUMPHERYS, TO STATE FOR THE RECORD THAT YOUR PLAINTIFFS 
WILL NOT PURSUE, DURING THE COURSE OF THIS TRIAL, ANY CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE INSURANCE CARRIER FOUNDED IN NEGLIGENCE? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: VERY WELL. MR. ROYBAL? 
MR. ROYBAL: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE UNFORTUNATE 
THING ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THIS CASE IS THE 
TIMING. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ALL PARTIES TO TAKE THE 
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1 I POSITION ON IT. NUMBER ONE, I HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO GO 
2 I THROUGH THE MEMORANDUM AND RESEARCH THE ISSUES THAT THE 
3 j BANK HAS RAISED RELATIVE TO WHETHER CONTRIBUTION AND 
4
 j INDEMNITY GO TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN PURELY NEGLIGENCE, BUT 
5 I WILL SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT UNDER RULE 56(C), I MUST 
6 BE GIVEN AT LEAST 10 DAYS NOTICE BEFORE THE HEARING IS SET 
7 TO RESPOND TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHICH IS WHAT 
8 THE BANK HAS FILED, IS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
9 I HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN THAT, AND ON THAT GROUND 
10 ALONE, I THINK THE COURT SHOULD NOT REQUIRE ME TO EVEN 
11 RESPOND IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM TO IT, AND SHOULD THE 
12 BANK TAKE THE POSITION THAT THIS IS A MOTION TO DISMISS 
13 RATHER THAN A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RULE 2.7(B) OF 
14 THE RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS 
15 ALSO REQUIRE AT LEAST FIVE DAYS NOTICE PRIOR TO THE NOTICE 
16 OF HEARING WHICH I HAVE NOT HAD. 
17 NUMBER THREE, YOUR HONOR, THE STIPULATION AND 
*8 MOTION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL ENTERED INTO BY AND WITH THE 
19 BANK AND THE PLAINTIFFS CLEARLY STATES A BENEFIT, THAT THEY 
20 THROUGH ME, IN THEIR PARAGRAPH 3, THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
21 SHALL NOT AFFECT THE CROSS-CLAIMS OF FIRE INSURANCE 
22 EXCHANGE AGAINST THE BANK. THAT'S PRETTY CLEAR. THEY 
23 AGREED TO THAT, AND I WILL TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD, AND I 
24 WILL TAKE THEM AT THEIR WRITTEN WORD, AND WE WILL SUBMIT IT 
25
 ON THAT BASIS, YOUR HONOR, BUT I DO NOT WANT THE COURT TO 
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1 » CONSTRUE MY REMARKS TO BE ANYTHING OTHER THAN INFORMING THE 
2 j COURT OF WHAT MY POSITION IS RELATIVE TO RULE 56(C), 2.7(B) 
I 
3 J OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE. 
4 - IN ADDITION TO THAT, I HAVE BEEN GIVEN BY 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
PLAINTIFFS1 COUNSEL, AND SHOULD THE COURT CUT THE BANK LOOSE 
FOR SOME OTHER KNOWN REASON AND NOT REQUIRE THEM TO SIT IN 
THIS, THAT HE'S GOING TO MAKE A MOTION THAT I CANNOT EVEN 
BRING UP ANY FAULT ON THE PART OF THE BANK AT TRIAL, WHICH 
I FIND TO BE LUDICROUS AND UNBELIEVABLE, BUT NEVERTHELESS, 
THAT'S HIS INTENTION. 
THE COURT: WELL, OF COURSE, MR. ROYBAL, I WILL 
TAKE THESE ISSUES AS THEY COME. THE WAY WE ARE STRUCTURED 
AT THE MOMENT HERE, IT IS ACCURATE TO STATE THAT THE RULES 
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL TIME THAN WHAT HAS BEEN GIVEN AT THIS 
POINT FOR YOU TO PROPERLY RESPOND. 
DO YOU WISH TO RESPOND TO THAT ARGUMENT, MR. 
WIKSTROM? 
MR. WIKSTROM: YES, YOUR HONOR, JUST BRIEFLY. 
SINCE WE ARE ON THE MORNING OF TRIAL, THERE'S EFFECTIVELY 
NO WAY THAT I CAN GIVE MR. ROYBAL THE APPROPRIATE NOTICE. 
HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING, HE FILED THESE CLAIMS 
SOME TIME AGO, AND ONE WOULD EXPECT THAT COUNSEL WOULD KNOW 
WHAT THE LEGAL BASIS FOR HIS THEORY WAS. NEGLIGENCE IS, AS 
THE COURT KNOWS, WAS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THIS CASE AND HAS 
BEEN ONLY A SMALL PART OF THIS CASE FOR SOME TIME. 
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1 j MR. HUMPHERYS HAS MADE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT 
2 j HIS PRIMARY ISSUE WAS SURROUNDING INTENTIONAL TORT AND I 
3 BREACH OF CONTRACT, BUT AS LONG AS NEGLIGENCE WAS IN THERE, -
4 IT PRECLUDED US FROM BRINGING ANY SORT OF A MOTION FOR j 
5 SUMMARY JUDGMENT. j 
6 SO I WOULD THINK THAT EVEN THOUGH COUNSEL HAS | 
I 
7 BEEN SOMEWHAT HAMPERED BY NOT HAVING THIS UNTIL FRIDAY ! 
8 NIGHT, AND IT'S TUESDAY MORNING, THAT IF THERE WAS ANY LEGAL 
9 BASIS FOR HIM TO KEEP US IN UNDER HIS THEORIES THAT HE 
10 WOULD BE ABLE TO STAND UP AND ARTICULATE THIS TO THE COURT 
H vJUST BECAUSE WE CAN'T GET THE TIMING REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
12 I RULES, IT DOESN'T SEEM THAT WE OUGHT TO TAKE THE RISK OF 
13 I AFFECTING THE RECORD IN THIS CASE, NUMBER ONE, OR FORCING 
14 THE BANK TO SIT THROUGH AT MINIMUM THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE, 
15 WHICH PROBABLY MR, HUMPHREYS CASE WILL GO INTO NEXT WEEK 
16 SOMETIME, AT GREAT EXPENSE TO THE BANK, SIMPLY TO EXALT 
17 THE TIME REQUIREMENT OF THE RULES. 
18 I BELIEVE THE COURT HAS INHERENT AUTHORITY AS 
19 LONG AS THERE'S NO SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE SHOWN TO DEAL WITH 
20 THIS MATTER ON THAT BASIS- ONE OTHER THING I WOULD POINT 
21 OUT, YOUR HONOR, I AGREE WITH MR. ROYBAL, THE SETTLEMENT 
22 WITH THE BANK AND THE CROOKSTONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE CROSS-
23 CLAIM. IT'S ONLY THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES BY MR. HUMPHERYS 
24 THAT WE CONTEND AFFECTS THE CROSS-CLAIM. 
25 MR. ROYBAL: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD LIKE TO JUST 
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1
 SPEAK A WORD HERE. IN THE TIME I WAS INVOLVED IN THE CASE, 
2
 WHEN I FILED THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND UP THROUGH THE TIME 
J
 OF THE FILING OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, I HAVE NOT | 
! 
4
 | PLED ANY THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE. I HAVE PURPOSELY NOT PLED i 
i 
THIS TO AVOID THE CONTEXT OF COMPARATIVE FAULT AND COMPARA- | 
TIVE NEGLIGENCE. I PLED A CAUSE OF ACTION ENTITLED TORT 
OF INTENDED CONSEQUENCES, WHICH I INTERPRET IT TO BE AN 
INTENTIONAL TORT AND ONE THAT IS RATHER OBSCURE IN THE 
RESTATEMENT THAT EVEN THAT CAUSE OF ACTION I AM DROPPING 
AND LEAVING ONLY THE ISSUES OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, THE 
EXPRESS TERMS, BREACH OF THE IMPLIED TERMS OF GOOD FAITH, 
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, AND FINALLY THE INTENTIONAL TORT 
OF OUTRAGE. 
MR. ROYBAL: YOU FORGOT TO MENTION LIBEL AND 
TORTIOUS CONDUCT, COUNSEL, THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION. 
'6 i MR. HUMPHERYS: IN ANY E V E N T — 
17 j THE COURT: THE ESSENTIAL POINT BEING THAT THERE 
18
 j ARE CLAIMS OTHER THAN THOSE CATEGORIZED AS INTENTIONAL 
19
 I TORT OR BREACH OF CONTRACT? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: THAT IS CORRECT, AND FINALLY THOSE 
ARE THE ONLY CAUSES OF ACTION WE ARE PROCEEDING UNDER. 
THE COURT: MR. ROYBAL, YOU HAVE HAD THE MOTION 
AND MEMORANDUM, IN SPITE OF IT, SINCE FRIDAY LAST? 
MR. ROYBAL: 9 O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING. 
THE COURT: WHAT IS YOUR THEORY, IF ANY, AGAINST 
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1 THE BANK WITH REGARD TO THE INDEMNITY OR CONTRIBUTION? 
2 MR. ROYBAL: I REALLY HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO EXPLORE 
3 WHAT MY THEORIES WOULD BE, YOUR HONOR, EXCEPT THAT I WILL 
4
 REPRESENT TO THE COURT THAT I THINK THE COMMON LAW THEORY 
5 OF LIABILITY WOULD EXTEND IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. THAT'S 
6 J JUST MY INITIAL REACTION TO THE MEMORANDUM, HAVING PERSON-
7 | ALLY READ IT. 
8 ALSO, I BELIEVE THAT SHOULD THE CROSS-CLAIM BE 
9 DISMISSED, THAT I SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO FILE A THIRD-PARTY 
10 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BANK, SHOULD--AFTER I HAVE HAD AN 
11 OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW ALL OF MY OPPORTUNITIES FOR OPTIONS 
12 FOR VARIOUS CAUSES OF ACTION, THAT I MAY WANT TO BRING THE 
13 BANK IN TO INDEMNIFY FOR US THEIR ACTIONS AS AGAINST THE 
14 PLAINTIFF. THERE'S AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD IN THE 
15 MOTIONS STATED BY THE PLAINTIFFS THAT THEY KNOW THAT THE 
16 BANK HAD DONE A NUMBER OF THINGS TO THEM THAT THEY FELT 
17 CAUSED THEM HARM, WHETHER THEY COMPORT TO LEGAL THEORIES OF 
18 I THEIR COUNSEL, I DON'T KNOW, BUT I THINK THEIR TESTIMONY IS 
19 PRESENT HERE, THAT THEY WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE 
20 BANK, NUMBER ONE, WAS HANDLING THEIR ENTIRE AFFAIRS RELA-
21 TIVE TO THE CONSTRUCTION, FOR ONE THING, AND AS A RESULT, 
22 THERE IS A RELIANCE TO THEIR DETRIMENT, AND THERE'S JUST 
23 ONE OTHER ISSUE THAT POSSIBLY I CAN BRING UP WITH A LITTLE 
24 MORE THOROUGH ANALYSIS, AND THAT IS THE DISTRIBUTIONS BY THE 
25 BANK TO THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR, THE SUBCONTRACTORS, AND TO 
10 
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1 THE PLAINTIFFS THEMSELVES AND WHETHER OR NOT--
2 , THE COURT: WELL, YOUR CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE 
3
 ( BANK, ALLEGING CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION, HAS BEEN 
i 
4 j OF RECORD FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME; HAS IT NOT? 
5 j MR. ROYBAL: THAT IS CORRECT. 
6 j THE COURT: AND YOU AGREE, DO YOU NOT, WITH THE 
7 j PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS NO CLAIM AGAINST THE BANK OVER 
8 ON YOUR CROSS-CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR CONTRIBUTION INDEMNIFICA-
9 TION? DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT? 
10 MR. ROYBAL: I WOULD AGREE TO THAT. 
11 I THE COURT: IT APPEARS TO ME, COUNSEL, THAT WHILE 
12 I THE TIMING ISSUE IS ONE OF SOME IMPORTANCE, HOWEVER, OF 
13 ' COURSE, OUR LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE ALLOWS FOR THIS COURT 
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TO HEAR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LESS THAN THE 
TYPICAL 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE COURT HEARING, PRIOR TO THE 
16 ! TRIAL, DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, 
THE QUESTION OF COMPLIANCE, HOWEVER, WITH THE 
18 | RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(C) IS AT THIS STAGE AN IMPOSSI- I 
BILITY BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE THE JURY HERE THIS 
MORNING, AND THESE EVENTS, I TAKE IT, AROSE TO SOME EXTENT 
BY VIRTUE OF THE SETTLEMENT HAVING BEEN AFFECTED, AND IT 
l 
FURTHER APPEARS TO ME THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED IN THE j 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS . 
REALLY NOT ALL THAT COMPLEX. I AM JUST INQUIRING, SINCE YOU 
HAVE HAD, MR. ROYBAL, SOME DAYS TO REVIEW THIS MATTER, WHAT 
11 
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1 YOU ARE SAYING TO ME. AT LEAST, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT IF YOU 
2 i WERE PRESENTED THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A THIRD-PARTY COM-
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PLAINT OVER AGAINST THE BANK, YOU WOULD ASSERT NOTHING MORE 
4 j THAN THE CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION THEORIES THAT ARE 
! 
5 ALREADY EXISTENT IN YOUR CROSS-CLAIM? 
MR. ROYBAL: I'M NOT SAYING THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
I HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO EXPLORE ALL THEORIES, AND, IF I WOULD 
FILE A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, AT LEAST I WOULD BE GIVEN THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, AND I HAVEN'T EXPLORED ALL THOSE 
THEORIES, BUT I CAN RELATE TO THE COURT THAT THEY WOULD NOT 
BE STRICTLY CONTRIBUTION AND/OR INDEMNITY. 
THE COURT: YOU HAVE NOT HERETOFORE SOUGHT TO 
AMEND YOUR CROSS-CLAIM TO ADD ADDITIONAL THEORIES? 
MR. ROYBAL: THAT IS CORRECT, BUT I HAVE NEVER HAD 
ANY REASON TO UP TO THIS POINT. 
THE COURT: THINKING THAT THE CLAIM OF CONTRIBU-
TION AND/OR INDEMNIFICATION WAS SUFFICIENT IN YOUR JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE BANK? 
MR. ROYBAL: SAME AS THE BANK'S WAS AGAINST MINE. 
THEY HAVE EXACTLY THE SAME THEORIES AGAINST ME ON YOUR 
CROSS-CLAIMS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER IN THIS 
MATTER, GENTLEMEN, THAT YOU WISH TO ADD? 
MR. WIKSTROM: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR. 
12 
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1
 I THE COURT: I AM OF THE VIEW THAT IN LIGHT OF THE 
i 
2 j EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE NOW BEEN PROMPTED PRINCI-
PALLY BY A RESULT OF THE SETTLEMENT THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO • 
RESPOND, AS PROVIDED IN THE RULES, CAN BE AND SHOULD APPRO-
PRIATELY BE WAIVED IN LIGHT OF WHAT I DEEM TO BE NO SHOWING 
OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO-A PARTY, AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE NOTICE 
3 
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11 
REQUIREMENT IS WAIVED. IT'S MY JUDGMENT THAT BEING TUESDAY,! 
I 
I 
THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME ADEQUATE OR AT LEAST AVAILABLE TIME 
WITHIN WHICH MR, ROYBAL, THE MEMORANDUM, WHICH IS NOT 
LENGTHY IN THIS MATTER, COULD HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND AN 
ARGUMENT AT LEAST PRESENTED TO THIS COURT AS TO WHAT ADDI-
12 ! TIONAL THEORIES YOU THOUGHT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE OR WHAT 
13 I EVIDENCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO ALLOW YOU TO ASSERT A 
14 CROSS-CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY. 
15 THEREFORE, IT IS MY VIEW, COUNSEL, IN LIGHT OF 
16 | THE SETTLEMENT THAT'S BEEN EFFECTED AND THE ARGUMENTS THAT 
17 
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HAVE BEEN PRESENTED HERE, THAT THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, AND I THINK THAT, TOO, IN LIGHT OF WHAT 
APPEARS TO ME TO BE A VERY SLIM, IF ANY, LIKELIHOOD OF ANY 
BASIS FOR ASSERTING A CROSS-CLAIM OR INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST 
i 
THE BANK THAT SERVES TO MERELY UNDULY PROLONG THESE PRO- J 
I 
CEEDINGS AND THE ISSUES THAT THE JURY WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER,, 
IN ANY EVENT. SO THE BANK'S MOTION IS GRANTED. | 
MR. WIKSTROM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MAY I 1 
ORALLY MOVE, AT THIS TIME, TO DISMISS THE BANK'S CROSS- i 
13 
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 CLAIM AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY AND PROVIDE AN ORDER TO 
I 
2 j THE COURT TO THAT EFFECT? 
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THE COURT: I PRESUME THERE'S NO RESISTANCE TO 
THAT REQUEST? 
MR. ROYBAL: NO. WE WOULD ALSO MOVE FOR A CON-
TINUANCE, YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME, IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE 
THEORIES OF A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BANK. 
THE COURT: FIRST OF ALL, YOUR MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
THE CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE CARRIER, MR. WIKSTROM, IS 
GRANTED. SECONDLY, FOR THE RECORD, I WILL EXECUTE NOW YOUR 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE 
SETTLEMENT HAVING BEEN RAISED WITH THE BANK AND THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
DO YOU RECALL THE APPROXIMATE DATE, MR. ROYBAL, 
THAT YOU FILED YOUR CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE BANK? YOUR 
AMENDED ANSWER TO THE PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
WAS FILED BACK IN JULY OF 1986. 
MR. ROYBAL: THERE WAS A CROSS-CLAIM FILED IN 
DECEMBER OF f86, YOUR HONOR, DECEMBER 3RD. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: I THINK, YOUR HONOR, THERE WAS 
ANOTHER CROSS-CLAIM FILED BEFORE THAT. THERE WAS A—I fM 
NOT POSITIVE, FRANK. 
MR. ROYBAL: THAT IS CORRECT. THERE WAS--I NIT I ALLY) 
THERE WAS, WHEN THE INITIAL PLEADINGS BEGAN. 
THE COURT: WHEN WAS THE INITIAL CROSS-CLAIM 
14 
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1 , FILED, AS BEST YOU CAN REMEMBER, MR. ROYBAL? 
2
 ( MR. ROYBAL: I'M SURE IT WAS FILED WHEN WE FILED ! 
; I 
3 | OUR ANSWER TO THE INITIAL COMPLAINT. J 
4 | THE COURT: WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN? I 
5 MR. ROYBAL: WAY BACK IN 1983. 
6 j THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, AND SINCE THAT TIME, YOU 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
HAVE MADE NO REQUEST TO THIS COURT TO AMEND TO ASSERT 
ADDITIONAL OR OTHER THEORIES THAN THE CONTRIBUTION AND 
INDEMNIFICATION? 
MR. ROYBAL: NO. THE RECORD IS CLEAR ON THAT. 
THE COURT: YOUR REQUEST, NOW, IS TO CONTINUE, 
FOR PURPOSES OF — 
MR. ROYBAL: TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF FILING 
A THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT IN AS SHORT A TIME AS POSSIBLE. 
THE COURT: I THINK, COUNSEL — DO YOU WISH TO 
RESPOND TO THAT, MR. HUMPHERYS? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: YES, YOUR HONOR. THE ONLY THING 
THAT, IN MY KNOWLEDGE, HAS BEEN RAISED AS IT RELATES TO A 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT IS TO HAVE, UNDER THE NEW STATUTE, 
THE ISSUE OF PROPORTIONATE FAULT LITIGATED IN THE SAME 
ACTION. I'M UNAWARE OF ANY OTHER THEORY WHICH HAS BEEN 
ADVANCED OR SUGGESTED BY DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL. 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF FILING THAT THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT, FIRST OF ALL, YOUR HONOR, THE NEW STATUTE, I 
THINK, CLEARLY DOES NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATON. SECOND 
15 
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1 , OF ALL, EVEN IF IT DID, CERTAINLY THAT WAS WITHIN THE REALMS' 
2 AND CONTEMPLATION OF THE CROSS-CLAIM AND WAS THE VERY INTENT 
3 t AND PURPOSE OF THE CROSS-CLAIM, WAS TO HAVE PROPORTIONATE j 
* ! FAULT LITIGATED. 
5 YOUR HONOR, IF THE COURT HAS DETERMINED THAT THERE 
6 IS SOME RESPONSIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE BANK TO THE 
7 INSURANCE COMPANY BY WAY OF A CROSS-CLAIM, THERE WOULD BE 
8 A DEEP PREJUDICE, SIGNIFICANT PREJUDICE AFTER FIVE YEARS 
9 FROM THE DATE OF THE WRONGFUL ACTION NOW TO CONTINUE THE 
10 TRIAL FURTHER FOR PURPOSES OF ALLOWING THEM TO BRING A 
11 THIRD-PARTY ACTION, WHICH THEY HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO CON-
12 SIDER AND REVIEW OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. 
13 FINALLY, YOUR HONOR, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THERE 
14 IS GROUNDS FOR SOME THEORY OF WHICH I DO NOT KNOW, OR ELSE 
15 I WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED INTO THIS AGREEMENT ANTICIPATING 
16 THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN, IF THERE WAS SOME GROUNDS WHICH THE 
17 INSURANCE COMPANY CAN ASSERT AGAINST THE BANK FOR SOME TYPE 
18 OF A CLAIM, AND IT HAS TO BE SOME THEORY OF CONTRIBUTION, 
19 OF SOME SORT, UNDER THE THEORY, THEN, YOUR HONOR, IT APPEARS 
20 THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY ALLOWING THEM TO 
21 PROCEED AT SUCH TIME AS THEY CAN PROVIDE A CLAIM. 
22 THE STATUTE IS CLEAR THAT IF THERE IS SUCH A 
23 CLAIM, THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED OR TIME-BARRED UNTIL THEY 
24 HAVE PAID EITHER MORE THAN THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE OR PAID 
25 SOME AMOUNT FOR WHICH THEY CAN SEEK INDEMNIFICATION, AND 
16 
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1 , FOR THAT REASON, THEY SUFFER NO DAMAGES UNTIL THEY ARE 
2 ' REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THE PLAINTIFFS, IN WHICH CASE THEY 
3 I CAN BRING THEIR CLAIM THEREAFTER, AND IF THEY CAN FIND SUCH 
! 
4 A CLAIM, THEY CAN BRING IT AND ASSERT IT IN WHATEVER FASHION 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THEY WILL, BUT THEREfS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROCEEDINGS 
HERE TO BE DEFERRED ANY LONGER. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, MR. HUMPHERYS. MR. ROYBAL, 
DO YOU WISH TO SAY ANYTHING? 
MR. ROYBAL: WELL, YOUR HONOR, IF THE STATUTES 
THAT ARE IN EFFECT TODAY WERE IN EFFECT WHEN THIS CASE WAS 
ORIGINALLY FILED, I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN OTHER 
DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION THAT I THINK ARE ABSOLUTELY 
j CULPABLE RELATIVE TO THE DAMAGE 
1 THAT BEING THE THREE INDIVIDUALS 
PARTY COMPLAINT TO BEGIN WITH. 
j OF THE BANTERING BACK AND FORTH 
THE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED, 
WHO I SUED UNDER A THIRD-
THE COURT IS AWARE OF ALL 
THAT'S GONE ON, BUT I 
1 BELIEVE THE COURT, AS WELL AS OTHER COURTS IN THE THIRD 
1 DISTRICT, ARETAKINGTHE POSITION THAT THE TORT REFORM ACT 
IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A RETROACTIVE MANNER. 
THEREFORE, WE ARE STILL FUNCTIONING UNDER THE 
OLD RULE WHICH ALLOWS FOR THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS AND IF 
ANY THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT ALLEGES AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE, 
THAT'S MY RIGHT, UNDER THE RULES 
IF I'M NOT GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY 
AFTER TODAY'S RULING, I CONSIDER 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND 
TO DO THAT, I--ESPECIALLY 
MYSELF EXTREMELY VULNERABLE 
17 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
l 
1 | AND PREJUDICED BY ALL THAT'S OCCURRED UP TO THIS POINT TO 
I 
2 ; DENY ME THE RIGHT TO ASSERT AN ACTION AGAINST THE BANK. 
I 
3 J I THINK IT IS SEVERELY PREJUDICING MY CLIENT. 
THE COURT: I MIGHT STATE, WHILE WE'RE ON THE 
RECORD HERE, GENTLEMEN, THAT THE DECISION THAT I MADE WITH 
REGARD TO THE REQUEST FOR A DE FACTO SEVERENCE WAS BASED ON 
THE FACT THAT IT WOULD TEND TO CONFUSE THE JURY WITH REGARD 
TO THE ISSUES IN THE PRESENT CASE, THAT SPECIFICALLY BEING 
AN INTENTIONAL TORT, WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO SETTLE AND BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CLAIM. 
IT SEEMS TO ME TO SERVE NO VALID PURPOSE TO TRY j 
THE ENTIRE CASE AT THIS TIME. BY THE ENTIRE CASE, I MEAN I 
IN ADDITION TO THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS OFFERED FOR NEGLIGENCE.! 
MR. ROYBAL, THERE HAVE BEEN ASSERTED, ACCORDINGLY, 
THAT WAS THE RATIONALE FOR MY RULING ON THAT SPECIFIC ISSUE. 
HOWEVER, OF COURSE, YOUR CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENCE AGAINST 
VARIOUS SUBS, CONTRACTORS, ETC., ARE VIABLE, AND THEY WILL 
BE TRIED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS INITIAL PHASE OF THE 
TRIAL. 
SO YOUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO CLAIMS FOR 
NEGLIGENCE IN THE CREATION OF THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, REALLY, 
WILL BE RESERVED. 
MR. ROYBAL: AGAINST THOSE DEFENDANTS, BUT NOT 
AGAINST THE BANK, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT ASPECT OF THE CLAIM IS 
18 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE SUITE " U 
SALT LAKE C\T\ LTAH s-41 I I 
(8UII l i l - i O o 
- A 5 7 -
1 I PENDING INSOFAR AS THE NEGLIGENT TORT-FEASORS YOU ARE 
f 
2 i ALLEGING CAUSED THE CAVE-IN. 
3 I SO THE BANK'S MOTION BEFORE ME THIS MORNING IS 
4 J BASED STRICTLY UPON THE AFFIDAVIT THAT THERE IS NO CONTRIBU-
i 
5 | TION ON THE INDEMNIFICATION ON ANY THEORY, SO THE MOTION, 
I 
6 j THEREFORE, TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL IS DENIED. 
7 I NOW, BEFORE WE BRING THE JURY IN, COUNSEL--
8 MR. ROYBAL: I WOULD LIKETOMOVE, YOUR HONOR, AT 
9 THIS TIME, ALSO, TOO, IN ADDITION TO DISMISSING THE SEVENTH 
10 CAUSE OF ACTION, WHICH I TAKE IT MR. HUMPHERYS HAS 
11 ACQUIESCED TO, ACTING IN CONCERT, WHICH IT NO LONGER HAS 
12 I ANY RELEVANCE TO THIS CASE, AND ALSO THE TENTH CAUSE OF 
13 ACTION, WHICH HE INDICATED HE WAS WILLING TO DROP, WILL BE 
14 NO INTENDED CONSEQUENCES, AND THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION, 
15 LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT. I WOULD LIKE THOSE NOTED, 
16 WHAT THOSE ARE, IF THEY HAVE ANY RELEVANCE TO THE COURT'S 
17 RULING. 
18 MR. WIKSTROM: YOUR HONOR, WE ARE DISMISSING THOSE 
19 CAUSES OF ACTION. SO I'M NOT EXACTLY SURE WE ARE PROCEEDING 
20 ON FOUR THEORIES. 
21 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, THAT SETTLES THAT. 
22 MR. WIKSTROM: MAY WE BE EXCUSED, YOUR HONOR? 
23 THE COURT: MR. WIKSTROM, YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. 
24 NOW, YOU FILED A MOTION IN LIMINE, MR. ROYBAL. 
25 I LET'S DEAL WITH THAT. I HAVE REVIEWED THE MOTION. 
19 
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FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462) 
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON and RANDI 
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals, 
and ANNA W. DRAKE, as Trustee 
of the Estate of S. Larry 
Crookston and Randi L. 
Crookston, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, Cross-
complainants and 
Cross-defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
Cross-defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, having come before the Court on Tuesday, 
May 26, 1987, Francis M. Wikstrom and Daniel W. Hindert appearing 
on behalf of Rocky Mountain State Bank, Frank A. Roybal appearing 
on behalf of cross-complainant Fire Insurance Exchange (the 
o Mi 
o~ .,:•-* 
ORDER 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
"Insurance Co."), and L. Rich Humpherys appearing on behalf of 
plaintiffs; the Court having reviewed the Motion and Supporting 
Memorandum, having confirmed that said pleadings were served upon 
attorneys for plaintiffs and the Insurance Co. on Friday evening, 
May 22, 1987, having heard an objection by counsel for Insurance 
Co. as to the timeliness of this Motion and hearing on same, 
having waived the timing requirement on grounds that the basis 
for said Motion did not arise until a settlement had been reached 
between plaintiffs and the Bank on May 21 or 22, 1987, and having 
found that no unfair prejudice would result from waiver of the 
timing requirement for hearing and ruling on said Motion; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
cross-defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted and, further, that the crossclaim of the 
Insurance Co. against Rocky Mountain State Bank in the captioned 
action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 54B 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court finds that there 
is no just cause for delay and hereby certifies the Order as 
final. 
DATED thi lis ji^day of JftM , 1987 
BY THE tfOURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this 3-1T 
day of May, 1987, to: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Frank A. Roybal 
442 No. Main St. 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 E. 400 SO., #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin Larew, Jr. 
1200 Beneficial Life Towers 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 E. 300 So., 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John M. Chipman 
Lewis B. Quigley 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON S. CHIPMAN 
1300 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
322:052787A 
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
P.C. 
J * . .1. vJ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the Estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRE 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
-Trial on the above matter came on regularly before the 
court on the 26th day of May, 1987. Each of the plaintiffs 
appeared personally and were represented by their attorney, L. 
Rich Humpherys; defendant Fire Insurance Exchange appeared and 
was represented by its attorney Frank Roybal. A jury of eight 
people and one alternate person was regularly impaneled and sworn 
to try said action. Witnesses on the part of plaintiffs and 
defendant were sworn and examined, and all evidence was submitted 
by the parties. After six days of trial and having considered 
the evidence, arguments of counsel and instructions of the court, 
the jury retired to consider the verdict, and after deliberating 
for approximately four and one-half hours, returned its special 
verdict and answered the interrogatories as follows: 
<'\1.V -
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1. Did the defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange breach the contract of 
insurance with plaintiffs? Answer: Yes 
2. If you answered question no. 1 
"yes," was such breach a proximate 
cause of the damages alleged by 
plaintiffs? Answer; Yes 
Did the plaintiffs breach the 
contract of insurance with the 
defendant Fire Insurance Exchange? Answer: No 
If you answered question no. 3 
"yes," was such breach a proximate 
cause of the damages alleged by 
plaintiffs? Answer: N/A 
Did the defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange violate its duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its 
treatment of plaintiffs1 claims? Answer: Yes 
If you answered question no. 5 
"yes," was such violation a 
proximate cause of the damages 
alleged by plaintiffs? Answer: Yes 
7. Did the defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange intentionally inflict 
emotional distress on plaintiffs? 
8. If you answered question no. 7 
"yes," was such conduct a 
proximate cause of the damages 
alleged by plaintiffs? 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Did defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange commit fraud and 
misrepresentation in its treatment 
of plaintiffs' claims by clear and 
convincing evidence? 
Answer: Yes 
Answer: Yes 
Answer: Yes 
If you answered question no. 9 
"yes," was such conduct a proximate 
cause of the damages alleged by 
plaintiffs? Answer: 
In light of the foregoing answers, 
what if any total damages do you 
award the plaintiffs 
Yes 
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Compensatory damages $ 815,826 
Punitive damages 4,000,000 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs S. 
Larry Crookston, Randi L. Crookston and Anna W. Drake, Trustee, 
shall have judgment against Fire Insurance Exchange for the 
amount of $815,826 compensatory damages and $4,000,000 punitive 
damages. In addition, plaintiffs shall be awarded attorney's 
fees and court costs to be determined at a later date. 
This judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 12% 
per annum from the date hereof. 
DATED t h i s llthZay of June, , 1987. 
BY THE//COURT: 
AT TSST 
Ctacf 
OPOH^' r ' « " 
- A 6 4 -
- 3 -
t / / / ^ -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE was hand 
delivered this /th day of June, 1987, to: 
Frank Roybal 
Attorney at Law 
442 North Main St. 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
-4-
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H. RALPH KLEMM 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
500 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 328-2206 
H.DIX0H His.. 
istf/ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON & RANDI L. ; 
CROOKSTON, his wife, i 
Plaintiffs, t, 
-vs- i 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a \ 
California corporation, and ( 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, < 
a Utah corporation, < 
Defendants. ( 
| O R D E R 
Civil No. C83-1030 
The Motion for Necessary and Permissive Joinder of Parties 
Defendant of defendant Fire Insurance Exchange came before the court 
for hearing on April 12, 1983. Plaintiffs and defendants were repre-
sented by their respective attorneys of record. The court having 
heard arguments of counsel relative to the issues raised by the Motion, 
and the court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
-A66-
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion For Necessary and 
Permissive Joinder of Parties Defendant is denied. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON BJMDLEY 
^P^JlUA, (jfyfa^lSTpXtt JVVGE ' * 
*rV^L 
Deputy C'*fk 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
On the/-^—xiay of April, 1983, I served the foregoing Order 
on the defenda^ts by having true copies thereof delivered to their 
respective cou^se^ as follows: 
Frank A. Royba^ 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah- 84010 
Kathleen M. Nelson 
505 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
; * > • / 
/ , Attorney for/Plaintiffs 
-^< 
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County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
c^v UUXM OrtzLih^ 
A 
Plaintiff 
inS 1Kb A KOANCX-
Cfefendant ' 
Sk.d CASE NO: Cg3- [C30 
\ \ A 
"V 7~ 
Type of hearing: Div Annul. 
Present^ Pltf. Deft. 
Supp. Order. O S C Other. 
Summons 
Waiver 
lined: *3^** ^nxv^ft i rv\*s» fWv\dX% -^
-w waiver PUD 
<5JU CtujyfT-Defanit oLPItf/Deft Entered 
VA^. Date: i^-* lo- 5t> 
Stipulation. 
Publication. 
P&Qa*^ 
Others: 
ate 
Judge: 
Clerk: J^ft^t lLC/* . 
Reporter: 
Bailiff: _ fVu>K,.SvvHv^ 
ORDERS: 
• Custody Evaluation Ordered 
Visitation Rights D 
D Custody Awarded To 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
• Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:. 
« Per Month 
Per Month/Year D Alimony Waived 
• 
D 
Atty. fees to the. 
Home To: 
in the amount of • Deferred 
D 
• 
• 
D 
• 
• 
n 
a 
a 
-Enrn ich ings T O ! . Automobile To: 
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
Restraining Order Entered Against. 
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $. 
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
Divorce Granted To 
Decree To Become Final: 
Former Name of 
As. 
• Upon Entry • 3-Month Interlocutory 
. Is Restored 
• Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft. 
Returnable .Bail. 
D Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
Kfl Based on imillui jtipulition of respective Ii'inulimywf riiiiiiliff't mi il court orders 
V-s m^ftrvvi, Jrrv _Ae^^ tL4 r i a£v to* £t£vug.cl-
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L. Rich Humpherys, A1582 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Crookston 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
reciprocal or interinsurance 
exchange, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H. 
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
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BERT BERRETT, and KYLE H. ) 
BREWSTER, ) 
Fourth-Party ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. ) 
SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Fourth-Party ) 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on regularly before the court on the 4th day of 
May, 1987 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. Plaintiffs were represented 
by their attorney L. Rich Humpherys; defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange was represented by its attorney Frank A. Roybal; 
defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank was represented by its 
attorney Daniel W. Hindert; second party plaintiffs were 
represented by Andrea Alcabes; second party defendant Jimmie L. 
Jones, Jr. was represented by Karen J. McClurg; Bert Berrett was 
represented by John E. Hansen; and third-party defendant Syro 
Steel was represented by Dennis C. Ferguson. 
The Court, having considered argument of counsel, 
memoranda and all other information contained in the file, denied 
the motion for summary judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for Summary Judgment 
is denied. 
2 
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DATED t h i s J J ^ d a y of 
# , 1987. 
A T T E S T 
H CVXOHINOLEY 
CK»ff 
DeooTy Clem 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this O ^ day of 
1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT FIRE EXCHANGE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Carman E. Kipp 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Jimmie L. Jones 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John M. Chipman 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 285 
1095 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Stephen G. Morgan 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Bert Berrett 
Second Floor 
261 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Frank A. Roybal 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Fire Insurance Exchange 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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Francis W. Wikstrom 
Daniel W. Hindert 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Rocky Mountain 
State Bank 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. BOX 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 6 MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Syro Steel Company 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Anna W. Drake 
NIELSON & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^.v^gO 
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582 
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. ] 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, ] 
Trustee of the Estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. ; 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING REASONABLE 
t ATTORNEY'S FEES 
i Civil No. C83-1030 
i Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Award of Attorneys' Fees came 
on regularly before the court on the 14th day of December, 1987 
at the time of 1:30 p.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their 
attorney, L. Rich Humpherys, and defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange was represented by its attorneys, Philip R. Fishier, 
Stephen J, Trayner, and Frank A. Roybal, The court, having 
considered the plaintiff's motion, Affidavit of L. Rich 
Humpherys, Deposition of L. Rich Humpherys, memoranda filed by 
the parties, together with all other information contained in the 
court's file, and having further been present during the trial of 
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the above matter, roiled in plaintiff's favor by a Minute Entry 
Ruling dated December 22, 1987. The court now enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. H. Ralph Klemm, a licensed attorney, represented the 
plaintiffs as it relates to the present action from September, 
1982, until approximately June, 1984. 
2. Because of a conflict of interest, it was necessary 
that Mr. Klemm withdraw as counsel for the plaintiffs and L. Rich 
Humpherys was retained to represent the plaintiffs from June, 
1984 to the present. 
3. Both attorney Klemm and Humpherys are experienced 
litigation attorneys. Mr. Humpherys and his law firm have 
special expertise, experience and knowledge relating to the 
procedures and practices of insurance companies and the area of 
bad faith insurance law. 
4. Because of the numerous witnesses, exhibits, number of 
parties in the third party action, the factual and legal 
complexities of the case, and the lack of significant legal 
precedent, the litigation was difficult and novel, and the time 
and expenses incurred by plaintiffs' attorneys were not excessive 
and were reasonably incurred. 
5. At trial, plaintiffs attorneys were well prepared and 
presented plaintiffs' case effectively and efficiently, using 
among other things, visual aids, transparencies of exhibits on an 
overhead projector, and photographs. 
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6. The plaintiffs in this case were financially bankrupt 
and unable to finance the litigation and pay the attorneys' fees 
without recovery. These kinds of cases are customarily handled 
on a contingency fee basis of at least one-third of any recovery. 
The amount of $175,000 represents less than 4% of the total 
judgment against the defendant Fire Insurance Exchange. 
7. The amount of plaintiffs' damages claimed in this case 
were substantial and the judgment obtained is one of the largest 
verdicts in Utah history. 
8. In order to pursue litigation of this kind, there are 
substantial expenses and costs (in addition to the court costs 
customarily allowed under Rule 54(d) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) that are necessarily incurred and charged to the 
clients as part of the attorneys1 bill, such as expert witness 
fees, depositions, photocopies, photographs, trial aids, and 
other miscellaneous expenses. In addition to the court costs in 
the amount of $2,870.32 as described in plaintiffs Memorandum of 
Costs and Disbursements and in the amount of $1,320 as described 
in plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements, plaintiffs have necessarily and reasonably 
incurred an additional $11,126 in costs and litigation expenses. 
This amount reflects a set off for the court costs otherwise 
awarded pursuant to Rule 54(d). 
9. The amount of $175,000 for attorneys' fees and $11,126 
in necessary litigation expenses are reasonable under the 
circumstances of this case. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The amount of $175,000 constitutes reasonable and 
necessary attorneys1 fees and the amount of $11,126 constitutes 
reasonable and necessary litigation expenses incurred by the 
plaintiffs in prosecuting their action herein. 
2. Defendant is liable to plaintiffs for said attorneys1 
fees and litigation expenses. 
DATED this day of December, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. Dennis Frederick 
Third District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Philip R. Fishier 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES was hand delivered to Philip R. 
Fishier, Strong & Hanni, 6th Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah and a copy mailed to Frank Roybal, 442 North Main 
Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 this dav of December, 1987. 
i 
-All-
L. Rich Humpherys, #1582 
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. ) 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the Estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a ] 
California corporation, 
Defendant. 
ADDITIONAL JUDGMENT 
i AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE 
i EXCHANGE 
l Civil No. C83-1030 
i Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Based upon the court1s Minute Entry Ruling, it Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated this same day, the court awards 
as additional judgment against defendant Fire Insurance Exchange 
as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The courts previous order dated June 11, 1987, awarding 
attorneys' fees to plaintiffs is affirmed. 
2. Plaintiffs shall have an additional judgment against 
defendant Fire Insurance Exchange of $175,000 for attorneys1 
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fees, $4,190,32 for court costs and $11,126.00 in litigation 
expenses for a total additional judgment of $190,316,32. 
3. This additional judgment shall bear interest at the 
legal rate of 12% per annum from the date hereof until paid. 
DATED this /rdav of W ^ S ^ e ^ " l 9 8 ^ 
* BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Philip R. Fishier 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ADDITIONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE was 
hand delivered to Philip R. Fishier, Strong & Hanni, 6th Floor 
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah and a copy mailed to Frank 
Roybal, 442 North Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84040 this-^7 day 
of December, 1987. 
\&&ry^ y^ f£7^^^ 
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